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This thesis examines the concept of the nation found in British 
conservative thought (the "conservative nation"), and its relevance to the 
policies and doctrine of the Conservative Party, especially in the Thatcher 
years. I argue that as a political doctrine, nationalism is essentially 
nebulous, gaining distinctive character from the discourse with which it is 
joint ly-art icu lated and from its environment. Thus the British conservative 
nation is a distinct form of nationalist doctrine, built on core conservative 
values and on specific socio-historical factors. Its key themes are: (D 
tradition; (ii) organicism; (iii) community; Qv) hierarchy; (v) anti- 
rationalism. The conservative nation has also been bolstered by the use of 
historical myths and symbols eg imperialism, Unionism and the monarchy. 
The ideal-type conservative nation fuses ethnic (cultural) and civic 
(political) accounts of the nation, but contains significant sub-categories 
based on a separation of the political and cultural models. Chapter Two 
traces key moments in the development of the conservative nation, notably 
Burke's conservative state patriotism and the late 19th century emergence 
of the Conservative Party's "national strategy", based on a coherent idea of 
the nation and populist nationalism. Chapter Three looks at the breakdown of 
the concept into its political and cultural components by New Right 
theorists. It focuses on Hayek and Oakeshott as proponents of the political 
account, plus 
, 
Scruton and Casey as adherents to a cultural account. Chapter 
Four examines Powell's redefinition of the nation and the ultimate failure 
of his attempt to construct a nationalist strategy to cover policy on 
immigration, the European Community and the Union. 
The second half of the thesis looks at Thatcherism's revival of the 
language of nationhood, but argues that doctrinal tensions and the need for 
pragmatic issue management worked against the development of a coherent 
concept of the nation or a consistent national strategy. Chapter Five 
examines Thatcherism. as (a) Mrs Thatcher's personal values; (b) a political 
doctrine, noting the tensions between its - free market and strong state 
branches; and (c) as statecraft or issue management. The Falklands Var and 
policies on the territorial Union provide examples of the relative successes 
and failures in Thatcherism's "politics 'of nationhood'I. Subsequent chapters 
use detailed case studies on the European Community and the politics of 
race to illustrate Thatcherism's use of nationalist rhetoric, and its failure 
to construct a coherent national strategy across these policy areas-Chapter 
Six assesses British policy on the EC, the integration process and ideas of 
sovereignty. Chapter Seven outlines the main themes of the debate between 
Euro-scpetics and Euro- enthusiasts in the Conservative Party. In Chapter 
Eight I examine the problems which the management of an ethnically plural 
society has posed for Thatcherism and the conservative nation in general, 
assessing policies an immigration and integration. 
The thesis concludes by contrasting the shortcomings of the Thatcherite 
account of the nation with the positive themes of identity and community 
inherent in the conservative nation. 
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In this thesis I present an analysis of the concept of the nation found 
in British conservative thought and in the policies and rhetoric of the 
Conservative Party. The study draws upon the literature and methodology used 
in studies of nationalism, conservative thought and Thatcherism. It is my 
contention that the conservative concept of the nation (referred to 
henceforth as the "conservative nation") is a distinctive brand of 
nationalist doctrine, built on core conservative values and on specific 
socio-historical factors. The first half of the ý thesis examines the 
development of the conservative nation, noting its central themes, the work of 
conservative theorists from Burke to Scruton and the importance of the 
Conservative Party in creating a populist conservative nationalism. The 
second half looks at the conservative nation in the Thatcher era, with 
specific reference to Thatcherite discourse and policies on the Union, the 
European Community -(EC) and race relations. I argue that after the failures 
of both "one nation" and Powellite national strategies, Thatcherism did not 
bring a coherent approach to the "politics of nationhood"At lacked a clear 
concept of the nation and a national strategy in which an idea of the 
nation could be applied to the key policy fields found in the "politics of 
nationhood". I 
"Hationalismu can refer to a number of things: a sense of communal 
identity, a social movement or a political doctrine. The character of 
nationalist politics is influenced by both doctrinal and environmental 
factors. Therefore, although the primary focus of this study is on nationalism 
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as a political doctrine, and an the conservative nation as a variant of this, 
I also look at historical and sociological explanations for the initial 
success and recent decline of conservative nationalism in Britain. As a 
political doctrine, nationalism is notably malleable and flexible; it has no 
single necessary ideological expression but instead can co-exist with a 
wide variety of political doctrines and appear in a number of guises. On the 
Right, integral nationalism is found in fascist ideology while moderate 
conservatism offers a relatively depoliticized style of nationalist thought. 
Nationalist politics have also been coupled with both liberal and socialist 
doctrine, and with imperialist and anti-colonial movements. In each of these 
cases the basic nationalist belief in the importance -of the national group 
is given a distinctive character by the doctrine and environmental 
circumstances with which it is associated. Nat ional ism is chameleon- like, its 
political colouring depending on the values with which it is jointly 
articulated. 
"It is capable of being inflected to very different political positionst 
at different historical noments, and its character depends very much on 
the traditions, discourses and forces with which it is articulatedu 
(Hall, 1992, p. 6). 
The nebulous nature of nationalism has -meant that scholars have been 
unable to agree on a universal definition of the nation producing subjective 
and object ive, ethn ic and civic accounts of the nation as a social unit-The 
optimum definition of the nation should take account of these different 
elements, recognizing the importance of both objective factors (eg language 
and territory) and subjective factors (eg a sense of national identity and 
shared history). Its should also note the dual ethnic and civic components 
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of the nation, namely its roots in a distinctive ethnic community with its 
own culture, plus shared citizenship and civic culture. Thus, 
"A modern nation may be def ined as a territorial ly-based community of 
human beings sharing a distinct variant of modern culture, bound 
together by a strong sentiment of unity and solidarity, marked by a 
clear historically-rooted consciousness of national identity and 
possessing, or striving to possess, a genuine political self-government. " 
(Synmons-Symonolewicz, 1985, p. 221). 
The concept of - the nation espoused by the political discourse with 
which nationalism is coupled provides the key to understanding nationalist 
doctrines. The large number of nationalist doctrines and movements found in 
the modern world illustrates the flexibility of nationalism as a political 
phenomenon. Aside from minimal common threads regarding the significance 
of the nation as a social unit and the desirability of strengthening and 
protecting it through self-determination within a state structure, 
nationalism is ideologically nebulous. lationalist doctrines get their 
particular shape and characteristics from the political values with which 
they are associated and f rom their environment. A common typology of 
nationalist doctrine notes two main definitions of the nation, the ethnic and 
the civic (Smith, 199 1; Schwarzmantel, 199 I; Alter, 1989). The ethnic or cultural 
account def ines the nation in terms of common descent from a distinct 
ethnic group. Alter notes that: 
"The spirit of community that obtains in a cultural nation is f ounded 
upon seemingly objective criteria such as common heritage and language, 
a distinct area of settlement, religion, culture and history, and does not 
need to be mediated by a national state or other political form. 
Consciousness of unity, the sense of belonging together, develops 
independent of the state. " (Alter, 1989, p. 15). 
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Plamenatz and Kohl contend that the ethnic definition of the nation has 
been predominant in Central and Eastern Europe where it has given rise to 
exclusivist nationalisms (Plamenatz, 1972; Kohl, 1967). Fichte was one of the 
first writers to offer a coherent ethnic account of the nation, arguing that 
individuals owe their identity to the nation and culture into which they 
are born (Reiss, 1 955). His was an organic and deterministic nationalism 
defining the nation as an ethnically and culturally homogenous groupt 
superior to the state and the individual. The nation is a natural social 
unit, linking man with his forefathers and has language as its key external 
feature. The maintenance of ethnic unity and the cultural superiority of the 
German Volk was Fichte's paramount objective. To achieve this he advocated 
national self-sufficiency and a closed nation-state. The ethnic definition of 
the nation is not though confined to Central Europe: one of its major 
expressions was the integral nationalism of Barres and Xaurras in late 
nineteenth century France (Sutton, 19 82; Soucy, 1 972). Again the nation is a 
pre-political community, defined in ethnic and cultural terms. The individual 
owes his identity to the nation, and the nation is to be purged of alien 
elements. The ethnic nation then tends to produce exclus ivist, anti- pluralist 
and anti-democratic nationalisms which propogate myths of dead heroes and 
a golden age of authoritarian rule. Its politics are aggressive and often 
racialist. 
The alternative civic or political model of the nation is frequently 
cited as the predominant one in Vestern Europe, stressing equal citizenship 
in a legal-political community (Smith, 199 D. The emphasis here , is on 
individual and national self-determination. The civic model is a state-based 
account in which membership of the nation depends on citizenship rather 
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than ethnic origins: citizenship and nationality are caterminous. Patriatism 
or allegiance to the nation-state is a by-product of political citizenship 
and active participation in a shared civic culture. Whereas the ethnic model 
produces exclusivist nationalisms, the civic model advocates a pluralist 
nationalism in which ethnic diversity is welcomed and democratic 
government is the norm. This style of "citizenship nationalism" was- evident 
in the French Revolution when Abbe Sieyes ýdefined -the nation as an 
association of free and- equal citizens exercising popular sovereignty 
(Schwarzmantel, 1991). The liberal nationalisms of Kill and Mazzini linked 
individual autonomy with national determinatiou, while Renan provided the 
classic account of the political nation as based on a shared (democratic) 
history and on active consent of the people. For Renan, the nation is a "daily 
plebiscite" resting on democratic values and active participation (Renan, 
1990, P. 19). 
There is a tendency though to -portray the differences between ethnic 
and civic accounts of the nation as an inevitable dichotomy or unbridgeable 
divide. The re-emergence of ethnically exclusivist nationalisms in Eastern 
Europe and the evils of fascistic expressions of the cultural nation have 
led some modern socialists to seek a political model of the nation free 
from ethnic undertones (Samuel, 1989). 2 It is my contention that the division 
between the ethnic and civic accounts of the nation is not clear-cut or 
inevitable. To some extent the civic-ethnic divide is an artificial one. Renan 
recognized the importance of shared historical experiences and feelings of 
communal belonging and identity, but these tend to be at their strongest in 
nations based on a dominant ethnic group. As Renan argued, the nation has 
both "soul and body": it is a 'spiritual principle" baseý on communal 
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(primarily ethnic) memories as well as political institutions and culture 
(Renan, 1990, pp. 18-19). Smith too recognizes the dual civic-ethnic nature of 
many nationalisms, noting that "a national identity is fundamentally multi- 
dimensional; it can never be reduced to a single element" (Smith, 1991, p-14). 
The continued strength of the national idea rests on its dual civic-ethnic 
character: the quest for self-identity leads man to seek communal relations 
with his fellows in the framework of the national community where such 
ties are strongest. The national community is the location of ethnic 
memories which link man to the past, to the future and to the land on which 
he lives. But equally the national community is the locus of political and 
social relations, of citizenship and shared modes of behaviour. 
The concept of the nation found in moderate British conservatism is a 
prime example of an account which transcends the civic-ethnic divide. It is 
a Western civic concept in its stress on limited government and civic 
culture, but one which recognizes that attachment to the national community 
is enhanced by shared traditions, values and culture. Its focus then is 
neither exclusively political nor cultural, but fuses the two by depicting 
British political culture as a reflection of a national character which 
values tradition, community and constitutionalism. The conservative nation 
does not define the nation in primarily ethnic terms, though many of the 
traditional values and shared experiences on which it focuses are those of 
an English elite. Instead national identity has been defined to meet the 
needs of a multi-ethnic state: an Anglo-British Unionist culture is part of a 
populist conservative nationalism which aims for ethnic and social 
integration .3 Equally though the democratic aspirations of the political 
nation are curtailed. The conservative nation falls within the Western 
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tradition of state-based national identity but links state and society 
through a national community whose values help shape state institutions. 
The conservative nation is a hybrid of the more moderate elements of 
the cultural and political accounts of the nation. It is a concept in which 
the political and pre-political components of identity and community are 
recognized. The nation is shaped by both cultural and political factors; 
national identity is founded on state patriotism (allegiance to national 
institutions) and shared culture and experiences (whether ethnic or state- 
created). The conservative nation is also a special case because of its 
opposition to ideological expressions of nationalism. As a political 
doctrine, conservatism shuns ideological or end-state goals in favour of 
philosophical scepticism and a preference for "limited politics" (O'Sullivan, 
1976). Thus Burke presents a conservative account of nationhood rather than 
an ideologically nationalist one (Burke, 1986). Conservatism also seeks a 
middle way between the atomistic individualism of liberal methodology and 
the determinism of organic or integral nationalisms. The individual is a 
social animal whose identity is best expressed through his membership of 
various "little platoons" from family to nation, but his freedom is also 
valued. The nation should not become part of an ideological 'politics in which 
ethnic exclusivism or popular sovereignty work against the conservative's 
philosophical scepticism. 
The amalgamation of the political and cultural elements of national 
community is not a rigid one. Internal tensions between the two, which reflect 
those between the traditionalist and individualist wings of conservative 
thought, mean that the conservative nation is subdivided into political and 
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cultural accounts of the nation. The political account, found among liberal- 
conservatives of the New Right, adopts an individualist outlook focusing on 
the market and on limited government. Cultural conservatives espouse a 
cultural account which emphasizes national culture and community (see 
Chapter Three). The civic-ethnic mix in the conservative nation means that 
although membership of the national community is not defined along purely 
ethnic lines, groups not sharing the values and traditions of the majority 
British community are not easily integrated. This has created problems for 
conservatives- in coming to terns with a plural society which has a number 
of strong communal identities. 
Nationalism is not just a political doctrine and is not shaped solely 
by the discourse with which it is articulated. As well as looking at the 
conservative concept of the nation, this thesis also examines conservative 
nationalism as an official state nationalism and looks at the role of the 
Conservative Party in transforming the conservative account of the nation 
into a populist nationalism. The success of the conservative nation is based 
an doctrinal and socio-historical factors. English national identity emerged 
among the (relatively homogeneous) ruling elite well before the age of mass, 
ideological nationalism. The process of nation-building also began in this 
early-modern period, but neither the state nor conservative forces began to 
play an active role in encouraging state patriotism until the Napoleonic 
Vars, by which time radical accounts of the nation were prominent (Colley, 
1986). The early crystallization of national identity and the nation-state 
would both ease the way for conservative nationalism to become the official 
state nationalism, but conservative forces did not develop their own concept 
of the nation until Burke's ideas were widely disseminated. Hroch notes that 
-a- 
nationalist movements begin with scholarly interest in the nation among 
intellectuals who seek to define a concept of nationhood which is then 
popularized by a nationalist movement (Hroch, 1985). In Englnad, artists and 
intellectuals had been promoting national identity for much of the 
eighteenth century, while radical accounts of a nation of "free-born 
Englishmen" had existed since the Civil Var (Newman, 1987; Kohn, 1940). 
Burke's account of the conservative nation was not the starting point 
for English nationalism or national identity, but he did play a central role 
in developing an account of the nation acceptable to the conservative 
governing classes. This marked the beginning of a gradual appropriation of 
the language of nationhood by conservative forces which was not completed 
until Disraeli's Conservative Party transformed Burkean state patriotism 
into an official conservative nationalism (Cunningham, 1 989; Schwarz 1986) .1 
The conservative account of the nation is a special case because its status 
as an official state-based nationalism in a long-established state. As with 
other nationalisms the key roles played by intellectuals (Burke and the 
English Romantics) and a social or political movement (the Conservative 
Party) are present. The use of myths and "invented traditions" is also 
common to nationalist politics: in the British case this included myths of 
empire and monarchy. As an official state nationalism, conservat ism helped 
foster an integrative Unionist identity, encouraging loyalty to the state 
among the component nations of the UK. 
The literature and methodology employed in this thesis are drawn from 
studies of nationalism, especially studies of nationalist doctrines and 
national identity in Britain. But this thesis differs from and adds to the 
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existing literature by focusing on the unusual case of British conservatism, 
and analysing its successes and shortcomings in terms of political doctrine 
and soc io- historical factors. Of special interest for the study of 
nationalism are conservatism's appropriation of the language of nationhood 
and the way in which the Conservative Party helped to foster a populist 
state-based nationalism. British national identity has received more 
attention in recent years, but many studies have either neglected the 
conservative nation or have exaggerated its coherence. Naira has argued that 
Britain lacks an off icial, well-developed nationalist doctrine, instead having 
a "surrogate" nationalism based an the monarchy (Nairn, 198 8, a). He believes 
that the monarchy provides an integrative focal point for loyalty and a 
sense of community, without having the populist trappings associated with 
both democratic and ethnic nationalisms. The monarchy shores up the 
conservative forces of the pre-modern state, disguising the need for 
modernization which nationalisms recognize. Nairn is correct in identifying 
the monarchy as an important part of the conservative state, but the place 
of the monarchy only partly explains the endurance of a non-ethnic and 
traditionalist account of the nation. Of more importance is the persistence 
of the conservative nation and of conservative state-nationalism of which 
the monarchy has long been a significant (but not central) part. 
The second half of this thesis examines the concept of the nation and 
Opolitics of nationhood" associated with Thatcherism, focusing in particular 
on the nature of Thatcherism itself, and the policies of the Thatcher 
governments an the territorial Union, towards the EC, and on race relations. 
Some accounts have claimed that Thatcherism's revival of the language of 
nationhood (nationalist rhetoric, talk of 'the *enemy within" and "alien" 
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elements) is part of a coherent Thatcherite nationalism (Hall, 1988; Gordon & 
King, 1986; 0'Shea, 1984). However, I aim to show that this tendency to portray 
the conservative nation as having a natural or inevitable place as the 
dominant account of nationhood is flawed. The declining efficacy of the 
nation-state and of the two main national strategies of the Conservative 
Party since the 1960s has weakened the conservative nation. The "one nation" 
and Powellite strategies failed to adequately answer the questions about 
national identity and the nation-state raised by British membership of the 
European Community, the emergence of a plural society or sub-state threats 
to the Union. The political and cultural accounts of the nation found in the 
New Right further weakened the theoretical basis of the conservative 
nationSoices on the Left have depicted Thatcherism as a reassertion of 
conservative nationalism (eg in the Falklands War or in its policies on 
immigration), but I argue that Thatcherism did not manage (and probably did 
not intend) to produce a redefined or coherent account of the nation or 
politics of nationhood. Doctrinal tensions and problems of statecraft (eg on 
EC and race issues) prevented this. However, although it was conceptually ill- 
defined, the Thatcherite nation did move towards a new, uneasy pairing of the 
New Right's political and cultural accounts of the nation in which 
membership of the national community came to be defined along ideological 
and ethnic lines. Thus Thatcherite discourse simultaneously exhibited an 
individualist and internationalist economic outlook plus an authoritarian 
stress on culture and tradition. 
The study of Thatcherism f ound in this thesis thus reveals the complex 
place of ideas of the nation in modern conservative thought and in the 
political strategy of the Conservative Party. Xy analysis casts light on the 
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nature of Thatcherism by examining the merits and demerits of viewing it 
as (D Mrs Thatcher's personal values; (ii) as a political doctrine based an 
an uneasy relationship between free market and strong state values; and 
(iii) as statecraft, a government strategy based on pragmatic issue 
management. The nation/nationalism issue then becomes an important means of 
judging the character of Thatcherite rhetoric and policies; the relationship 
between Thatcherism and other conservative thought; plus the benefits and 
problems awaiting modern conservatives seeking to redefine the concept of 
the nation or construct a national strategy. 
This study of the conservative nation also offers important insights 
into the nature of conservatism as well as the relationship between 
conservative thought and the policies of the Conservative Party. I maintain 
that conservatism is best seen as a collection of values and insights which 
taken together produce a distinct style of political thought. There is no 
single rationale of conservatism which can capture the essence of 
conservative thought in its different historical guises: values of tradition 
and scepticism are not unique to conservatism. Honderich's claim that the 
essence of conservatism is selfishness and lack of moral principle is an 
unsatisfactory conclusion (Honderich, 1990, p. 239). Equally contentious is his 
list of nineteen features of conservative thought whose length and breadth 
- it draws on too wide an array of political thought, including Nozick - do 
not help in the search for conservatism's core propositions (Handerich, 1990, 
p. 210). Philosophical scepticism is an important feature of conservative 
thought, much of which is shaped in opposition to rationalist politics 
(Allison, 1984). O 'Sullivan Is claim that conservatism is distinctive because of 
its preferrence for "limited politics" and civil rather than social freedoms 
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conveys the essence of Oakeshott's liberal-conservatism, but this is not the 
only valid manifestation of conservative thought (O'Sullivan, 1976 & 1989, a). 
Conservatism should not be reduced to either a situational or class-based 
ideology (Huntington, 1957; Eccleshall, l 977). Mannheim notes the differences 
between pre-ideological traditionalism and modern conservatism when he 
notes that: 
"Conservatism-refers to a continuity, historically and sociologically 
comprehensible, which has arisen in a specific sociological and 
historical situation and which develops in direct conjunction with 
living history" (Naunheim, 1986, p. 77). 
Huntington's situational definition of conservatism depicts it as a 
positional ideology, memplayed to justify any established social arder, no 
matter where or when it exists, against any fundamental challenge" 
(Huntington, 1957). But this account neglects the configuration of ideas and 
values which lies at the heart of conservatism (Allen, 19 8 D. Themes of 
tradition, organicism, a hierarchical community plus philosophical scepticism 
are interlocking values, recognizably conservative only when taken together 
as a statement of values. Even then it is important to recognize that 
conservatism is not static or uniform: its values are dynamic, shifting 
according to historical circumstances. Doctrinally too, conservatism is not 
rigid but has two main branches, the traditional-authoritariau and the 
individualist (Greenleaf 1983; lgorton & Aughey, 1981). In this thesisj regard 
conservatism is a configuration of core values and propositions, but one 
shaped by reactions to historical circumstances, philosophical scepticism 
and opposition to rationalist politics, as well as by its belief in the value 
of tradition, arganic change and communal relations. Conservatism is not a 
rigid or static body of thought, but one capable of responding to changing 
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-groupings. The strength of the circumstances and containing significant sub 
conservative concept of the nation is in part explained by the similarities 
between some nationalist and conservative values eg the emphasis on a 
traditional, historic national community, and on the value of patriotism as a 
bond between individual, state and society. 
The theoretical clarity of conservatism is further confused by its 
uneasy relationship with the Conservative Party. Bound as it is by 
considerations of statecraft and the need for pragmatism, the Conservative 
Party cannot be an automatic vehicle for the realization of conservative 
programmes (Bulpitt, 1986, a & 199D. The second part of the thesis refutes the 
conclusions of Hall and proponents of the "New Right, New Racism" account 
- which claim that Thatcherism is an ideological ly-coherent hegemonic 
project - by outlining the problems of translating a commitment to 
nationhood into a cons istent, pract ical policy framework (Hall, 1988; Gordon & 
King, 1986). Powellism illustrated the political unsuitability of a nationalist 
strategy for a party concerned with issue management. The gap between the 
Burkean conservative nation and the populist nationalism of the 
Conservative Party was apparent in the racialist and imperialist rhetoric 
of the late nineteenth century. The case study covers the Thatcher 
governments and the Major government up to the 1992 general election. 
This thesis then draws on the literature and methods used in both 
political theory (studies of nationalism and conservative thought) and 
British politics (the Conservative Party, Thatcherism, race politics and 
Britain's relations with the EM to provide an assessment of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the conservative nation and conservative state 
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nationalism. 1t thus adds to the revival of academic interest in nationalism, 
British national identity and developments in conservative politics but 
often differs in its outlook and conclusions. 
A note on terminology. The Oconservative nation" refers to that 
configuration of values and propositions which together make up the 
conservative account of the nation. "Nationhood" refers to those 
subjective and objective factors which give rise the sense of being a 
national community. A "politics of nationhood" is one concerned with the 
protection and development of these bases of national identity, with a 
"national strategy" translating these concerns into an active political 
project, which in contemporary life would cover areas such as race, the 
EC and territorial Union. Xy use of the term "conservative nation" to 
mean the concept of the nation found in conservative thought should be 
clearly distinguished from Andrew Gamble's use of the term 
"Conservative Nation* to mean the electoral perspectives ("politics of 
support") and governing strategies ("politics of powerm) put together 
by the Conservative Party (Gamble, 1974). 
2. Tom Nairn claims that "the theory of nationalism represents Marxism's 
great historical failure (Nairn, 197 7, p. 329 ), but recent Left scholarship 
has sought to redress the balance by reviving socialist accounts of the 
nation. The collected History Workshop in Samuel's collection illustrate 
a renewed interest in radical patriotisms in British history (Samuel, 
1989). Schwarzmantel argues for a plural ist, citizenship nationalism based 
on ethnic diversity, popular sovereignty and multiple loyalties 
(Schwarznantel, 1991). 
3. Problems of terminology exist because of the United Kingdom's status as 
a multi-ethnic state. The UK may be better def ined as a state-nation 
rather than a nation-state because its Unionist identity emerged long 
after that of the ethnic-based national identities. I argue that the 
conservative nation draws an the values and experiences of an English 
elite, but is concerned with promoting an Anglo-British state-based form 
of national identity. Welsh and Scottish identity exist alongside British 
identity, but English identity has lost much of its distinctiveness. Irish 
and British identities are the major source of contention in the UK. 
4. The conservative nation is a state-based patriotism, adding attachments 
to the state and its institutions to attachments to the landscape, 
people and culture of one's country. Themes of allegiance and affection 
towards the "parliamentary nation" and the monarchy are common in 
this "conservative state patriotismu. The official state nationalism of 
Disraelian conservatism suggests a politicization of these basic 
loyalties in the face of external or internal threats to the nation. 
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As a political doctrine, nationalism is largely nebulous, its ideological 
shape and tone being influenced by the political ideas with which it is 
jointly articulated. The conservative nation is that expression of 
nationalist doctrine which emerged in Britain when conservative theory 
began its appropriation of the language, of nationhood. Its roots date back 
to Burke and it has found significant expression in the discourse of 
Disraeli, Baldwin, Powell and various New Right thinkers, all of whom will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapters. This chapter focuses 
on the theoretical core of the conservative nation, that configuration of 
values which has shaped a distinctive conservative account of the national 
community and national identity. 
The conservative concept of the nation is not a rigid one, changing over 
time to reflect political circumstances, but it tends to draw on the same 
common fund of doctrinal themes, reinforcing them with the use of myths-In 
this section I will examine those values which taken together produce the 
"conservative nation" and have enabled it to enjoy a dominant position in 
British accounts of nationhood. These key themes in the theretical make-up 
of the conservative nation are: M tradition; (ii) organicism; (iii) 
community; (iv) hierarchy and (v) ant i- rationalism. I will also discuss the 
most important myths to have bolstered the conservative account of the 
nation. 
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A belief in the importance of traditional procedures as a guide to 
contemporary problems, and a reverence for the past are central themes in 
conservative thought. For conservatives, continued usage over time is a better 
indicator of the worth of an institution than abstract principle. Burke 
stressed the "prescriptive authority" of long-lived institutions and the 
continued relevance of the wisdom of past generations. Modes of behaviour 
are passed from generation to generation, with practices becoming part of an 
immemorial tradition which has prescriptive authority because of its 
continuity and transmission over time. Disraeli echoed Burke's belief in 
tradition and prescription as the basis of political knowledge: 
"This respect for Precedent, this clinging to Prescript ionthis reverence 
for Antiquity, which are so often ridiculed by conceited and superficial 
minds, and move the essential contempt of the gentlemen who admire 
abstract principles, appear to me to have their origin in a profound 
knowledge of human nature, and in a fine observation of public affairs, 
and satisfactorily to account for the permanent character of our 
liberties. Those great men, who have periodically risen to guide the helm 
of government in times of tumultuous and stormy exigency, knew that a 
state is a creation of refined art.. They knew that if once they admitted 
the abstract rights of subjects, they must inevitably advance to the 
abstract rights of men, and then that the very foundations of the civil 
polity would sink beneath them. " (Disraeli, 1835, p. 45). 
For Disraeli, shared tradition is at the heart of national character and 
identity: It is through tradition that individuals become aware of themselves 
as belonging to a historic community in which values and behaviour shared 
across time give society a sense of continuity and meaning (Pocock, 1968). 
Familiarity comes through shared patterns of behaviour so that social 
intercourse occurs within a framework of tacit and collective understanding. 
Hayek argues that traditions emerge spontaneously through a process of 
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cultural evolution which reveals the optimum rules of the free society 
(Hayek, 1982). Scruton claims that tradition has two main functions: turning 
Ohistory into reason" so that it guides man's actions, and locating man in a 
transcendent society (Scruton, 1984, pp. 40-42). Traditions develop in a 
national context, shaping man's perception of his role in, and the nature of, 
the national community. 
This focus on tradition as a repository of wisdom and experience 
produces a sceptical attitude to change, but it is misleading to associate 
conservatism with opposition to all change or with reactionary nostalgia. 
Conservatives do not oppose all change, but argue that it should be 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary (Honderich, 1990, pp. 1-16). Cultural or 
institutional change can only be successful when it works with the grain of 
tradition and maintains continuity. Conservatives value stability and order, 
defending the interests of the established forces in society against change 
based on abstract principle or end-state goals. Aughey argues that 
conservatism is the "political recreation of the meaning of tradition*, 
putting its interpretation of the past to work in the battle of ideas 
(Aughey et al, 1992, p. 13). 
wConservatism believes itself to be in touch with the varied life of the 
state; indeed that it is life's 'true' political character.. In this sense 
conservatism may be understood as the inner vision of the life of the 
state. It looks within the traditions, customs and conventions of a 
political community for its imagery and inspiration, and attempts to 
give these practices an authoritative statement. " (Aughey et al, 1992, 
p. 14). 
Mannheim recognizes the centrality of traditionalism to conservative 
thought, but argues that a respect for tradition by itself is not enough to 
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distinguish the conservative from his doctrinal opponents (Nannheim, 1986). 
For Mannheim, traditionalism is a psychic attribute present in all humans, 
while a traditionalist approach to politics is merely reactive. Conservatism 
in contrast is a historically and sociologically specific occurence, emerging 
in dynamic, class-differentiated societies. In conservatism, traditionalism is 
given meaning in relation to a specific set of circumstances. The values of 
the past and lessons of history are taken as ways of seeing the world: "the 
conservative mode of experience thus preserves itself-by raising to the 
level of reflection and methodological control those attitudes to the world 
which would otherwise have been lost to authentic experience" (Mannheim, 
1986, p. 10D. The conservative judges the modern world not in terms of a 
pr-icr-i values but through a framework in which history and past experience 
enables the worth of actions to be evaluated. 
There is no single value which alone can be taken as the rationale of 
conservatism: the stress on tradition is only intelligible as part of a wider 
set of values which include organicism and an hierarchical account of 
community. Tradition and a concern with national history are central to any 
nationalist doctrine: nationalism is necessarily Janus-faced, looking 
backwards to Justify the nation's claims to be a unique community., But 
reverence for the past and the focus on a shared history as a source of 
national identity are particularly important elements in the conservative 
nation for they are core conservative values. The conservative nation also 
relies upon myths or "invented traditionsm. Its account of British history is 
a politicized one, stressing continuity and using myths to bolster 
conservative values. The Conservative Party has benefitted electorally from 
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its attachment to tradition, gaining from and helping to f aster deference 
among the electorate (Jessop, 1974). 
Conservatives portray the nation-state as an organic unit, evolving 
gradually over many years and reflecting the character of the. British 
people. National institutions are shaped by the inherited wisdom of previous 
generations, their essential features surviving the test of time, changing 
only when the mood of the nation dictates it. The nation-state is not an 
artificial or rational creation, but a natural growth. Institutions are 
national in character because they are expressions of the essential 
character of the national group itself. Sir Geoffrey Butler regarded an 
organic interpretation of the development of society and its institutions as 
"the fundamental doctrine of Toryism" (Butler, 1957, ch. 1 ). Anthony Quinton 
ranks it second only to traditionalism, to which it is closely linked: 
"The second principle is that of organicism, which takes society to be a 
unitary, natural growth, an organized living whole, not a mechanical 
aggregate. It is not composed of bare abstract individuals but of social 
beings-The institutions of society are thus not external, disposable 
devices, of interest to men only by reason of the individual purposes 
they serve; they are, rather, constitutive of the social identity of men. " 
(Quinton, 197 B, p. 16). 
The monarchy, Parliament and constitutional doctrines of the rule of 
law are embodiments of conservative values (eg tradition, authority, national 
unity and continuity) and are reflections of the national character ("the 
English genius"). Lord Hugh Cecil believed that "the Constitution is the 
greatest contribution that the English people have made to human progress, 
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and it bears deeply imprinted on it their peculiar characteristics" (Cecil, 
1912, p. 218). State institutions are expressions of the national essence which 
binds the national community across time. The principles of liberty, limited 
government and rule of law have traditional authority, expressing continuity 
and unity. Through these national institutions, state and society are linked 
in a national community. For Leo Amery, 
"A human society is not a numerical aggregation of individuals 
inhabiting a certain area. It is an organic entity, with its own 
structure, its own history, its own tradition, its own character. The 
individuals who in constant succession compose and maintain it are in 
turn sustained by its economic life, moulded to its structure and 
permeated by its tradition. " (L. Amery, 1935, p. 164) 
Conservatives depict the process of state-building as one of gradual 
and continuous development in accordance with the character of the English 
people. The course of English history is presented as evolutionary, free from 
dramtatic breaks with tradition, with change occuring only in order to 
strengthen links between institutions and national character, removing 
proven flaws. Burke, Disraeli and Winston Churchill all portray the 'Magna 
Carta and the Glorious Revolution as moments in the triumphal march of 
constitutionalism across the ages. This mythical tranquility is compared 
favourably with the disruptions to social order provoked by change based on 
abstract principle. Burke criticized the Jacobins for working against the 
grain of French history and character, while belief in the supremacy. of 
English development underlines Disraeli's wry comment that "an English 
revolution is at least a solemn sacrifice, a French is an indecent massacre" 
(Disraeli, 1835, p. 65). 
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The organic nature of state and society mean that the optimum elements 
of the past are maintained. Traditional authority and social relations 
survive, with tradition and the passage of time proving better guides to the 
values of institutions than abstract principles. Order and authority are 
strengthened by their links with tradition and inherited wisdom. The 
existing state of affairs is, for conservatives, the optimal one: its worth 
has been proved by its survival and evolution. Constitutional change must be 
sympathetic, working with the grain of national history and tradition: "you 
cannot play loose and fast with these ancient growths of civilization. " 
(Balfour, quoted in Buck, 1975, p. 174). 
The conservative idea of the organic development of the British state 
reflects, in part, its historical and sociological development. English 
nationhood developed early but gradually: an English nation existed long 
before the late eighteenth century when nationalism as a political doctrine 
first took shape-English institutions also had a long, though not strife 
free, development with traditions of constitutional rule entrenched before 
the modern age. Because of the relatively early and uncontested nature of 
English nation-building and state development, the conservative emphasis on 
continuity and organicism lends itself to the English , case. But the 
conservative reading of history is neither uniform nor clear-cut: many 
conservative thinkers have espoused a Vhig history, focusing on limited 
government and historical continuity. 
A more potent problem for the conservative belief in the organic 
development of nation and state is that the United Kingdom does not have a 
single ethnic or national identity, but consists of a number of national 
-22- 
groupings with distinct identities and historical experiences. the story told 
by conservatives is that of the English, then Anglo-British, historical 
experience, reinforced by those Unionist myths which entered the vocabulary 
of the conservative nation in the late 19th century. The idea of the organic 
state stresses continuity and tradition, but as differences in historical 
experience exist between the component nations, the conservative nation has 
had to foster a new state-based account of British identity, though still 
from a largely English perspective. 
The conservative idea of the nation reflects conservatism's concern 
with community. The nation is the most important of a number of communities 
which shapes the individual's character and gives him identity. From Burke's 
"little platoons" onwards, the family, local community and nation have all 
been upheld by conservative thinkers. The liberal notion of the 
independent, asocial individual is rejected: individuals achieve identity and 
belonging through their communal ties, chief among them being their national 
identity. Man is a social organism whose identity springs from his 
membership of a traditional national community which links him to past and 
future generations and to his fellow man. As Chris Patten notes, the 
individual is "a social animal who can obtain his full stature only in 
groupings greater than himself, such as his country, his church or his 
family. " (Patten, 19 83, p. 7). Communal membership is crucial for self- 
conception and identity, and also shapes one's character. Patriotism binds 
members of the nation together: a sense of nationhood is integrative, uniting 
people of different classes in common interest and experience. The nation is 
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more than a sum of its individual members: it is an organic entity in its 
own right, surviving across time. 
Despite a revival of interest in the concept of community in political 
philasophy, its significance in contemporary conservative thought has 
declined, with New Right individualism moving into the ascendancy. In both 
political philosophy and studies of ethnicity, community is an important 
concept. Comiaunitarian theorists depict man as a social animal with communal 
membership meeting man's need or desire for identity and social relations. 
Communitarian ideas are compatible with a number of doctrinal positions 
from anarchism to conservatism (Plant, 1978; Parry, 1982; Kymlicka, 1989). For 
conservatives, the idea of community relates to a hierarchical, organic 
society and gives the life of the individual content and meaning. David 
Clark's study claims that the two fundamental components of communal 
membership are *solidarity and significance", together providing social 
cohesion, a sense of belonging and security (Clark, 1973). For conservatives, 
membership of the nation brings social unity, common identity, patriotism and 
structure. Anderson argues that nationalism relies on a sense of "imagined 
community": no citizen can ever meet all the people who live in his country 
so feelings of unity must be based on "imagined" links of shared history 
and culture (Anderson, 1983). Burkean conservatism values the sense of 
community found in social units from the family to the nation and beyond, 
but recognizes the role of "representations" of communal solidarity. The 
conservative concept of community is also imagined because of its focus on 
links between past and future generations. lisbet noted the centrality of the 
idea of community in early conservative thought, stressing the group-based 
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view of man and society f ound in Burkean and Hegelian conservatives 
(Nisbet, 1962). 
*The family, religious association and local community - these, the 
conservatives insisted, cannot be regarded as the external product's of 
man's thought and behaviour. They are esseniiallY prior to the individual 
and are the indispensable supports of belief and conduct. Release man 
from the context of community and you get not freedom and rights but 
intolerable aloneness and subjection to demonic fears and passions. " 
(Nisbet, 1962, p. 25) 
The conservative concept of community is not indifferent to the liberty 
of the individual, but rejects an individualist methodology. The individual is 
in part shaped by his communal relations, but the conservative view avoids 
the deterministic extremes of the continental Right's organic theorists (es 
Fichte, Barres) for whom the individual is subservient to, and shaped by, his 
national community. For the conservative, the individual is important in his 
own right, but influences society and furthers his own personality through 
membership of a plurality of communitites, especially his family and nation. 
Man is both shaped by and helps to shape his social environment. But it is 
the group which survives longest and is ultimately most significant, its 
best features having to be preserved by the current group nembers. The 
individual's actions, if they are wise, are determined by his membership of 
this historical community. Man is "the temporary possessor and life-renter" 
(Burke, 1986, p. 192) and if he does not find expression in a historical 
community he becomes "little better than the flies of a summer" (Burke, 1986, 
p. 193). Recently, Kymlicka has argued that liberals can accept cultural or 
communal membership as a primary goal, but rejects the conservative claim 
that groups can have a meaning and identity beyond the aggregate of their 
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members. Instead he argues that the value of community lies in its role as 
the arena in which individual choices are made (Kymlicka, 1989). 
Casey believes that membership of the national community rescues the 
individual from the excesses of individualism, providing him with a sense 
of identity and purpose (Casey, 1978). Self-knowledge and identity are 
depicted as moral values by John Vincent and Norman St John Stevas, with 
nationality as the main cement binding people together (Vincent, 1991; St John 
Stevas, 1980). The opposite of communal membership is isolation, which 
produces alienation and anomie. 
"Central to Conservative thinking is the idea of community which 
moderates the rigours; of the clash between individual and state. 
Conservatives have faith in social spontaneity and organic growth. They 
see society as-the manifestation of a shared life in co-operation and 
reconciliation by those who hold certain ideas in common. " (St John 
Stevas, 1980, p. 9) 
Conservatism attaches great value to the traditional authority of state 
institutions, but legitimate state authority is balanced and moderated by 
that of decentralized institutions like the Church or local community. The 
individual has multiple attachments and loyalties, shaping his character and 
providing fraternity. The most immediate is his family, while ethnicity or 
nationality gives him a corporate capacity. Socialisation occurs within a 
national arena, where symbols of national identity such as language and 
history provide the context in which individual perceptions and identity 
are formed. For many conservatives, the Church is a focus of allegiance, 
linking man with his Creator and imbuing society with Christian principles, 
Coleridge (1972), Cecil (1912) and Eliot (1939) all stressed the importance 
of religion to the English national character and the role of the Church in 
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preserving Christian lifestyles. 2 But in an increasingly secular society, 
the influence of the Anglican Church has declined, with patriotism taking 
over the integrative functions of state religion. This integrative patriotism 
does not rule out local attachments and identities: conservatives welcome 
active membership in and allegiance to the locality (Vordsworth, 1809; 
Baldwin, 1937 & 1938). Conservatism's commitment to the Union has been 
strengthened by a strong Scottish Tory tradition evident from the time of 
Sir Valter Scott.: 3 
Differences within conservatism arise over the precise nature of the 
communal links which underpin nationhood. The split is between those 'who 
stress the political elements of national identity and those looking to its 
cultural roots. For those who see the nation as a community defined by 
culture, the nation is exclusivist and ethnically based, held together by a 
common culture which distinguishes its members from outs iders. Scruton for 
example stresses the pre-political nature of the community: the nation as 
the key communal grouping exists independently of political institutions. 
Nationhood is a non-political experience: its membership is determined by 
common culture and is prior to and above the state. 
The political nation in contrast def ines nationhood and national 
membership in terms of common allegiance to state institutions, which in 
turn ref lect the national traits such as deferrence and constitutionalism. 
This interpretation rejects the idea of a pre-political community, arguing in 
Oakeshott's case for a conservatism built around civil association where 
authoritative rules provide integration and a common vernacular (Oakeshott, 
1962). The individual is given a greater theoretical role in this liberal- 
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conservative interpretation with the historical development of state and 
society revolving around limited governemnt and individual freedom. Both 
offshoots of the conservative nation will be further discussed below. 
The conservative nation is hierarchical and structured, with a governing 
elite acting in the interests of the nation as a whole. The social make-up of 
this "national class" has changed, from aristocracy to the wealth-creators 
of the market economy, but the idea of rule by an elite group with special 
skills remains constant (Eccleshall, 1977). The individual achieves a sense of 
belonging through his communal role as mentioned above, and also through 
knowledge of his place in an ordered society. Inequality is an inevitable 
outcome of social relations: the governing classes though have a duty to 
protect the interests and well-being of the nation as a whole. The governed 
recognize the authority and expertise of the ruling group. The conservative 
idea of community is one of inequality, structure and duty: weaknesses in 
human nature dictate that society should be ruled by the talented few. 
Conservatives fear the social unrest and dislocation which mass rule or 
untamed democracy would bring. Mistrust extends to intellectuals, especially 
those without roots in the national culture who prefer ideological politics 
to social realities. Eliot argued that the main function of the ruling class 
was the transmission and preservation of culture in society (Eliot, 1940). 
The Nnatural aristocracy" of Burke and Disraeli was the national class 
in the sense that it best understood the national interest and the 
historical development of the nation. The unequal and hierarchical society 
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could only be governed only by those with an interest in the nation ie by 
landowners or the emerging middle class. For Disraeli, the landed aristocracy 
were the national class because their connections with inherited land and 
their upbringing as rulers marked them out as an enlightened elite 
(Disraeli, 1835). The defence of private property and its unequal ownership 
has been a key part of the conservative project from the industrial 
revolution, when Tories sought to uphold agrarian patterns of ownewrship and 
production, to the democratic age in which conservatives elicit popular 
support for extended, but unequal, ownership (Aughey et al, 1992, pp. 55-78). The 
conservative nation though does not explicitly focus on the relationship 
between man, land and nation, unlike continental Romanticism or fascist 
ideas of the nation. The idea of rule by a privileged group also reflects the 
conservative ideal of an "Establishment" upholding the high culture and 
social responsibility eg Coleridge's Clerisy (Aughey et al, 1992, pp. 98-113). 
Rule by an enlightened or hereditary elite is associated with continuity, 
discipline and social order. "One nation" conservatism fostered a 
paternalistic view of the duties of the ruling class; liberal-conservatism 
looks to individuals working within the free-market economy to bring 
national prosperity (with greater wealth trickling down to all classes) and 
uphold national prestige. Both traditions have the few using their talents 
to benefit the wider whole. Lord Salisbury claimed that rule by an 
enlightened minority was the optimal state of affairs: 
"Always wealth, in some countries birth, in all intellectual power and 
culture, mark out the men to whom, in a healthy state of feeling, a 
community looks to undertake government. " (Quoted in Pinto-Duschinsky, 
1967, p. 115). 
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The integrative nature of the hierarchical community is also apparent 
in Disraeli's view of the Conservative Party as the national and patriotic 
party, working to improve the condition of the people. Social divisions 
threaten national unity and patriotic bonds between the classes: the 
governed must be part of the nation or the bonds of community are loosened. 
But "one nation" conservatism was not a "citizenship" nationalism for it was 
opposed to extensive rights and mass participation in political life. 
Integrative state nationalism was a means of disguising class divisions and 
ensuring the continued rule of a conservative elite. The national community 
is a structured one where each individual has a place: all classes owe 
allegiance to the state while the governing classes have paternalistic 
duties. 
"Man is born into society, into a family and into a nation and, by the 
mere fact of existence, assumes inescapable duties towards his fellows 
and is endowed with the rights of 
' 
membership of that society" (David 
Clarke, quoted in Buck, 1975, p. 166). 
The embracement of the capitalist market economy by contemporary 
conservatism has weakened the idea of a structured, hierarchical society. 
Inequality is still an inescapable fact in the market economy, although its 
advocates claim that those who benefit from the workings of the market do 
so by merit. John Major's vision of a "classless society" is not an 
egalitarian one, but one in which each individual is treated according to his 
personal attributes so that his achievements are earned an merit. The market 
economy is also the environment in which the modern conservative vision of 
a "property- owning democracy" -can be realized. The wider ownership of 
consumer goods, shares and housing indicate a move towards greater equality 
and a rise in the standards of living which offsets the inevitable 
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differences between rich and poor. However, conservatives still support the 
principle of inherited wealth and the market economy is far from a perfect 
neritocracy (Hoover & Plant, 1989). Ferd inand Mount provides an' interesting 
account of contemporary conservative views on inequality and hierarchy, 
noting three styles of thinking: (a) the High Tory which thinks that 
society is inevitably hierarchical eg Sir Peregrine Vorsthorne; (b) the 
Middle Tory who sees inequality as a matter of practical efficiency, 
providing incentives; (c) the Low Tory who sees a tendency towards greater 
equality in the liberal capitalist economy and embraces the idea of a 
*property-owning democracy" eg Ian Macleod whose views John Major is known 
to admire (Kount, 1990). 
The conservative concept of the nation reflects conservatism's anti- 
rationalist style-In outlining the chief characteristics of the national 
community, conservatism's focus is on empirical realites and specific 
circumstances rather' than an abstract accounts of national criteria. The 
subjective element of nationhood is emphasized: the nation's identity and 
unity spring from shared experience and common values. Conservatism is not 
a nationalist ideology: its rationale is not centered around an abstract 
account of nationhood or based in an end-state account of national unity or 
strength as the ultimate political goal. 
Vhereas nationalist ideology offers universalist accounts of nationhood, 
the conservative adopts an empirical approach, looking specifically at the 
British nation-state. The values of the conservative nation tend towards 
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state-patriotism (a respect for and allegiance to traditional institutions) 
not ideological nationalism, but conservative politics have of course taken 
on the characteristics of expansionist, aggressive nationalism on occassion. 
Here state-patriotism (itself strongly conservative given the nature of the 
British nation-state) becomes more overtly political, often in the face of an 
identified external enemy (Newman, 1987; Doob, 1963). Thus, conservative forces 
directed their nationalist rhetoric against enemies at home and abroad 
during the French Revolutionary Vars, while in the late nineteenth century 
the Conservative Party made use of Jingoism and imperialist rhetoric. 
Conservative thought however tends to be nostalgic or parochial, notably in 
Baldwin's use of homespun themes of rural England or in Allison's account 
of cricket as the epitomy of the conservative mind (Baldwin, 1938; Allison, 
1984). Eliot's list of England's cultural traditions, which includes the Henley 
Regatta, Cowes and the Glorious Twelfth, is a reminder of the conservative 
focus on the high culture of the English establishment (Elict, 1940). 
Conservatism is faced with the problematic task of protecting a high 
culture which is appreciated only by a minority, while ensuring that 
conservative values find their way into popular culture (Aughey et al, 1992, 
pp. 104-113). 
Conservatives are sceptical of rationalist politics which seek to 
impose an end-goal or set pattern on political decision-naking. Instead they 
look to evolutionary change which runs with the grain of tradition and 
respects limited government. Allison believes that such political scepticism 
is the defining feature of conservative thought. For him, conservatism is non- 
ideological, even "negative" in character, shaped by its - opposition to 
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"humanisn" rather than by a coherent rationale of its own (Allison, 1984). 
Aughey agrees that there Is: 
"a basic negativity at the heart of conservatism, a reluctance to 
formulate principles or slogans that fail to capture the subtelties; of 
political life.. Each period of history will exhibit its own peculiar 
blend of conservative thought and politics, the purpose of which is to 
defuse radical attacks on the political order and to adjust principle in 
terms of the workable and the convenient" (Aughey, 1986, pp. 30-31). 
Oakeshottian conservatives reject the winclusivist" account of ideology 
which argues that all politics are necessarily ideological in character. 
O'Sullivan compares conservatism as "formal" or "limited" politics, concerned 
with the maintenance of procedural conditions and legitimacy, with "activist" 
or "programmatic" politics which have an express aim or purpose (OSullivan, 
1976 & 1989, b). He argues that the term "ideology" makes no sense when 
applied to conservative thought which lacks a programmatic vision of what 
men are like and how society should be shapedlevy argues that conservatism 
is not an ideology because it derives from a pre-ideological view of 
politics and society (Levy 1985). Conservat ism places a great deal of 
emphasis on "circumstance" and the need for pragmatic action. Graham argues 
that pragmatism or a non-ideological politics is possible in connection 
with a conception of the limited statebut recognises the philosophical 
scepticism and specific interpretations of politics and the past which are 
found in conservative thought (Graham, 1989). It is my belief that 
conservatism is made up of a configuration of values which give it the 
character of a political doctrine, but its scepticism, particularism and 
pragmatism means that it does not share the programmatic world-view 
common to ideological systems of thought. 
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The conservative nation is a distinctive account, but one linked to a 
tradition of "limited politics" rather than the ideological or "activist" 
politics of many nationalist doctrines. It is a reflection of conservatism's 
anti-rational character, its scepticism and the importance that opposition to 
radicalism plays in shaping conservative discourse. The conservative nation 
is often parochial and its patriotism latent, but the cultural account of the 
nation found on the New Right is more programmatic than either Burkean or 
Oakeshottian conservatism, looking to an ideal society in which the nation 
is culturally homogeneous. British conservatism is also shaped by the 
policies and actions of the Conservative Party, which has on occassion 
blatantly nationalistic rhetoric, politicizing the conservative nation and 
giving it a populist slant. 
The theoretical elements of the conservative nation are backed up by 
the use of myths and symbols of national identity, giving it a populist and 
mobilising character. r- These myths have tended to arise at times of crisis 
or when national identity is being challenged. The main theorists of the 
conservative nation such as Burke, Disraeli and Powell all sought to 
redefine and revitalize the conservative concept of nationhood in the face 
of external and internal challenges. In Burke's case the support for the 
abstract principles of the French Revolution, notably that of popular 
sovereignty, by English radicals prompted him to redefine the nation as an 
organic and hierarchical entity (Burke, 1986). 
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The most significant use of political myths to bolster the conservative 
nation came in the late 19th century with the development of myths of 
imperialism, Unionism, race and the monarchy. The "invention of tradition" 
and appetite for nostalgia is common to nationalist doctrines, being part of 
the intellectual and political reconstruction of the past for nationalist 
purposes (Smith, 1986; Boerner, 1986; Anderson, 1 983). Conservat ives from Burke 
to Churchill and Thatcher have all had a political interest in reworking 
history in a conservative light. The conservative account of national 
development is characterized by the organic view of history it presents, 
though much of it is myth ical, ignoring an alternative tradition of popular 
sovereignty and radicalism. The role of the monarchy was transformed''by 
"invented traditions" and popular ceremonials in which the monarch became a 
symbol of national unity and continuity. The personal unpopularity of Queen 
Victoria in the 1860s was replaced by a populist commercialization of the 
royal family eg in the Jubilee celebrations (Pugh, 1985; Cannadine, 1986). r- 
Unionist politics entered centre stage when the Union with Ireland was 
being challenged by Irish nationalism and some Liberals at the end of the 
19th century. Chamberlain campaigned for the Union, imperialism and social 
reform, deve loping a patriotic domestic image and portraying the Liberals as 
a threat to national prestige (Chamberlain, 1914). Unionist politics and 
culture helped create a viable British identity when no British ethnie or 
nation as such exists. This Unionist or British identity employs a state- 
based notion of membership: allegiance to the common institutions and 
constitutional principles of the Union is the shared experience at the heart 
of the British national community. The territorial integration of the United 
Kingdom is incomplete though: the component nations retain their own 
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seperate traditions, historical experiences and even different modes of 
government (Bulpitt, 1983; Keating, 1988; Kearney, 1989). Un ion ism was grafted 
on to the theoretical basis of the conservative nation, itself rooted in the 
experiences and values of an English minority and their high culture, to 
provide a cross-ethnic means of identity and cohesion. 
The economic benefits of empire strengthened the state- patriotism of 
the Unionist political culture. Imperialism emerged as the most effective 
populist and mobilising myth in the armoury of the conservative nation. 
Chamberlain and Salisbury orchestrated Conservative Jingoism and social 
imperialism, spreading the Conservative's image as the patriotic party 
(Cunningham, 1989; Schwarz, 1986). Imperialist rhetoric extended the party's 
integrative message, attracting support from all classes and ethnic groups. 
Imperial myths promoted images of national greatness, a golden age and 
national mission. Conservative writers cultivated myths of a continuous 
Anglo-Saxon tradition in British history whereas in pre-Victorian times 
radical forces had used myths of the Anglo-Saxon constitution and the free- 
born Englishmen (Mehan, lggl; Thompson, 1980). Racial myths proclaimed the 
superiority and civilisation of the British race, strengthening the hand of 
the nationalist Right and giving undeserved credence to Social Darwinist 
theories (Eldridge, 1984). 7 Myths of racial superiority and national mission 
were widespread in conservative thought and in Conservative Party rhetoric 
from Chamberlain In the 1890s to the Tory Right in-the 1930s (Vebber, 1986). 
The general tone of the age was one in which imperial and racial myths 
were often used and accepted across political divides, but the Conservative 
Party was the most successful in using imperialist rhetoric for its own 
political purposes. 
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Imperial myths also had negative implications for the conservative 
nation. By linking the party so closely with Empire, it suffered from any 
popular backlash against imperial commitments (Cunningham, 1986). Extending 
patriotism and a sense of unity across the Empire proved unrealistic and 
its universalizing outlook detracted from the conservative nation's care 
values. Themes of common allegiance and interests across the Empire set in 
store problems of immigration control for future Conservatives. The decline 
in imperial self-confidence after the Boer War produced a retreat into 
mythical notions of "merrie England". Baldwin's evocation of the rural 
English landscape marked a return to parochialism and "golden age" 
wistfulness in conservative circles. But the ghost of Britain's inperial past 
continued to cast a long shadow over conservative accounts of nationhood 
and would not be exorcised until Powell recognized the contribution of 
imperial myths to national self-doubt. 
Myths are historical artef actsreactions to a particular set of 
historical problems. The myths of empire and Union brought f or the 
Conservative Party an invaluable image as the national and patriotic party 
at a time when the genesis of mass democracy threatened conservative 
forces. The conservative nation had added populism to its theoretical 
repertoire, but as imperial and economic strength drained away and the Union 
again came under challenge from the peripheral nations, the myths lost their 
potency and became unwelcome baggage f or a conservatism seeking to adapt 
to new challenges. Unionism has lost much of its mobilizing strength: in 
Scotland, where conservative politics are predominantly Unionist, disputes 
over devolution, allegiance plus a Scottish versus Unionist identity and 
traditions have weakened the Conservative Party and Scottish conservatism 
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(Mitchell, 1990). On Northern Ireland issues, Conservatives have been unable to 
end the political Impasse while close links with the Unionist parties have 
been eroded. Northern Ireland remains a special case: it is not fully 
integrated into the UK political system and the Conservative commitment to 
the Province's constitutional position is a conditional one. Unionism is no 
longer a coherent platform or a key feature of conservative discourse. Powell 
drew attention to the malaise in the relationship between conservatism and 
Unionism, but propogated myths of ethnic homogeneity and effective British 
sovereignty. 
The concept of the nation is an important element of conservative 
thought and a distinctive brand of nationalist doctrine. The conservative 
nation is a community of subjective identity, hierarchical structuring and 
organic evolution. It provides unity and continuity, a sense of social 
belonging and links the people with state institutions. But it is not a 
uniform or monolithic structure within British conservatism. Two divergent 
accounts of the nation have been significant in conservative thought, a 
cultural account and a political account. Both take themes inherent in the 
conservative nation and redefine them according to the individualist or 
authoritarian branches of conservatism of which they are part. 
The cultural account of nationhood in British conservatism has a long 
tradition, encompassing the organicist thought of the English Romantics and 
the more recent cultural nationalism of the authoritarian New Right. This 
strand of conservatism is defined by its'emphasis on the pre-political 
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basis of national community and opposition to individualist methodology. A 
common culture is the central feature of nationhood, providing a means of 
understanding and shared experience for the national community. The 
community is not primarily political: membership of the national community 
is independent of and prior to the contractual basis of citizenship 
fostered by the liberal state. Patriotism is the outward expression of the 
subjective- sense of communal identity, creating a public spirit and unity 
which cannot exist in a state built only on contractual relations between 
fundamentally asocial individuals. State and nation are separate entities: only 
when the state can harness the corporate identity and personality of the 
nation can it enjoy allegiance and loyalty. For Scruton: 
"The legitimacy of the state depends upon its ability to overcome the 
separation inherent in civil society, and to recuperate in free and legal 
f arm the sense of belonging which surrounds us at birth and nurtures 
our identity. " (Scruton, 1990, p. 84). 
The cultural definition of nationhood offered by the authoritarian wing 
of the Few Right is highly critical of the individualist outlook of liberal- 
conservatism (Scruton, 1984). For the cultural conservative, the individual is 
the product of the social order, dependent on membership of the nation and 
allegiance to national institutions for his identity. The liberal account of 
individual freedom is a dangerous abstract ion, ignaring themes of authority, 
allegiance and communal identity. The constitution of the nation-state 
reflects organic growth and national character. 
The English Romantics Coleridge and Vordsworth also used a cultural 
conception of nationhood, but one drawing an the organic theories of 
continental Romanticism as well as Burkean values (Cobban, 1962; Xendilow, 
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1986). The individual is seen as a product of Hature, and society an organic 
growth. The conservative link between individual and society is adhered to., 
man is conditioned by his environment but is not its captive, modifying it 
to reflect change thus furthering the organic evolution of society. The 
individual achieves full humanity when his personality is an expression of 
his national belonging: Vordsworth stressed the value of patriotism and 
attachment to the locality. These are Burkean themes drawing on the 
conservative nation, but given a Romantic slant which elevates the spirit of 
Nature and looks to harmony between man and his environment. Coleridge 
Iý espoused conservative values of authority, hierarchy and tradition, while t .! 
encouraging the paternalism and social conservatism which influenced 
Disraeli in his Young England phase. 
The cultural account of the nation draws upon many of the values 
inherent in the conservative nation, but adds its own distinctive cultural 
and conmunal emphasis. Nationhood is def ined in terns of subjective 
experiences of common identity and experience, but the main bond of 
community is a pre-political common culture. Organicism, authority, hierarchy 
and the importance of tradition are all core values. Cultural conservatives 
on the New Right have moved towards ethnic and ideological accounts of 
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nationhood in which membership of the national community depends upon 
commitment to the culture of the English establishment. 
At its extremes then the cultural definition of nationhood expresses 
doctrines alien to that of the conservative nation. Themes of a primarily 
ethnic basis to national identity, the subordination of the individual's 
freedom and interests to the needs of the national whole and a tendency to 
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identify culture with race are parts of Right-wing thought which 
conservatism and the conservative nation should regard as extreme and 
unwelcome. The conservative nation must adapt to identify with the plural 
society, with unity to be based on patriotism and community. It should now 
move towards a civic-ethnic Anglo-British concept of nationhood in which 
individual and community are not antithetical, but are linked by communal 
identity and ordered liberty. 
The other major theoretical offshoot of the conservative nation focuses 
on the political or state-based dimensions of membership of the national 
community, f inding expression in liberal-conservative thought. Its emphasis 
is on political association and individual ism, with Oakeshott's concept of 
civil association and O'Sullivan's attack on the social politics of the 
cultural conservatives as two prime examples (Oakeshott, 1962; O'Sullivan, 
1976 & 1989, a). 
The political nation defends the constitutional development of the 
British state, particularly its emphasis on the rule of law, a balance of 
power and the distinction between state and civil society which gives the 
individual legal citizenship. It is this citizenship and membership of the 
political community which brings individual identity and freedom coupled 
with communal unity and belonging. This liberal-conservative concept of 
citizenship contrasts with the Tory tradition in which, members of the 
political community have the status of subjects with a duty of obedience to 
state authority. It is though a limited account of citizenship, focusing on the 
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legal aspects of membership of the political community, contrasting with 
socialist accounts of welfare rights and active participation in decision- 
making. 0 'Sullivan is critical of Scruton's cultural conservatism for its 
emphasis an pre-political social unity and his desire to reintegrate state 
and society. He notes: 
"The introduction of this pre-political unity creates a strong current 
of - anti-constitutionalist thought in Scruton's work since he is 
convinced that not all Ahe organs of the established constitution 
articulate the real social self properly. " (O'Sullivan, 1989, a, p. 179). 
Rather than being based an common cultural belonging, civil order is 
founded on impersonal law and legitimate state power. The institutions of 
the state provide for common identity and belonging as they are 
expressions of the values of the English people. Membership of the nation is 
not determined by ethnicity but by the political values and traditions of 
the people which find expresion in their constitutional arrangements. The 
individual is a part of the political community because of his consent to 
its constitution: authority must be legitimate and accountable -to the 
political community. Oakeshott's idea of civil association is one of limited 
government based around rules of conduct such as the rule of law and the 
seperation of state and society. British constitutionalism combines tradition 
and individualism: constitutional principles and legal citizenship are the 
bases of political community and bring integration and unity. 
The idea of the political nation as espoused by Oakeshott is a liberal- 
conservative one, recognizing the importance of tradition but presenting a 
Vhig account of the development of constitutional government. Society is 
seen in a pluralist mode: independent from state power, decentralized and 
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with countervailing spheres of power. Corporatism and rationalism are 
perceived as alien to the British political tradition. Patriotism arises from 
a -deep allegiance to this political tradition and a regard for it as the 
optimum means of integration and membership. 1n, liberal-conservatism, the 
concept of community is a limited one, based an individual consent and 
feelings of attachment. Culture is an expression of human traditions, not an 
autonomous entity. In the writings of some liberal-conservatives, notably 
Hayek, nationhood is not regarded as a central aspect of the political 
community although the nation-state is recognized as the dominant political 
unit of the modern age. Here the political account of society has only a 
loose idea of community and its national character is ignored or even 
rejected. 
The political nation uses the ideas of tradition, community and the 
gradual development of national institutions to espouse a liberal- 
conservative focus on political community. However, it is difficult to assess 
the precise point at which the political account of the nation is no longer 
a conservative one. The works of thinkers like Oakeshott, Hayek or Brittan 
illustrate this problem (see Chapter Three). To qualify as a conservative 
account, the values of tradition, evolutionary development, natural inequality 
and community should be present (Staal, 1987; Gray, 199 D. Generally speaking 
an emphasis on the traditional national community acts as a useful 
indicator in determining whether New Right neo-liberals qualify as 
conservatives. Although Oakeshott regards ideas of community as dangerously 
close to rationalism, his ideas of patriotic allegiance and social relations 
at least contain the seeds of a concept of the nation as a politically- 
defined group (Oakeshott, 1962 & 1975). The political account of the nation is 
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one of state patriotism. The individual is not asocial, but is a member of a 
national community which produces a whole greater than the aggregate of its 
component parts through patriotism and civic spirit. Razick cannot be 
included as a conservative because of his refusal to grant notions of 
community beyond those voluntary exchange and protection groups which have 
little character beyond that of their members. 9 Individualism which ignores 
the social role of the person as a member of a political community with 
some autonomy - though one bound by the rule of law and the separation of 
state and civil society to protect the individual from the excesses of 
ideological notions of the collective good - or places the defence of 
capitalism above national unity or legitimate authority is best seen as a 
manifestation of liberalism rather than moderate conservatism. 
As I noted earl ier, conservat ive thought is sceptical and empirical, 
rejecing the rationalism of ideological projects in favour of the wisdom 
found in tradition and the exisiting order. This philosophical scepticism 
often means that its attitudes are in part shaped by the doctrines which it 
opposes. Historically then, the character of the conservative nation has 
emerged in response to radical accounts of the nation. The success of the 
conservative concept in becoming the dominant account of the nation in 
British politics does not mean that it has a monopoly over the language of 
nationhood, but shows that it had managed to meet and overcome the 
challenges posed by other accounts. The conservative theory of the nation 
was f irst espoused by Edmund Burke as a response to what was then the 
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dominant account of the nation: a. radical ideal based on popular sovereignty 
whose roots can be trace back to the English Civil Var. Here the nation is 
equated with the people or the popular will: its values include equal 
citizenship, voluntary membership and a democratic community. Nationality and 
democratic citizenship are linked: the national community should be based on 
equality and popular rule. It is a political nation based on radical and 
democratic citizenship rather than liberal- conservative values of 
constitutionalism and minority rule. Burke's conservative nation also 
countered French democratic Jacobin nationalism as expressed in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man or in the rhetoric of Abb6 Sieyes 
(Schwarzmantel, 1991). '9 
The conservative nation is a hierarchical community, ruled by an 
experienced governing class: popular sovereignty and the will of the people 
are alien to it. The conservative nation values unity, social cohesion and 
traditional authority whereas the radical ideal is of patriotism as an 
oppositional force, English history as a struggle for the rights of the 
people to govern themselves, and is critical of state authoritarian ism. Recent 
historical scholarship, grouped, around the History Vorkshop, has emphasized 
the radical element in English nationalism which dates back to the-Civil 
Var when Puritan ideals of individual liberty and equality were matched 
against ecclesiastical and state authority (Samuel, 19 89). Radical and 
appositional patriot ism, us ing myths of the Anglo-Saxon constitution and 
the "free-born Englishman" was also found in the works of Paine, Price, 
Vilkes and the Chartists. Its historical decline has been traced to the 
emergence of a conservative culture and to the state's role in promoting a 
conservative nationalism through imperialist rhetoric, " invented traditions", 
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and its portrayal of radicals as anti-patriotic (Newman, 19 87; Cunn ingham, 
1989). In this thesis though, the emphasis is on conservative thought and 
the values of the conservative nation, which have been durable yet flexible 
enough to allow successful responses to changing circumstances. But accounts 
of the nation by the British Left have recovered in recent years, moving 
away from the conservative tone of Orwell's writings on the nation (1954 & 
1968), to again offer a coherent intellectual challenge to the' conservative 
nation. I (I 
The conservative concept of the nation, especially in its cultural made 
which looks to pre-political community, developed as a critique of the 
atomistic individualism of some liberal thought. In classical liberal 
nationalism, national independence is linked with individual autonomy: both 
individual and nation are to be free to determine the course of their own 
affairs. Greta Jones argues that conservatives have accepted much of the 
liberal account of the nation, including its focus on citizenship within a 
territorial state and the Whig view of the constitution (Aughey et al, 1992, 
pp. 79-97). On the question of the nation, conservatism has again shown itself 
capable of change without losing the essence of the civic-ethnic concept of 
nat ionhood. Libera 1-conservat ism has combined liberal values of individual 
freedom and limited government with conservative themes of community and 
tradition. To some extent then conservatism has minimized the threat of 
liberal ideals of nationhood by synthesizing what it sees as its more 
attractive elements with values of its own eg in the conservative espousal 
of Whig history. Modern conservatism thus values both the community and 
the market, fusing Whig and Tory values (Willetts, 1992). Liberals like 
J. S. Mill have also blurred the distinction between liberalism and 
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conservatism by recognizing the importance of the historic national 
community (Mill, 1962). 13 
The conservative nation differs fundamentally from the deterministic 
and racialist nationalism found on the continental Right. The scepticism and 
moderate character of British conservatism and its commitment to limited 
politics distinguishes it from the ideology of the far Right. At the time of 
Burke's work on the conservative nation in Britain, Fichte produced an 
organic account of the nation in which the nation was valued above the 
individual and defined in terms of an ethnically homogeneous linguistic 
group (Reiss, 1955). For Fichte, the German Volk was Europe's dominant nation 
and had to 'maintain its culture and practice national self- subsistence. 
Vhile Disraeli and Chamberlain popularized the conservative nation in the 
late nineteenth century, the French Right turned to the proto- fascistic 
nationalism of Action Francaise as expressed by Barres and Maurras (Curtis, 
1959; Sutton, 1982; Soucy, 1972). Th is integral nationalism saw individuals as 
totally subordiante to the nation: without the nation, the individual is 
nothing for his very essence is determined by his membership of the nation. 
The nation is also ethnically exclusivist and anti- democratic: al iens; are to 
be expelled and parliamentary democracy replaced by a strong monarchy. 
Integral nationalism is strongly anti-rational, glorifying "the soil and the 
dead", charismatic leadership and aggressive expansionism. ' 
Although the conservative nation has largely remained doctrinally 
distinct from the nationalism of the continental Right, the imperialist and 
militarist nationalisms of the British Right have at times influenced the 
character of conservative accounts of the nation. The British Right has 
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rarely been organized or politically significant on a wide scale, but the 
Tory Right has often espoused racist and nationalist politics (Yebber, 1986). 
Racial myths claiming the superiority of the British race and its mission 
to "civilise" or conquer ubackward" areas were widespread and influential 
for- several decades from the Disraelian era onwards. Conservatives of the 
time incorporated racial ideas into the conservative nation, but socio- 
biological conjecture an the superiority of races did not infiltrate the 
conservative nation to a major extent. The Conservative Party and 
conservative ideologues have used racialist discourse, but racism is 
parasitic on the "ideal type" conservative nation. The conservative nation 
emphasizes the particular, whereas racism is a universalist doctrine. Balibar 
notes that notions of racial or cultural ties go beyond attachment to the 
nationddeas of racial unity run counter to the conservative nation's 
emphasis on the shared experiences and feelings f ound in the nation-state 
(Balibar & Wallerstein, lggl, pp. 59-61). The conservative nation may not easily 
lend itself to ethnic -plural ism, bui lt as it is on the historical experiences 
and values of Anglo-British elites, but neither is it inherently racist. It is 
not a closed account of the nation, but its emphasis on continuity of 
traditions and the importance of the past means that f irst and second 
generation immigrants do not share the same subjective experiences of 
nationhood. Where racial myths have permeated the conservative nation, it 
tends to be as a reflection of the wider social beliefs of that particular 
era. They are largely peripheral to its concept of the nation, and at best 
alien to and distinct from it. 
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British conservatism has developed its own distinctive brand of 
nationalist doctrine. This draws on core conservative values and reactions 
to particular historical experiences to present a moderate, non- ideological 
account of the nation which the Conservative Party, using myths of 
imperialism, has popularized. For a summary of the conservative nationjulian 
Amery is worth quoting at length: 
"In the Tory view a nation is more than a conglomeration of 
individuals. It has a past and a future; and the men and women who form 
its population are at any given time not the only interested party. 
They are the heirs of its history and the trustees of its posterity.. 
The nation is made up of a network of loyalties, individuals to each 
other, to their families, to their professions, to their localities, to their 
distinctive cultures, and to their fellowships. Far from being a denial of 
the brotherhood of man, their loyalties constitute the way in which 
human fraternity manifests itself in history and practice, as opposed to 
the literature of political philosophy. " (J. Amery, 1975, p. 29). 
The conservative account of the nation is shaped by a belief in the 
value of tradition, in the organic development of the state, in a hierarchical 
community and by conservative negativism and anti- rationa. lism. These values 
are well represented in the works of Burke, Disraeli, Powell and others whose 
contribution to the conservative nation at crucial times will be examined 
in more detail in the following chapters. But the conservative nation is not 
uniform or unchallenged. In practice it is dynamic, reacting to change and 
defining itself in relation to forces which it opposes, while theoretically 
it has two distinct sub-groupings, the political nation and the cultural 
nation which reflect the different sides of the civic-ethnic mix found in 
the conservative nation proper. 
-49- 
The success of the conservative nation in becoming the dominant 
expression of nationhood in British politics has, both theoretical and 
environmental explanations. The "nation" is a malleable and contested 
concept: the character of any nationalist doctrine is influenced by the idea 
of the nation which is used, and this depends on both theoretical and 
environmental factors. 13 There is no single political doctrine with which 
nationalism is inevitably and naturally linked. Instead nationalism may, in 
specific cases, be associated with different doctrines, from fascism to 
liberalism to socialism. The idea that nationalism in Britain is inevitably 
conservative is therefore wrong. The dominant position of the conservative 
nation is not a natural one: it developed from specific theoretical and 
environmental circumstances which together allowed for the appropriation of 
the language of nationhood by conservative forces . 14 
Some of nationalism's more attractive and positive values are also 
present in conservative thought, making the conservative nation an unusually 
resilient and fertile hybrid. Wationalism appeals to man's desire to be part 
of a community with people who share his experiences and social values. 
Conservatism too sees man as a social animal, finding his identity in his 
group relations with the national community as a crucial arena of social 
integration -Patriotism is for conservatives a natural phenomenon which 
links man with his compatriots across the generat ions. National ism is 
"Janus-faced" looking to the nation's past to find the expressions of unity 
and continuity which will allow it to progress in the future. Though not a 
modernizing or reformist nationalism, the conservative account of the nation 
values tradition and reveres the past. The organic account of state 




individual autonomy as the deterministic accounts of integral nationalists. 
For Burke, organic development means that state institutions reflect the 
national character of the people, linking state and civil society thus 
providing effective allegiance and authority. 
Conservative doctrine also mirrors some of the core factors identified 
by students of nationalism. The f ocus on organic evolution in conservative 
thought mirrors the process of natioz-building. The conservative nation is 
an official state-based concept of the nation, emerging at a time when 
English identity was already well-established, then proceeded to create a 
state-based Anglo-British identity. Studies of nationalism note the key role 
of intellectuals in nation-building while conservatism both echoes this 
belief in the key role of a national elite', and provides examples of thinkers 
who have redefined the concept of the nation eg Burke. Myths play a vital 
role in any nationalist doctrine or movement. For British conservatism, this 
has included myths of imperial ism, m onarchy and rural England. 
Many studies of nationalist doctrine have distinguished between civic 
and ethnic accounts of the national group, noting the differences between the 
civic, pluralist accounts found in Western liberal nationalisms and the 
ethnic accounts of Central plus Eastern European authoritarian, exclusivist 
nationalisms (Smith. 1991; Schwarzmantel, 1991; Alter, 1989). They do though 
accept that the distinction between the two is not rigid and that often 
nationalism contains, both civic and ethnic elements. It is my contention 
that the "ideal type" conservative nation as found in Burke and Disraeli is 
one of the clearest examples of a doctrine in which the civic and ethnic 
dimensions of nationhood are fused. In the conservative account, the national 
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community is def ined through the political culture and traditions of the 
dominant ethnic group, providing a link between state and civil society. 
Citizenship and nationailty are distinct but related themes f or the 
conservative nation. It is not ethnically exclusivist but because it reflects 
the traditions of the dominant Anglo-British culture, problems exist in 
integrating those from different backgrounds. Conservatism is not 
ideologically uniform: its two doctrinal branches, the liberal-conservative 
and the traditional-authoritarian, have produced their own accounts of the 
nation which mirror the civic (political) versus ethnic (cultural) divide 
mentioned above. The conservative nation though is not an expression of 
ideological nationalism. Conservative theory is instead characterized by 
scepticism, parochialism and anti-rationalism, though the Conservative Party 
and conservative ideologues have often been mare identifiably nationalist. 
Even then, the Conservative Party, though the most successful exponent of 
official state- patr iotism, has not always benefitted from , its nationalist 
rhetoric. 
The theoretical proximity between some conservative and nationalist 
values helps explain the success of the conservative nation in dominating 
British political discourse on the politics of nationhood. This dominance 
should not though be mistaken for an inevitable manopoly: recent scholarship 
has emphasized the opportunities for a socialist account of the nation to 
challenge conservatism's position. Environmental factors also help account 
for the success of the conservative nation, but here challenges to 
conservatism have been more effectively realized. The conservative -nation is 
a state-based official nationalism, a doctrinal construct of a state elite 
which already had a strong sense of identity. The multi-ethnic character of 
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the British state means that if nationhood is to be integrative it can not 
be defined along purely ethnic lines. The conservative nation is not merely 
an expression of English nationalism and the Conservative Party's appeal 
should not be that of an English Nationalist Party. Though originating in an 
English or Anglicised elite, it aims to be integrative both territorially (by 
permitting some peripheral autonomy within a Unionist framework) and 
socially (through social reforms and populist nationalism). The conservative 
nation is built on the historical experiences and values of an Anglicised 
governing class, but has translated its appeal into an Anglo-British state- 
based identity. 
The Conservative Party has played a significant role in translating the 
theoretical accounts of the conservative nation into practical "politics of 
nationhood" Ue policies designed to preserve or enhance national identity) . 
Disraeli and Chamberlain transformed the conservative account of the nation 
into a populist nationalism based on imperial ism, social reform and 
Unionism. The Conservative Party in the late nineteenth century transformed 
Burkean state patriotism into an official state national ism, which was again 
prominent in the Baldwin era. Since the 1960s though the conservative grip 
over the language of nationhood has been eroded: later chapters will discuss 
Powell's doomed attempt at reviving a nationalist strategy and the failures 
of Thatcherism to address issues relevant to national 'identity. The rhetoric 
and policies of the Conservative Party are necessarily more pragmatic than 
conservative theory, so the relationship between party and doctrine is not a 
clearly defined one. But although it is not a nationalist party, it is through 
the populism of the Conservative Party's politics of nationhood that the 
conservative nation has found effective express ion. V ithout the populism and 
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mobilising force provided by the Conservative Party's appropriation of 
state-patriotism and use of myths, the conservative nation developed from an 
intellectual redefinition of the nation to an active politics of nationhood. 
I have argued here that an account of nationalism in the United Kingdom 
needs to look at both the doctrinal coherence of the concept of the nation 
and at the history-and character of ethnic and state relations. In any one 
state, national identity will be multi-dimensional and different languauges 
of nationalism will exist. Concepts of the nation are shaped by political 
doctrine and socio-histarical circumstance. The nature of the conservative 
nation is thus influenced by conservative values, the multi-ethnic make-up 
and Anglo-British state-based identity of the United Kingdom, and the 
incorporation of myths or invented traditions at certain historical 
junctures. The next chapters will examine the historical and doctrinal 
development of the conservative nation in more detail, beginning with the 
role of Edmund Burke. 
Nairn sees nationalism as Janus- faced, looking both backwards (to the 
myths and historic experiences of the nation) and forwards fto a 
modernized, independent nation-state) (Nairn, 1977). Gellner and Smith 
stress the role of nationalism as a modernizing ideology seeking the 
creation of a modern, bureaucratic state-structure (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 
1986). The emphasis of the conservative nation is though primarily on 
continuity with the past and it is often nostalgic and reactionary in 
tone. 
2. Anglicanism is often depicted as a central tenent of British 
conservatism (eg Cecil, Hogg) but -this neglects the secular emphasis in 
some conservative thought (eg Hume, Allison). On Eliot see Michael Iveni: 
"T. S. Eliot as a Conservative Thinker" in The Salisbux-y Review, vol. 2, no. 29 
1984. pp. 39-41 and Duke Maskell: "T. S. Eliot as a Conservative Thinker: A 
Reply" in The Salisbury Review, vol. 3, no. 3,1985. -pp. 29-33. 
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Scottish conservatism has a strongly Scottish and Unionist character, 
but this has been strained in recent years. The relative autonomy of the 
Scottish Conservative Party has also declined in the face of party 
centralization (see Mitchell, 1990). On Scott see Diana Spearman: 'Walter 
Scott as a Conservative Thinker" in The Salisbur7 Review, vol. 5, no. 3, 
1987. pp. 29-32. 
4. Private property and inherited wealth are key conservative values, but 
are not central to the conservative nation. See Chapter Three of Aughey 
et al, 1992 and Andrew Reeve: 1"perty, Macmillan, London, 1986. pp. 152- 
178. British conservatism rarely stresses the links between manjand 
and nation which are found in continental Romantic thought. Note though 
the conservative accounts of the environment examined in Lincoln 
Allison: Ecology and Utility: Tbe Milosophical Dilemmas of Planetary 
Nanagement, Leicester University Press, 1991. 
5. On myths and symbols in nationalist politics see Smith, 1986. For 
comparative purposes see George Xosse: The Nationalization of the 
Nasses. Political Symbolism and Nass Novements In Germany from tbe 
Napoleonic Fars througb the Tbird Reicb, New York, 1975. 
6. The monarchy has carefully avoided being identified with only one of 
the United Kingdom's ethnic groups. Note the 1822 visit of George IV to 
Edinburgh dressed in symbolic tartan and the investiture of the 
Prince's of Wales at Caernarvon in 1911 and 1969. 
7. See Michael Biddiss: ImaEes of Race, Leicester University Press, 1979, a 
collection of Victorian essays on race, including J. W. Jackson's attack on 
Mill's non-racial concept of the nation. 
8. See Robert Nozick: Anarcby, State and Utopia, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1974. Nozick is classed as a conservative in Ted Handerich: 
Conservatism, Hamish Han ilton, Londonj 99 0. 
9. See Aira Kermilainen: *The Idea of Patriotism During the First Years of 
the French Revolution" in History of European Ideas, vol. 11,1989. 
pp. 11-19. This article traces the development of "patriotism" into a 
term associated with liberal or revolutionary reform. 
10. In "The Lion and the Unlcorn", Orwell talks of the nation as "a family" 
with the wrong members in control (Orwell, 1 968). His is an often 
nostalgic and parochial account of national identitY, but argues that 
"patriotism has nothing to do with conservatism" (p. 103). Instead 
patriotism is predominant in working-class culture, where it is 
egalitarian. See Gregory Claeys: "The Lion and the Unicorn, Patriotism 
and Orwell's Politics" in The Review of Politics, vol. 7,1985. pp. 186-211. 
11. See Mill's "Essay on Coleridge" and the section on nationality in "On 
Representative Government". Among other liberals to write an nationality 
and nationalism were Acton, the British Idealists Green and Bosanquet 
and Barker. See Julia Stapleton: "The National Character of Ernest 
Barker's Political Science" in Political Studies, vol. 37,1989. pp. 171-187 
f or an account of the Whig and Burkean elements in Barker and British 
Idealism. On the proximity between Whig and Tory historiography in the 
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19th century see J. V. Burrow: A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and 
the Engllsb Past, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
13. On the idea of "contested concepts" see William Gallie: "Essentially 
Contested Concepts" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 56, 
1956. pp. 167-198. 
14. On the persistence of liberal and socialist accounts of the nation see 
Paul Rich: "A Question of Life and Death to England: Patriotism and the 
British Intellectuals, c 1886-1945" in New Communityvol. 15,1984, pp. 491- 
508. Paul Rich: wBritish Imperial Decline and the Forging of English 
Patriotic Menory, c 1918-196811 in History of European Ideasvol. 9,1988. 
pp. 659-680. Miles Taylor: "Patriotism, History and the Left in Twentieth 
Century Britain" in The Historical Jourmalvol. 33,1990. pp. 971-987. 
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CHAPTER TVO: THE DEVELOPXEIT OF THE *WISERVATIVE ]FATIONI., 
In this chapter I examine in detail two crucial moments in the 
development of the "conservative nation". Firstly, the period of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Vars when Edmund Burke and then the Romantic 
theorists Vordsworth and Coleridge produced the first major conservative 
accounts of the nation and national identity. Second is the late Victorian 
era of Disraeli, Salisbury and Chamberlain when the Conservative Party 
developed a popular "national strategy" of integration and imperialism. I 
will also briefly assess the Baldwin era in which the Conservative Party 
withstood the challenge of the nationalist Right to maintain its dominance 
over the language of the "nation". 
An English national consciousness had begun to develop well before the 
emergence of nationalism as a political doctrine at the time of the French 
Revolution. Also significant was the early emergence of England as a 
relatively unified and homogeneous nation-state: these two factors meant 
that English national identity was being formed, at least among the ruling 
elite, without the presence of a mass nationalist movement or concerted 
state activity. The early-modern English state had acquired the means of 
central control through a bureaucratic system of taxation and internal 
discipline, a well organized standing army, a developing national economy 
and a territorial state which was for the most part culturally and 
linguistically homogeneous (Tilly, 1975). This comparatively extensive state 
penetration was coupled with a ruling elite possessing the necessary pre- 
requisites of national identity. The English ruling elite was drawn from the 
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same ethnic background, and their shared historical and political interests 
were coupled with an emerging sense of national solidarity rather than 
local rivalry or cosmopolitanism. 
For Anthony Smith, the emergence of national identity is related to the 
presence of a dominant ethnic group, with the precise nature of the national 
consciousness which springs from this depending an the type of ethnic 
community involved (Smith, 1986 & 1991). In the case of England, national 
identity developed among the aristocratic upper strata of landed interestj 
the state and the established church. A sense of national community among 
the ruling elite in the Elizabethan era was fostered by a cult of the 
monarch, the identification of an external enemy and the Protestant 
character of the English state (Fletcher, 1982). National consciousness 
became more widespread and hence more politicized in the Civil War when a 
number of competing accounts of the nation flourished. Patriotism was a 
doctrinal weapon of both radicals and loyalists: as yet the state was 
playing no significant role in spreading an official nationalism. Hans Kohn's 
classic examination of English national consciousness in the Civil War 
period emphasises the connection between Puritanism and radical patriotism 
(Kohn, 1940). He argues that Englishmen became more aware of their national 
Protestant religion and equated this with a quest for greater liberty from 
ecclesiastical and state 'authority. But loyalist patriotism was also forming 
around support for the hierarchical constitution, the monarchy and the 
established church (Furtado, 1989). 
The recent revival of academic interest in the emergence of different 
patriotisms and concepts of the nation has tended to focus on the late 
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eighteenth century (Newman, 1987; Colley, 1986 & 1989). In this era the 
influential radical patriotism and its identification of the "nation" with 
popular sovereignty and civic rights lost political ground to an emergent 
conservative patrictism, developed by conservative ideologues rather than by 
the state itself. Gerald Newman treats English nationalism in the same way 
as other nationalisms by tracing the rise of a nationalist movement among 
intellectuals and artists in the latter half of the eighteenth century 
(Newman, 1987). Ethnic consciousness among this elite was translated into 
practical moves such as literary quests for the essence of Englishness and 
community, the use of national symbols such as John Bull and Britannia, and 
anti-French sentiment. The English national identity was morally elevated 
through the mythical ideal of "national sincerity" and the virtues of the 
English character, taking radical political shape in demands for popular 
sovereignty. 
Although a number of intellectuals and literary f igures shaped a 
concept of the nation in the late eighteenth century, the English case 
differed from other instances of nationalist politics because a mass 
nationalist movement did not emerge. Nationalist movements tend to undergo 
several phases in their development, the first of which is the intellectual 
stage on which Newman's study of English nationalism concentrates. Hrach 
notes that nationalist politics have three main stages: (a) a period of 
scholarly interest in which intellectuals revive the study of the national 
culture and past; (b) a period of patriotic agitation by the intelligentsia 
and professional classes, often in opposition- to foreign or authoritarian 
rule; (c) the rise of a mass nationalist -movement incorporating members of 
all social strata, with nationalist rhetoric and themes spreading through 
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society (Hroch, 1985). No one class has af ixed or necessary role in the 
emergence of nationalist politics (Hrach, p. 129), but it is significantly 
shaped by the character of the social groups which play the key roles in 
each of these phases. In the case of English nationalism, the initial period 
of scholarly interest was followed by limited patriotic agitation, marking 
the politicization ýof a pre-existing national consciousness. Nationalist 
language was though largely confined to the upper reaches of a society 
lacking the mass participation and communications needed to spread popular 
nationalism. The radical impetus of much of this patriotic agitation became 
stunted in the 1790s with the growth of popular loyalism and the emergence 
of a coherent conservative account of English national identity. The 
takeover of the concept of the nation by conservative forces was further 
enhanced by the growing role of the state in fostering national identity in 
the nineteenth century, culminating in the official state nationalism 
propagated in the Disraelian era. 
The American War of Indepedence and the French Revolutionary Wars 
brought a greater awareness by the ruling elite of the potency of 
nationalist appeals, and the beginning of a difficult period for radical 
patriots (Cunningham, 1989; Schwarz, 1986). Pitt the Younger's government 
suppressed domestic radicalism and recognized the value of patriotic 
appeals in uniting the ruling elite (O'Gorman, 19 89). But the most significant 
expressions of conservative patriotism emanted not from the state but from 
conservative ideologues and popular loyalist movements. Linda Colley notes 
that governments of the time feared that if the state actively encouraged 
nationalism this would open the doors to mass participation in politics, 
undermining the stable, hierarchical structure of society (Colley, 1986). The 
-60- 
state welcomed but did not actively encourage the development of the 
popular loyalist uReeves Societies" in 1792 (Dickinson, 1989). Its role in the 
spread of conservative patriotism was limited to equating national pride 
and achievement with the reign of George III (Colley, 1984). Conservative 
propogandists stressed the benefits of the settled English constitution, 
urged patriotic support for nation and monarchy, and attacked the Jacobin 
appeal to *reason' (Schofield, 1986). The most significant figure in the 
development of a conservative patriotism though was Edmund Burke whose 
1790 "Reflections an the Revolution in France" achieved high sales and 
great influence. 
Although Hume and Bolingbroke - often classed as conservative 
thinkers - had written on "national character" in the eighteenth century, 
neither of them provided a "modern" conservative doctrine or a coherent 
account of the nation. This only emerged with Burke's reaction to the 
emergence of a radical nationalist ideology in the French Revolution. Hume 
saw man as a social animal and in his essay "Of National Characteristics" 
argued that "moral causes" such as the nature of government were important 
in shaping national character (Hume, 1964). ' But Hume rejected myths of 
continuity in British history and claimed that the high level of diversity 
in English society meant that it had no clear national character. Rather 
than being an organic community, "a nation is nothing but a collection of 
individuals" (Hume, 196 4, p. 2 4 4). Bol ingbroke Is "The Patriot King" espoused the 
virtues of national unity and balanced government, but did not refer to 
patriotism or national identity in the sense associated with Burke 
(Bolingbroke, 19 67). 
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Edmund Burke provided the English ruling elite with the f irst coherent 
conservative statement of political philosophy. His account of the nation was 
an important counterpart to radical patriotism (his "Reflections" was a 
response to Richard Price's 'A Discourse on the Love of our Country') and 
paved the way for the appropriation of nationalist rhetoric by conservative 
f orces. Burke set out a conservative account of the development of the 
English state using the themes of organicism, tradition, community and 
hierarchy I outlined as the core of the conservative nation in the previous 
chapter. It is in Burke's discussions of man's "second naturell, the basis of 
national character and the importance of the nation as a community, that 
the conservative nation is first outlined. 
For Burke, the strength of the English state lies in its longevity and 
organicism. The constitution has evolved over the course of centuries, 
reflecting the wisdom of past generations: it is not an artificial creation 
based on abstract principle, as the Jacobins sought to construct in 
revolutionary France, but one built on tradition, emerging from the national 
past and reflecting the national character. English history is presented as a 
fluid and consistent progress towards the mixed constitution culminating in 
the Glorious Revolution and Declaration of Right. 
"From Magna Carta to the Declaration of Right, it has been the uniform 
policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties as an 
entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers, and to be 
transmitted to posterity. " (Burke, 1986, p. 119). 
His account of English history is consistent with the role played by 
nationalist intellectuals in re-interpreting the national past and 
developing myths of national glory or a golden age. Though on part a Whig 
appraisal of the development of the mixed constitution and its principles 
of liberty and balanced government, Burke also offered a defence of existing 
institutions from those who would have them restructured according to 
Oreason". In part icular, Burke claimed that the Glorious Revolution was 
fundamentally different from the French Revolution and was Britain's last 
major constitutional development. Thus, "the Declaration of Right is the 
cornerstone of our constitution as reinforced, explained, improved and in its 
fundamental principles forever settled" (Burke, 1986, p. 100). It was consistent 
with the national character of the English and ran with the grain of 
tradition, comparing favourably with the the upheaval caused in France by 
non-traditional change. Burke's political career reflected his interest in 
preserving the balanced constitution, his "On the Present Discontents" 
arguing that united parties were needed to promote the national interest 
and curb the power of the "King's Party". Burke's last years were dominated 
by his concern to defend the hierarchical constitution from the threat of 
domestic Jacobinism. 
Thus for Burke, the English constitution reflected both the accumulated 
wisdom of the past and the essential character of the English people. He 
suggests that in a stable pol ity, inst itut ions must be in accord with the 
values and habits of the nation. The French Revolution ignored the character 
of the French people and the nation's political traditions and was thus 
doomed to failure. The Jacobin suppression of Christianity runs against the 
grain of French national values and habits. In England though civil society 
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is based on Christian values and these are at the core of the national 
character. The state should be based on mutual duties and interests between 
the major groups in society: only in this way can it claim authority. The 
English national character values ordered liberty and rule by a natural 
aristocracy. Englishmen recognize that the constitution reflects morality, 
natural law and national habits, so adopt a largely deferrential attitude. 
Though Burke was concerned by the extent of radical support in the country, 
he believed most people supported the existing institutional arrangements. 
"Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the f ield ring 
with their importunate chink, whilst thousands of great cattle reposed 
beneath the shadow of the British oak chew the cud and are silent, pray 
do not imagine that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants 
of the f ield.. or that, after all, they are other than the little shrivelled, 
meagre, hopping, though loud and troublesome insects of the hour. " 
(Burke, 1986, p. 181). 
Burke's writings offer only occasional accounts of national character 
and identity, but these are nonetheless important elements of his 
conservative nation. Cultural differences between national communities are 
the result of differing habits and prejudices, not human nature. These form 
manis "second nature", so although men share the same feelings of pleasure 
and pain, people from different societies have different traditions (Dreyer, 
1979, pp 54-67). The customs and values of a society were the basis of its 
national or historical character, yet this was not static or racially 
determined. The relationship between state institutions and national 
character must be mutually compatible if stability was to be assured. The 
imposition of "reasoned" principles on a society threatens traditional 
habits. 
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Burke was critical of policy towards the American colonies, arguing 
that the government was wrong not to apply the English tradition of 
individual liberty there. Colonial policy should be formulated according to 
"circumstance" not abstract rights: the Americans should have the chance of 
self-government and political liberty because they share the values and 
habits of the English. Denying them the institutions their character merits 
harms England as head of the empire ("Speech on Conciliation with the 
Colonies", in Hill, 1975). In his "Impeachment of Varren Hastings", Burke warned 
against damaging the character and reputation of England (in Hill, 1975). 
Burke's is thus an enlightened imperialism: his hope is that the principles 
underlying the English constitution can be applied to imperial government. 
He criticised the corrupt Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland and supported 
Irish Catholic Emancipation, but believed that responsible British rule in 
Ireland would best suit its people. 
The nation is a key f arm of human community, providing common 
allegiance, shared values and a "moral essence". Through the nation, society 
becomes "a partnership.. between those who are living and those who are dead 
and those who are yet to be born" (in Casey, 19 82, p. 23). Man is a social 
animal belonging in a number of associations or "little platoons" ranging 
from the family, through his local community to his nation and ultimately to 
mankind as a whole. But the importance of the individual's freedom is never 
lost in this process which is not the case with Fichte's deterministic 
account of the nation. The individual's character is in part framed by his 
socialization in the national community, but he is not exclusively dependent 
on the nation for his essence or moral worth. Man's allegiance is distributed 
among a number of associations, rather than exclusively given to the nation. 
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Fichte's individual owes everything to his membership of the nation, which 
is defined in terms of linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Burke's is a 
limited and humanitarian view of the nation compared with the accounts of 
the continental Right. As a community, 
"a nation is not an idea only of local extent and individual momentary 
aggregation, but it is an idea of continuity which extends in time as 
well as in numbers and in space. And this is the choice not of one day 
or one set of people, not a tumultuary and giddy choice, it is a 
deliberate election of ages and generations. It is a constitution made by 
what is ten thousand times better than choice; it is made by the 
peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions and moral, civil 
and social habitudes of the people, which disclose themselves only in a 
long space of time. It is a vestment which accomodates itself to the 
body. " (Speech an Reform of Representation in the House of Commons, 1784 
in Burke, 1867, p. 408). 
The national community brings social solidarity and a sense of 
belonging: it is here that man's patriotism and status as a social animal 
are realized. The nation as a "moral essence" is integrative, bonding together 
those who share the same "second nature", traditions and values. It is not 
defined in ethnic or racial terms, its unity and value coming instead from 
shared experiences and character. Patriotism is of moral worth too, providing 
a sense of unity, solidarity and identity: "next to the love of parents for 
their children-the strongest instinct both natural and moral which exists 
in man is the love of his country" (Speech on the Impeachment of Hastings). 
The Burkean nation is not an egalitarian community. Whereas the Jacobin 
concept of the nation was extolled the virtues of popular sovereignty and 
equal citizenship, Burke's is based on "prescriptive authority" and rule by a 
"natural aristocracy". The "nation" was not democratic: in political terms, the 
nation consisted of those with landed or financial interests in the 
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country, but this "national class" had duties towards the rest of society. 
Themes of tradition, organicism and hierarchy are fused in his account of 
the evolution of the constitution. Legitimate claims to property and 
authority rest on prescriptive authority with longevity and "tine out of 
mindu traditions of hierarchy Justified according to prescription rather 
than abstract principle. Rights to rule or own property develop over long 
periods of time and become vested in a "natural aristocracy" which best 
understands and represents the interests of the nation as a whole. 
Prescription or long-lived usage of property or office brings stability and 
order. Through its long period in authority, the natural aristocracy also 
accumulates experience and a specialized knowledge of governing plus the 
relationship between institutions and national character. The optimal 
national community is a structured one where ordered liberty is promoted by 
clear senses of duty and allegiance. The established church plays a key role 
in protecting social order and cohesion, ensuring that individuality does not 
threaten discipline (Stafford, 1982, pp. 390/1). 
Burke's political writings laid the foundations for the conservative 
nation and offered the first major conservative challenge to radical 
patriotism. The Burkean nation is a hierarchical community deriving its 
strength from the weight of tradition and the proximity of its ruling 
institutions to the national character. It is an integrative community, but 
not an oppressive onefthe individual flourishes within the nation as he is a 
social animal, naturally patriotic with his character shaped in part by the 
national community into which he is born. The nation is not the single 
overriding focus of a man's loyalty, but one link in a chain of Anglican 
"universal benevolence" extending from the family unit to all humanity. Men 
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are not racially divided, but differ because of their environmental ly-shaped 
usecond nature". Burke's is a non-ethnic nation, but one based around the 
values and traditions of the ruling elite of the dominant English ethnic 
group, even though as an Irishman found difficulty in reconciling his 
support for the constitution with his concerns for the welfare of his 
native people (O'Brien, 1986). This mix of the political and cultural aspects 
of national identity and its reflection of the interests of the Anglo- 
British state and ruling groups marked the beginning of a gradual 
appropriation of the concept of the nation by conservatives. Burke's was a 
*conservative state patriotism" (Newman, 19 87, p. 167) rather than a state- 
sponsored "official nationalism". The role ý of the state in promoting a 
conservative nationalism grew, but would not reach its zenith until the late 
nineteenth century when mass education, political participation and 
communications provided the necessary conditions for state-sponsored 
patriotic rhetoric. 
The English Romantics and the "Conservative Nation"., 
Many of the Burkean insights into the nature of conservative state 
patriotism were extended by the English Romantics, Coleridge and Vordsworth. 
Both moved away from the radicalism of their youth to provide an early 
nineteenth century Romantic conservatism which emphasized the links 
between man and his environment (Robertson Scott, 1989). Though influenced by 
Burke's account of the nation, the Romantics placed greater emphasis on the 
pre-political basis of community. 
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Coleridge followed Burke in praising the organic evolution of the 
English constitution and relating it to the national character. In "On the 
Constitution of Church and State", Coleridge suggests that the national 
community is united through a shared "Ideal', that is the psychological, 
historical and philosophical essence of the nation (Coleridge, 1 972). As with 
Burke's account of national character, the "Ideal' as a set of shared values 
and traditions gives the national community its own distinct character or 
personal ity, which is then reflected in the constitutional arrangements of 
that society (Calleo, 1966). The state is an organic entity evolving over time 
and in tune with the "Idea". Man is a social animal, finding expression in a 
community, with his moral development shaped by Nature and his local 
environment. Reason and rationality are not as important as an individual's 
nationality or his socialization within the local and national community. 
According to Coleridge, "in order to be men we must be patriots" (quoted in 
Calleo, 1966, p. 78). 
The balance of the English constitution and its deeply-laid roots in 
history are admired by the older Coleridge as he stresses the conservative 
themes of community, authority and allegiance. The constitution balances the 
forces of permanence (eg the landed aristocracy) with those of progression 
(eg the professional and manufacturing classes). But these groups are of 
less significance than a National Church and "Clerisy" (largely secular 
rather than Christian) of educators whose task is to provide social 
cultivation and promote allegiance. 
Wordsworth also fuses Burkean values with a Romantic account of the 
relations between man, community and nation. As with Coleridge, Wordsworth 
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focuses on the conditioning of man by his immediate environment and the 
traditions and values of the community in which he develops. The national 
community again links past, present and future generations, and is only one 
link in a chain of communities to which man belongs. In "The Prelude", he is 
critical of rationalist theories which explain the nature of the individual 
without reference to his environment or nationality (Wordsworth, 197 1; 
Mendilow, 1986). In the 1850 version of "The Prelude", he praises the "genius 
of Burke" who: 
"Vhile he f orewarns, denounces, launches forth, 
Against all systems built on abstract rights, 
Keen ridicule; the majesty proclaims 
Of Institutes and Laws, hallowed by time; 
Declares the vital power of social ties 
Endeared by Custom; and with high disdain, 
Exploding upstart Theory, insists 
Upon the allegiance to which men are born. " 
(Vordsworth, 1971,, vol. 7, lines 503-510). 
In "The Convention of Cintra", Wordsworth again proclaims the 
importance of nationality. "National independence and liberty, and that 
honour by which these and other blessings are to be preserved.. are more 
precious than life" (quoted In Vhite, 1953, p. 146). His love for England and the 
Lake District in particular is not an inward-looking nationalism, but part of 
a wider concern for humanity: patriotism again is the foundation for 
universal benevolence. Concerned by the struggles of Spain and Portugal for 
national independence in the face of Napoleon's armies, Wordsworth calls on 
the British government to aid the cause of national freedom, so reflecting 
her own traditions of liberty. Each nation has a vested interest in 
promoting the freedom of its fellow national communities. 
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The English Romantics promote a more humanitarian and individualistic 
account of nation and nationalism than is found in the German Romantic 
thought of Fichte or Herder. Vhile Romantic thought has in common an 
emphasis on environmental conditions rather than abstract thought, the 
accounts of the nation outlined by Fichte in particular focuses on ethnic 
factors to a greater extent than do Vordsworth and Coleridge. For the Lake 
District poets, the national -community is one founded on shared character, 
history and experiences, but with a stronger cultural element than is found 
in the Burkean nation. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the conservative concpet of the nation 
was only one among a number of competing accounts. The liberal ideas of 
nationhood found in Bentham and J. S. Mill equated national independence with 
personal liberty, while Macaulay produced a vast Vhig account of English 
history. In Scotland, Sir Valter Scott played a significant role in developing 
a distinctive Scottish Toryism. Though Palmerston recognized the political 
value of patriotic appeals, it was Disraeli who exploited patriotism to its 
full potential in developing a Conservative "national strategy". This was the 
era in which the conservative concept of the nation became the dominant one 
in British political life. 
The Di5rdelian Party's "National Strategy". 
In the, f inal quarter of the nineteenth century, the conservative 
appropriation of the language of patriotism gathered pace as the 
Conservative Party under the guidance of Disraeli, Salisbury and Joseph 
Chamberlain developed a "national strategy". This national strategy had 
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several key planks: 
(i) a concerted use of appeals to patriotism and national unity, in which the 
Conservative Party was portrayed as the national party and contrasted with 
Gladstone's "anti-patriotic" Liberal party; 
(ii) a "one nation" approach aiming to neutralize class conflict and broaden 
Conservative support through promises of social reform; 
(iii) the portrayal of the Conservative Party as the party of empire, and the 
spread of imperial myths into popular culture; 
(iv) the linking of Conservatism with territorial unity and opposition to 
Irish Home Rule; 
(v) the further development of such symbols of conservative nationalism as 
the monarchy and the empire. 
During this period, the conservative concept of the nation became a key 
weapon in the ideological and electoral armoury of the Conservative Party. 
Burke's conservative state patriotism was translated into an official state- 
based nationalism, based on the conservative concept of the nation. The 
Conservative Party itself especially in government, was the prime mover in 
disseminating this conservative nationalism through society by a concerted 
promotion of popular myths and symbols. The nation was equated with 
conservative interests and values, and the opposition denigrated as 
unpatriotic. Conservat ism enjoyed ideological dominance over the language of 
patriotism and exploited the potency of nationalist symbols and rhetoric to 
mobilize popular support as mass democracy emerged. In appeals to the newly- 
enfranchised lower classes, the Conservative Party portrayed itself as 
representing all classes rather than factional interests, being the party 
best able to implement social change through "social imperialism" and its 
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better understanding of the interests and traditions of the British people 
McKenzie & Silver, 1968). 
Disraeli was a pivotal f igure in the metamorphosis of the conservative 
nation from state patriotism into an official state nationalism. In his 
political writ ings, Disrael i adapted the Burkean themes of the conservative 
nation to meet the challenges of the genesis of democratic part ic ipation. As 
political leader, he established the Conservative Party as the party of 
patriotism, national unity, Empire and Union. Disraeli's earliest and most 
coherent political thought, dating back to his "Young England" phase, is 
contained in his 1835 "Vindication of the English Constitution". Here 
Disraeli develops the Burkean account of the nation as an organic community 
and contrasts this favourably with utilitarianism. The landed aristocracy are 
praised as the representatives of tradition and the national interest. They 
are the natural statesmen of society for they are in the best position to 
govern the country according to an understanding of the national character 
and its constitutional development. The aristocracy "have always taken the 
lead in civilization" (Disraeli, 1835, p. 163) and as land owners represent the 
permanence of Burkean prescriptive authority. English organic development 
and its hierarchical national community ensure stability and wise rule. 
Disraeli's account of English history draws on the Whig account of the 
underlying progress of ordered freedom and equal ity, but, influenced by Burke, 
Bolingbroke and the English Romantics, he uses it for Tory aims (Faber, 1961; 
Kendilow, 1986). 
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*As equality is the basis (of English society), so gradation is the 
superstructure, and the English nation is essentially a nation of classes 
but not of castes. Hence that admirable order which is characteristic of 
our society, for in England every man knows or finds his place. " 
(Disraeli, I 835, p. 2 01). 
Although advocating rule by the landed classes, Disraeli is concerned 
that the national community is not excessively divided by competing class 
interests. His Young England navels illustrate his fear at the development of 
the utwo nations" of rich and poor and his support for paternalism. In 
"Coningsby" and then "Sybil", Disraeli argues that the traditional values of 
the hierarchical Constitution must be at the core of a paternalistic organic 
community (Vincent, 199 0). As early as 1835 he envisaged the Conservative 
Party playing this national-integrative role. 
"The Tory party of this country is the national party; it is the really 
democratic party of England. It supports the institutions of the country 
because they have been established for the common good and because 
they secure the equality of civil rights" (Disraeli, 1 835, p. 182). 
Toryism is the "national voice" whereas liberalism and the "anti- 
patriotic" Whig party place sectional interest and factionalism above 
national unity. The Tories as the "national party of England" represent 
national traditions, the national character and the national church. These 
themes formed the crux of the Conservative Party's national strategy under 
Disraeli's leadership as illustrated in his famous 1872 speeches at 
Xanchester and Crystal Palace. In these, the upholding of national 
institutions, the "elevation of the condition of the people" and imperialism 
were outlined as the party's "three great objects". Through these policies, the 
Conservative Party would enhance its position as the national party, gaining 
the support of the patriotic and deferrential British people. 
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"The people of England, and especially the working classes of England, 
are proud of belonging to a great country and wish to maintain its 
greatness.. they believe, on. the whole, that the greatness and empire of 
England are to be attributed to the ancient institutions of the land" 
(Quoted in O'Gorman, 1986, p. 147). 
The Conservative Party's defence of existing institutions was framed so 
as to appeal to the latent patriotism of the people with social reform 
helping to bind the national community. The utility of social reform was 
Judged by its integrative effects, creating "one nation" by neutralizing class 
conflict, rather than by reference to social justice or citizenship rights. 
The "elevation of the condition" of the people would ensure social stability, 
while its patriotic appeal would secure popular deferrence and continued 
rule by a hierarchical (but paternalist) elite. "One nation" conservatism 
envisaged a national community in which people were bound together by 
reciprocal obligations plus patriotic respect for the Constitution, the 
Church and the social hierarchy. The state in industrial England had to 
adopt some of the paternalistic duties previously bound up in the concept 
of "noblesse oblIge", but beyond the rhetoric there lay little in terns of 
social legislation. 
Paul Smith's study of the record of the Disraeli governments argues 
that the Conservatives offered by way of a social reform strategy. Rather 
than achieving a "rapprochement with the masses", the Disraelian party 
achieved "the assimilation of the bourgeoisie" (Smith, 1967, p. 3). Behind the 
social reform rhetoric lay the reality of minimal practical legislation, 
though the extension of compulsory education certainly aided the cause of 
conservative state nationalism. Although the practical achievements of the 
Conservatives have often been overstated, the Disraelian linkage of national 
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well-being with minimising the damaging effects of class division continued 
to be seen as a core of Conservative national strategy. In the 1880s Lord 
Randolph Churchill picked up "Elijah's Mantle" on social reform by 
developing a "Tory Democracy" of imperialism, social reform and maintenance 
of the constitution, with which to attract support from urban areas 
(Quinault, 1979). Joseph Chamberlain began his career as a radical Liberal, but 
as a Liberal Unionist from the 1890s he identified social reform, national 
unity and imperial expansion with Conservative policies. 
Despite the paternalistic and collectivist values of Churchill and 
Chamberlain, the Conservative governments of Disraeli and Salisbury tended 
to lean towards pragmatic free-market economics, and the party organisation 
had greater success in attracting the support of the urban bourgeoisie than 
the working class or trade unionists (Cornford, 1963/4). The most significant 
aspect of the Disraelian "one nation" legacy was its appeal to national 
unity and the use of nationalist or imperialist propoganda (often linked 
with social reform) to attract support and disguise class conf lict. The 
transformation of the conservative nation into a Conservative Party 
national strategy reflected important social developments: the growth of 
democracy with its associated need for the party to attract and mobilize 
support; and the expansion in social communications which meant that 
official state nationalism could be an effective tool in the hands of the 
conservative state. 
The association of the Conservative Party with imperialism was another 
Disraelian achievement, developed further by Joseph Chamberlain. Disraeli had 
followed Palmerston's lead in portraying foreign policy in terms of national 
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interest and pride in imperial achievements, but tied it to the other planks 
of the conservative national strategy. The intense Jingoism and propoganda 
surrounding imperial expansion enhanced the image of the Conservatives as 
the upholders of patriotism and unity, and helped spread the appeal of the 
conservative nation. Jingoism spread among the lower middle-classes as a 
reaction to the disintegration of traditional values and social structures 
(Price, 197 7). Kew systems of mass communication such as the popular press, 
the music halls and later the cinemas acted as agents for the spread of 
imperialism into the popular psyche (MacKenzie, 1985). The image of the 
Conservatives as the national and imperial party was reinforced by attacks 
on Gladstone's reluctance towards imperial expansion, and later his support 
for Irish Home Rule. Although primarily remembered for their espousal of 
"one nation" conservatism, a large part of Disraeli's 1872 speeches were 
taken up by attacks on Liberal policy towards the empire as divisive and 
not in the national interest. Party propoganda was widely used in the battle 
for electoral support, with patriotic appeals at the heart of the 
Conservative mobilization of the lower middle-classes. 
"The central argument which appears in the popular party literature is 
that the Conservatives are uniquely qualified to govern Britain and 
that the institutions of the country are safe in their hands 
alone.. Because of their understanding of the nation and its history, 
their devotion to the interests of the whole community, and their 
inherently superior governmental skills, they alone are qualified to 
rule" (McKenzie & Silver, 1968, pp. 72-3). 
The growth of imperialist rhetoric and Jingoism was related to the 
increased popularity of Social Darwinism and racial accounts of politics 
(Bolt, 1984; Baumgart, 1982). Disraeli believed that "race was everything", and 
the "key to history", with the Saxon and Jewish races notable for their 
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strength and purity. Chamberlain saw imperialist expansion as a national 
mission for the British race Othe greatest governing race the world has 
ever seen") to spread "civilization" and overcome "barbarism" (Bennett, 
1962). 2 Racial theories were commonplace in much late Victorian 
thought, often being expressed in the crude pseudo-scientific language of 
Social Darwinism and in xenophobia aimed at Irish inhabitants in Britain 
and "uncivilizedu ethnic groups in the Empire. Ideas of the superiority of 
the British race and its moral mission to "civilize" other races were 
widespread in this popular culture of imperialism and militarism. Many 
Liberal and Conservative supporters of Empire wrote in terms of national 
mission or the expansion of the British nation: Dilkes and Seeley spoke of 
the self-governing colonies as part of a "Greater Britain" united by race, 
language and law. In the 1870s, imperialism involved the desire to strengthen 
bonds between Anglo-Saxon settlers and the mother country, and ideas of a 
civilizing mission (Koerner & Schmidt, 1964). But universalizing themes of 
racial unity or mission were a diversion from the particularism of the 
conservative nation (Balibar & Vallerstein, 1991, pp. 59-61). Expansionist 
imperialism marked a move away from the parochial Burkean nation (and its 
enlightened imperialism) towards a more ideological brand of nationalist 
politics. 
Disraeli saw imperial expansion as a means of Increasing British power 
and spreading British governing skills, but Chamberlain played the pivotal 
role in developing a popular Conservative imperialism. He equated imperial 
expansion with social reform, claiming that "social imperialism" would see 
the increased wealth Britain gained from her colonies being used to improve 
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the condition of the people. Colonial outlets would provide new markets to 
maintain economic stability and Britain's strong trading position, though in 
reality the myths of imperial glory only served to mask Britain's long-term 
decline from world-power status. Chamberlain also looked to a federal union 
of Britain and her self-governing colonies and regarded the new imperialism 
in Africa in terms of a civilizing mission (Kipling's "White Man's Burden). 3 
Imperial propaganda was widespread in the popular culture of the day, 
but in the longer term imperialism posed problems for both the British 
state and the Conservative's national strategy. The conservative nation was 
both enhanced and threatened by imperialism. Initially imperial propaganda 
helped the spread of conservative nationalism in Britain, but attempts to 
find a wider imperial or racial identity incorporating Britain and her 
colonies were unsuccessful and undermined the conservative nation. 
Chamberlain's advocacy of imperial preference and tariff reform dominated 
politics in the Edwardian era and divided the Conservative Party. He equated 
tariff reform with imperial solidarity, social reform and commerical 
expansion, but the policy was economicaly dubious and electorally unpopular 
(opponents dubbed the Conservatives the party of "dear food") (Green, 1985). 
As I have noted, the late Victorian era was one in which conservative 
nationalism was popularized and mobilized by a concerted use of myths and 
symbols, one of the most significant of which was the monarchy. The monarchy 
had been 'long recognized as a symbol of national unity during times of 
crisis, but was not the central plank . of official state nationalism 
(Cannadine, 1986). Hobsbawm's "invented tradition" thesis notes the way in 
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which emerging democracies dramatized the national community by reviving 
civic rituals as expressions of official state nationalism (Hobsbawm & 
Ranger, 1983). Significant invented traditions, myths or symbols of British 
conservative state nationalism included imperial propaganda, myths about the 
Anglo-Saxon race (Melman, 1991), the creation of national symbols such as 
Brittania or John Bull, and the celebration of the nation in music and 
literature. Invented traditions symbolized social cohesion and membership of 
the national community, legitimized the conservative state and were used to 
mobilize support for the conservative nation (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, p. 7). 
The ritualization and commercialization of the monarchy began in 
earnest with the popular ceremonials which marked Victoria's Golden and 
Diamond Jubilee's of 1887 and 1897. The monarchy became a symbol of the 
ancient constitution and of national cohesion at a time when republicanism 
was threatening to undermine it. 4 The empire and the monarchy (linked with 
the crowning of Victoria as Empress of India) passed into popular culture, 
promoting lower class patriotism in defence of the constitution and the 
conservative nation. Pugh has noted the role of the Primrose League in 
mobilizing the monarchy (and the Church of England) as a symbol of the 
conservative nation, thereby achieving the desired effect of increasing 
working class support for conservative values (Pugh, 1985). Tom Nairn argues 
that the monarchy provides the United Kingdom with a surrogate national 
identity that offers a sense of community without mass participation 
(Iffairn, 1988, a; Arblaster, 1989). However, it is my contention that the 
popularization of the monarchy was only one element in the creation of a 
conservative state nationalism in the late 19th century. National identity 
had been politicized in the course of the earlier development of radical and 
-80- 
conservative concepts of the nation, and was appropriated by the 
conservative state at this time of social upheaval. Disguising conflicting 
class interests and mobilizing the lower classes behind popular expressions 
of conservative state nationalism allowed the Conservative Party and the 
ruling elites to maintain the exisiting social structures and successfully 
adapt to mass politics. Though the monarchy was an' important mobilizing 
agent, it was never wholly, politicized or identified with the Conservative 
Party. 
The Conservative Party's national strategy in the late nineteenth 
century was directed towards territorial unity as well as social unity. This 
concern for the territorial integrity of the nation-state was most notable 
in Conservative , support for the Union" with Ireland, especially when 
contrasted with Gladstone's attempts to bring about Irish Home Rule. 
Imperialism benefitted the Conservtive's national strategy in electoral 
terms, but the greatest benefit arising from opposition to Irish Home Rule 
was -in the sphere of "high politicsl. Chamberlain and Hartington led a 
breakaway from Gladstone's Liberal Party after his 1886 Home Rule Bill, 
with their Liberal Unionist MPs being firmly allied with the Conservative 
Party after the 1893 Home Rule Bill (Fair, 1986). Fair claims that the Irish 
Question was the dominant factor in the flight of the Liberal Unionists, 
analysing the voting behaviour of MPs to show that policy differences 
between Liberal Unionists and Conservatives existed in other areas. 
Chamberlain claimed that the Conservatives offered the best chances of 
social-reform and imperial expansion, but his tariff reform campaign divided 
the party in the Edwardian era. 
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Chamberlain, Churchill and Salisbury linked conservatism with Unionism, 
but it was the political theorist Albert Dicey who of fered the clearest 
defence of the Union , (Dicey, 1973; Ford, 19 85). DiceY rejected , federalism as 
alien to the British constitution and attacked the nationalists, claim that 
Ireland was ready to become a self-governing nation. He supported 
Chamberlain's "constructive Unionism", arguing that only the Union could 
maintain jusitce, freedom and state authority. The party's commitment to the 
Union proved electorally advantageous in Protestant working-class areas 
where the links between Orangeism and Conservative voting lasted into the 
second half of the 20th century. However, Unionism was ý not as effective a 
plank of conservative nationalism as imperialism and did not have the same 
impact on popular opinion. The Unionist territorial settlement afforded the 
conservative state a sufficient level of autonomy to manage "high politics", 
but territorial integration was incomplete (Bulpitt, 1983). The centre's 
willingness to grant peripheral areas a large measure of governmental and 
cultural autonomy maintained the state's ethnic balancing act, ensuring that 
Unionism was not merely an extension of English identity and interests. 
Long-held national identities lived alongside Unionist culture, preventing 
the latter from becoming the sole mode of identity. 
In the Edwardian era the Conservative's "national strategy" of one 
nation politics and nationalist rhetoric began to run into trouble as 
nationalist appeals divided the party and lost popularity. Conservative 
nationalism had begun as a collection of general, popullst values such as 
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empire or national unity, but gradually became identified with specific (and 
often unpopular) policies (Cunningham, 1 986). Conservat ive imperialism lost 
its mobilizing character after the Boer War and was riven by internal 
division during Chamberlain's tariff reform campaign. Though Chamberlain had 
claimed that the Conservative's were committed to social reform, the 
Edwardian era saw the party defending privilege and opposing constitution 
reform and welfare measures. Conservative support for the Union remained 
strong, but was not a major mobilizing force. 
Another factor in the decline of the Conservative's national strategy 
was the emergence of a Radical Right which used an extreme and divisive 
form of nationalist rhetoric. Only with Baldwin's patriotism, based on 
nostalgia for rural England and a desire for national unity, did the moderate 
Right regain its grip on patriotic discourse. The Edwardian Radical Right 
was not a united ideological grouping, but the most significant in 
nationalist terms were the "Diehards" (eg Lord Willoughby de Broke) and 
Lord Milner's social imperialists (Sykes, 1983; Searle, 1981). Willoughby de 
Broke fused together a number of themes in a pragmatic "nationalist 
strategy" akin to that of the continental Right. He was critical of the rich 
for failing to perform the social duties demanded by "noblesse oblige"tyet 
opposed the Parliament Bill despite a Unionist whip (Phi llips, 19 8 0). Other 
themes included *national efficiency", social imperialism and tariff reform, 
"race regeneration" and strong Unionism-The Radical Right faction sought to 
restore a populist-nationalist ideology with which to attract the votes of 
the masses, but it made little headway in the Conservative Party. Its 
Onationalist strategy" however showed the ability of the Right to seize the 
nationalist mantle and damage the image and integrity of the moderate 
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"conservative nation". The nationalism of the Edwardian Right was also 
expressed in popular Leagues which built an mass patriotism and lobbied for 
nationalist policies. Among the most significant were the Tariff Reform 
League, with which Chamberlain was closely associated, and the Navy League 
which lobbied for social cohesion, a. strong navy and Nsplendid isolation" 
in foreign policy (Summers, 1981). The Primrose League had been an important 
player in the spread of conservative nationalism and the "invention" of the 
conservative monarchy, but its mobilizing impetus had begun to wane by the 
late Edwardian era (Pugh, 1985). 
The Conservative Party did not form a majority government until the 
early 1920s, divided by the issue of tariff reform for much of the period. 
The First World War restored the party's belief in itself as the party of 
nation and patriotism, but it could no longer convincingly present its 
Liberal or socialist opponents as want i-patriotic". V ith the decline of the 
Liberals, the Conservatives re-emerged as the party of government. As leader, 
Baldwin re-established its credentials as the party of national unity and 
social reform rather than class interests, but still struggled with the 
tariff reform issue. Baldwin's patriotism was that of the English country 
gentleman, evoking images of a ugolden age" of rural life and idealizing the 
English character (Baldwin, 1937,1938 & 1939). This marked a return to an 
essentially English parochial conservative nation, moving away from imperial 
mission and nationalist ideology. Baldwin depoliticized the conservative 
nation, cleansing it of racist and aggressively nationalist elements, making a 
clearer distinction between moderate conservatism and the nationalist Right. 
The Baldwinite concept of the nation stressed themes of national unity, a 
settled polity and latent patriotism (Schwarz, 19 86). Th is reflected a general 
-84- 
trend towards studies of national character (eg by Sir Ernest Barker) and 
themes of rural England and local patriotisms. 6 Baldwin waxed lyrical about 
the English countryside and his memories of rural Worcestershire. 
'Then I ask myself what I mean by England.. England comes to me through 
my various senses - through the ears, through the eye, and through 
certain imperishable scents.. The sources of England, the tinkle of the 
hammer on the anvil in the country smithy, the corncrake on a dewy 
morning, the sound of the scythe against the whetstone, and the sight of 
a plough team coming over the brown of a hill, the sight that has been 
England long after the Empire has perished and every worker in England 
has ceased to fuction, for centuries the one eternal sight of England. " 
("On England", 1924; in Baldwin, 1936, p. 2 0). 
Baldwin's idea of the nation was a return to the traditional English 
ordered community, relegating the now unpopular or defunct themes of 
'Unionism and imperialism. The establishment of the Irish Free State altered 
the character of the Conservative's national strategy: many of the unpopular 
elements of Unionism had been purged, and Baldwin's patriotism was 
essentially English, building on traditional identities rather than 
politically manufactured ones. Scottish conservatism however retained its 
distinctive features and the Conservative commitment to Ulster ensured 
support in Orange areas. Although it was primarily insular, Baldwin's 
conservative patriotism retained a romantic attachment to empire, but 
allowed greater self-government including the 1935 Government of India 
Act. The gradual move away from imperial government was criticized by some 
Conservatives such as Leo Amery, for whom Empire was the embodiment of the 
principles of British political evolution. 
"The Empire is the embodiment of a tradition of political life in which 
all are free to co-operate-The British Empire is not merely an adequate 
field for economic development, or a sound and economical system of 
mutual security. It is a partnership in memories, in sentiment, in outlook, 
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in ideals. It is, above all, a living personal thing, a mighty soul housed in 
no mean outward framework. " (L. Amery, 1935, pp. 174-5). 
The retreat from Empire after 1945 left the conservative nation 
f loundering. Many Conservatives continued to support British colonial and 
overseas commitments, but the Commonwealth failed to become an effective 
means of ensuring a British world role. The end of Empire and Britain's 
declining political and economic status, contributed to a, mood of national 
self-doubt in which patriotism was shunned. The conservative concept of the 
nation suffered accordingly unitl Powell sought to redefine the nation and 
restore a positive sense of national identity, free from the corrosive myths 
of the past. 
In this chapter I have examined the emergence of the conservative 
concept of the nation as the dominant one in British politics, and the 
benefits the Conservative Party derived from this. England had developed as 
a centralized nation-state in the early modern period, while national 
consciousness was evident among the ruling groups well before the French 
Revolution ushered in a period of nationalist politics. There was no mass 
nationalist movement in England: instead nationalism was appropriated by 
conservative forces, first by Burke's doctrine of conservative patriotism and 
then by the development of an official state nationalism in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. The doctrinal basis of the Burkean nation, 
focusing an the organic constitution, its links with the national character 
and the importance of the national community, has remained the leading 
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model of conservative state patriatism. This Burkean nation was seized upon 
by the governing classes and transformed into a populist nationalism by 
Disraeli and Chamberlain. The Conservative national strategy which they 
developed had two central expressions: (i) the translation of the 
conservative nation into a Conservative Party programme of national unity, 
social reform, imperialism and Unionism; and (ii) the spread of conservative 
state nationalism into popular culture, often by the Conservative Party and 
its popular Leagues, through myths of empire, race and monarchy, and the use 
of jingoism for party political purposes. 
This national strategy was highly successful in mobilizing patriotic 
support behind the Conservative Party, and in popularizing the conservative 
constitution. Radical -accounts of the nation were neutralized by the 
extensive 'penetration of conservative nationalism into popular culture and 
by the identification of patriotic values with the Conservative Party. 
However, cracks began to emerge in the Conservative's national strategy in 
the Edwardian era as the popularity of imperialism and Unionism waned and 
rival views on empire emerged within the party. The nationalist Right took 
many of the values of the conservative nation to extremes, threatening to 
undermine the integrity of the patriotism of the moderate Right. Baldwin's 
rural nostalgia restored much of the integrity of the conservative nation, 
and echoed the Disraelian aim of neutralizing class conflict through a 
politics of social harmony and cohesion-By the end of the Second Vorld Var 
though, the Conservative's national strategy had been severely weakened. The 
gradual retreat from empire, Britain's decline as a world power, and the 
emergence of a collectivist consensus all hindered the development of a new 
conservative concept of the nation. In subsequent chapters on Powellism and 
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Thatcherismj will look at more recent attempts at reviving a national 
strategy, commenting in particular an the modern dichotomy between "one 
nation" and "nationalist" strategies. The next chapter though looks at the 
concept of the nation in the thought of the Kew Right. 
Miller notes a common defence of the post-1688 Establishment in the 
thought of Hume, Smith and Burke. He argues that only Burke can truly be 
deemed a conservative (in the ideological sense) because only he lived 
long enough to react to the ideological issues raised by the French 
Revolution. See David Miller: Pbilosopby and Ideclogy in Hume's 
Political Thougbt, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981. 
2. See Volfgang Mock: "The Function of 'Race' in Imperialist Ideologies: The 
Example of Joseph Chamberlain" in Paul Kennedy & Anthony Nicholls 
(eds): Yationalist and Racialist Novements in Britain and Germany 
Before 1914. Macmillan, London, 1981. pp. 190-203. 
3. On the history of the British Empire see Bernard Potter: A Sbcrt 
History of Britisb Imperialism, 1850-1983.2nd edition, Longman, London, 
1984. T. O. Lloyd: The Britisb Empire, 1558-1983. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1984. 
4. The monarchy had been a symbol of nationhood for the Establishment in 
Elizabethan and Georgian tines, but was dynastic in character and often 
directly involved in politics through Court parties. Only in the 
Victorian era was the monarchy popularized and effectively 
depoliticized. 
5. On early 20th century patriotism see Robert Colls & Philip Dodd feds): 
Englisbness. ftli tics and Cultur-e, 1880-1920. Croon Helm, London, 1986. 
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Theories of nation and nationalism in British politics had long been 
the property of the moderate right, exemplified in the Conservative Party's 
status as the "national party", when both conservatism and the viability of 
the nation-state were forcibly challenged in the post-war world. The 
Keynesian Welfare State consensus produced a shift in conservative politics 
away from individualism and laissez-faire towards a collectivist and 
interventionist approach. Xacmillan's NXiddle Way" (Macmillan, 1938) and 
Butler's "new conservatism" had replaced the laissez-faire and anti-statist 
approaches of Sir Ernest Benn and Lord Hugh Cecil (Benn, 1953; Cecil, 1912). 
However, the post-war consensus and the "new conservatism" of state 
intervention were challenged by a revival of classical liberalism, tempered 
by conservative traditionalism, most notably in the writings of Friedrich 
Hayek. By the 1970S this *New Right" trend in political theory began to 
manifest itself in the Conservative Party, initially through Enoch 
Powell, then through the monetarist economics of Sir Keith Joseph. ' 
The New Right is not though a homogeneous body of political opinion. 
There are commonly acknowledged to be two clear bodies within the New 
Right. The first is made up of economic liberals concerned to promote the 
virtues 'of the free-market, individual liberty, a negative concept of freedom 
and a greatly reduced role for the state. The second group is less cohesive, 
but tends to stress the authority of the state, the importance of traditional 
institutions and morality, and the cultural and national identities which 
shape the individual. The libertarian wing of the New Right has an 
individualist methodolgy, while the authoritarian wing has at its core a 
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belief in the importance of culture and communal identity. In this section of 
the thesis I will examine how both wings have contributed to a renewed 
interest in national identity (often culturally or racially defined). The 
libertarians acted as its thesis, the authoritarians its antithesis, to 
produce a synthesis of economic liberalism and strong state nationalism as 
seen in the thought of Powell and, less cohesively, in the politics of 
Thatcherism. 
Libertarians such as Nazick have only peripheral relevance f or the 
study of contemporary conservatism. Their wholesale rejection of a role f or 
the state beyond maintaining the conditions necessary f or individual 
liberty and the workings of the capitalist market economy is clearly 
contrary to the conservative values of authority, tradition and allegiance. 
Libertarianism is instead a radical restatement of classical liberalism. 2 
Nozick's individualism is a restatement of Lockean principles of individual 
rights, property and the minimal or "night-watchman state" which emerges 
from competing *mutual protection agencies" (Nozick, 1974). For libertarians, 
political order is only Justifiable if it is beneficial to individual 
freedon. Nozick's theory lacks any concept of community, citizenship or 
identity: group membership is voluntary, and the individual rather than the 
group is the basic unit of analysis. 
Of more immediate interest to the study of the New Right and 
contemporary British conservatism is the work of Samuel Brittan, a neo- 
liberal economics thought is supplemented by his "two cheers" for 
utilitarian theory. Brittan's support for the market economy derives from 
this mixed neo- liberal /utilitarian standpoint but also takes a libertarian 
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attitude , towards morality which conservatives associate with the 
upermissive society" (Brittan, 1988). Brittan has called for liberalization of 
economic life in a largely unbridled system of competitive capitalism, and 
an extension of personal liberty. Competitive capitalism and the "permissive 
society" are two sides of the same coin, as the consumer society and 
enhanced personal freedom will inevitably break down traditional class and 
hierarchical barriers. Capitalism for Brittan is undermined by the corporate 
institutions and traditional social structures with which it has been forced 
to operate. 
Brittan promotes a "corrected market economy", with the prof it native 
and self-interest as its guiding values, but working in a framework of rules 
to provide an optimal market environment and -meet individual needs where 
the market has proved inefficient (Brittan 1988). His is a theory drawing on 
liberal utilitarianism and a Rawlsian-type system of contractarian rights 
(Brittan, 1983). The utilitarian method of Judging actions by their effects an 
individuals and their welfare is welcomed, but he believes this must be 
tempered by a system of rights and constitutionalism. He shares the Hayekian 
opposition to the dangers of "unlimited democracy" produced by the 
excessive demands of interest groups and bureaucracy (Brittan, 1975,1977 & 
1983). Of traditional conservative concepts of society and tradition, Brittan 
notes: 
"Once the traditional consensus broke down, and human expectations were 
increased, the concept of society as an organism with its own demands 
became a recipe for unlimited political intervention and for 
interminable strife. " (Brittan, 1988, p. 105). 
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The concept of society is associated with the nationalist Right of 
which he is highly critical. Brittan's distaste for nationalism is clearly 
seen in his critique of the Thatcher government's handling of the 1982 
Falklands conflict. From a utilitarian analysis, war is unjustifiable even if 
through fighting a possible future benefit may be real ized. However, 
"It was obvious to the world that the motives of most of the British 
public in supporting the war had nothing to do with safeguarding 
international law; the struggle was a symbolic one over hurt national 
pride. " (Brittan, 1983, p. 47) 
As with the concept of society, the idea of the nation is a dangerous 
one, threatening individual liberty and autonomy. Brittan has also been 
critical of the way in which the debate on European economic and monetary 
union has degenerated into the rhetoric of national sovereignty. The real 
focus should not be on such fictions or abstractions as nationhood, but on 
individual freedom. 
"It would be useful to translate all political demands into statements 
about individual human beings-statements about governments, states or 
nations should be translated into translated into statements relating 
to individuals, who alone can feel, suffer or die. " (Brittan, 1983, p. 20). 
For the economic liberals the voluntary actions of individuals are the 
only true basis of group action or community. Comnunity or nation has no 
prior claim an the allegiance of the indiv idual. Nat ions then are to be seen 
as composed of individuals rather than as an organic whole. Individuals must 
be seen as the best judges of their own interests and policies must be 
tailored to satisfy their needs. Liberalism is restored as an essentially 
individualist ethos whereas the dominant strand in conservative thought has 
seen individuals taking their place in a whole which is greater than the 
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sum of its members. Hayek's thought contains the individualist methodology 
of the economic liberals, but also a conservative stress on evolution and 
tradition, though again without a true theory of community. 
Hayek's conservatism. 
The postscript to Hayek's "The Constitution of Liberty" is a critique of 
conservatism, outlining why Hayek himself rejected claims that he was a 
conservative (Hayek, 196 0). However, in this section I will argue that Hayek's 
thought contains important conservative themes, notably his emphasis on 
tradition and the evolution of the rules of social order, but is critical of 
the hierarchical community of ordered liberty which makes up the 
conservative concept of the nation. Hayek's account is of a "political, nation" 
in which individuals find expression for their social character through the 
shared political traditions and interests of a market economy. 
Hayek def ines conservatism largely in terms of its opposition to 
liberalism and progress, claiming that conservatism offers only resistance 
to undesirable developments and a defence of existing institutions rather 
than an alternative set of ideas. Conservatism is based on opportunism, 
nostalgia and a fear of change, is complacent towards authority and unable 
to comprehend the logic of market forces, leaning towards protectionism. The 
conservative reverence of author ity, hierarchy and its tendency towards 
collectivism are compared unfavourably with the individualist and 
progressive ethos of liberalism. The conservative is intellectually weak 
because of his distrust of new knowledge and lack of a body of political 
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principles. This weakness in the battle of ideas is further revealed by 
conservatism's proneness to nationalism. 
"Connected with the conservative distrust of the new and the strange is 
its hostility to internationalism and its proneness to a strident 
national ism.. The ideas which are changing our civilization respect no 
national boundaries.. It is this nationalistic bias which frequently 
provides the bridge from conservatism to collectivism: to think in terms 
of 'our' industry or resource is only a short step away from demanding 
that these national assests be directed in the national interest. " 
(Hayek, 196 O, p. 4 05). 
Hayek's opposition to nationalism and economic protectionism are 
clearly seen in the international nature of his Great Society (Hayek, 1982, 
vol. 3). The workings of the market economy occur on a worldwide scale and 
should not be distorted by nationalistic policies of protection or misplaced 
feelings of communal solidarity. Nat ional ism and collectivism, like feelings 
of communal solidarity, are "primitive" or *tribal" feelings, inappropriate to 
the international and impersonal market economy of his ideal Great Society. 
Hayek talks of the clash between loyalty to the tribal group and the 
commitment to universal Justice, arguing that the latter must win out in a 
free society where the most important groups are small, voluntary 
associations (Hayek, 1 982, vol. 2, pp. 147-152). The free society should renounce 
the tendency for communal groupings to seek the common good. Protectionist 
and collectivist policies threaten the freedom of the individual, which is 
the guiding ethos of his Great Society, and undermine the economic benefits 
of the catallaxy (market economy). But society still suffers from its sub- 
division into smaller groups based an tribal habits and primitive desires 
for communal solidarity and face-to-face relations (Forsyth, p. 246). 
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*Vhile I look forward, as an ultimate ideal, to a state of affairs in 
which national boundaries have ceased to be obstacles to the free 
movement of menj believe that within any period with which we can now 
be concerned, any attempt to realize it would lead to a revival of 
strong nationalist sentiments and a retreat from positions already 
achieved. However far modern man accepts in principle the ideal that the 
same rules should apply to all nen, in fact he does concede it only to 
those whom he regards as similar to himself, and only slowly learns to 
extend the range of those he does accept as his own. " (Hayek, 1982, vol 2, 
p. 58). 
Hayek's evolutionary process through which unfavourable ideas and 
practices are rejected has not yet been able to overcome "primitive" 
feelings of community. The individualist ethos of the Great Society, under 
which the individual is an autonomous economic unit guided by the rules and 
traditions of that society, is also undermined by democratically-elected 
governments pursuing collective welfare. The functions of the state are wider 
than those of Mozick's minimal state, with Hayek's concern being that 
government intervention is not directed towards achieving specific goals or 
benefiting identifiable individuals (Barry, 1979). Gne area of state 
involvement which Hayek regards as necessary, despite his criticism of 
Otribal" instincts of communal identity, is control over immigration. 
"To confine to the citizens of particular countries provisions for a 
minimum standard higher than that universally applied makes it a 
privilege and necessitates certain limitations on the free movement of 
men across frontiers-Such restrictions apper unavoidable so long as 
certain differences in national or ethnic traditions (especially 
differences in the rate of propagation) exist. " (Hayek, 1982, vol 3, p. 56). 
Hayek's view of man and the evolution of the rules of society are 
similar to the accounts offered by conservatism. Man is not a self- 
determining being using his reason to organize society in terns of abstract 
or artificial principles, but is a natural being or biological organism 
working within a system of rules and traditions (Hayek, 1982, vol. 2, pp. 35-54 
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& 1960, pp. 54-70) -Culture and society are not rationally created entities 
but emerge through a process of "cultural evolution" in which the rules 
most beneficial to the free society become established as traditions. Reason 
appears through the tacit knowledge by which man comes to recognize and 
understand social organization: 
"The mind is embedded in a traditional impersonal structure of learnt 
rules, and its capacity to order experience is an aquired replica of 
cultural patterns which every individual mind finds given. The brain is 
an organ enabling us to absorb, but not to design culture. " (Hayek, 1982, 
vol 3, p157). 
This distrust of man's capacity to artificially create the rules and 
Institutions of social organization echoes the model of human nature found 
in conservative thought. Hayek's account of the evolution of society also has 
significant similarities with conservative accounts of the organic rather 
than mechanical creation of society. Society is a growth, evolving over time 
and mirroring the evolutionary processes of nature in that the optimal 
customs and institutions survive to become the rules of the Great Society. 
This cultural evolution is a selection and rejection process in which the 
rules best suited to the free society and individual development emerge. 
Rules and traditions are spontaneously formed, the unintended consequences 
of mans' interactions. The "spontaneous order" emerges from mans' adherence 
to the rules of conduct which ensure his survival and progress. Xan is 
incapable of rationally creating society, only becoming aware of his positon 
through social rules. Man emerges from the initial primitive and tribal 
stages of the evolutionary process into the urban and commercial 
environment of the Great Society in which individual's seek progress and 
the maximization of their wealth and autonomy. Crowley argues that primitive 
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and tribal societies are doomed in Hayek's Great Society because its 
emphasis on collective goals is incompatible with the desire of individuals 
to follow their own life-plans (Crowley, 1987). Freedom is the goal of man, and 
the root of civilization, but individual liberty is best expressed in an 
ordered society. 
Hayek's evolutionary account of the development of society fuses the 
role of man as a purposive individual, seeking autonomy and wealth, with a 
social order which structures the interactions between individuals (Rowland, 
1987, p. 38). Individual actions are comprehensible because of recognized rules 
and trad itions. Trad it ions and social institutions are *knowledge- bearers", 
acting as the necessary conditions for man to become a purposive being 
(Hayek, 196 O, pp. 54-7 0). This emphasis on the importance of traditions as 
unplanned guides to social action, being embedded in successful rules, again 
fuses a liberal emphasis on freedom with conservative values. 
"He has produced a defence of liberty which reconciles the modern sense 
of individuality with the claims of tradition. Hayek shows that we are 
to rely primarily on inherited traditions of thought and conduct in all 
our dealings with each other. " (J. Gray, 1988, p. 256). 
This valuing of tradition implies that any change based on abstract 
reasoning is dangerous, and rests uneasily with his criticism that 
conservatism places too much value on existing institutions at the expense 
of progress. In his "Individualism and the Economic Order", Hayek notes that: 
Nthe fundamental attitude of true individualism is one of humility 
toward the process by which mankind has achieved things which have 
not been designed or understood by any individual and are indeed 
greater than human minds. " (Hayek, 194 B, p. 24). 
-97- 
Although Hayek's account incorporates conservative values of tradition 
and anti-rationalism, his political thought lacks the extensive notion of 
community found in conservative doctrine. Hayek's Great Society is not a 
community in the sense that tribal societies were: here is no common idea of 
collective good or communal solidarity. The whole is not greater than the 
sum of its parts, so society never transcends its individual members. These 
types of tribal society are a throwback to a type of social organization 
rejected by the evolution of freedom. Indeed Hayek cares little for the 
nation as a community and explicitly rejects nationalist economics. There is 
little mention of patriotic allegiance or the national basis of traditions 
and culture, though he accepts that the Great Society is an ideal and that 
nation-states are likely to survive in the medium- term. Hayek Is theory of 
society is then a minimalist account of the "political nation": the most 
individuals living in any one territory need to have in common is 
allegiance to the same set of traditions and rules of conduct which flow 
over time. Ideal ly, the Great Society should nullify national boundaries, but 
Hayek recognizes the present day attachment to the nation-state and the 
need for immigration controls. Hayek's idea of community is a limited one: 
society is a collection of strangers meeting in the marketplace to make 
mutually beneficial exchanges, l inked only by their allegiance to shared 
ruies. Tribal loyalties threaten individual autonomy and the smooth 
functioning of the market: individuals may share allegiance to social rules, 
but diversity is vital. 
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"The moral superiority of the Great Society lies in its anonymity, the 
distance it requires all men to establish between themselves and 
others, which in turn allows men, in their pursuit of their own private 
and arbitrary goods, to provide goods to anonymous purchasers, guided in 
what to produce only be the impersonal price mechanism and not by any 
form of coercion. " (Crowley, p. 235). 
In claiming that he is not a conservative, Hayek recognizes that he does 
not fit into the category of classical liberal either, instead calling 
himself an "Old Whig", a title he also accords to Edmund Burke (Hayek, 1960). I 
have already noted the similarities between Burkean values and the Hayekian 
themes of man as a social animal, the development of society through the 
evolution of rules, plus his stress an traditions as governing the arena of 
social relations. Rowland detects a Burkean influence in Hayek's limited 
account of the basis of community in legal and political traditions 
(Rowland, 1987, pp. 103-128). However, it is my contention that whereas Burke 
offered the paradigmatic account of the conservative nation, Hayek presents 
an account of a "political nation", a subcategory of the conservative nation 
which is critical of the values of community present in the former. Hayek's 
limited sense of community includes none of the Burkean emphasis an 
national character and its relation to the institutions or political culture 
of a society (which links nation or civil society with the state). The 
political account of the nation as presented by Hayek lacks a sense of the 
importance of the nation as a community bringing together individuals 
through feelings of communal solidarity and patriotic attachment to the 
institutions and traditions of the nation-state. 
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Oakeshott and the "Political Nation". 
The political thought of Michael Oakeshott is similar to that of Hayek 
in its liberal-conservative emphasis an the legal and political basis of 
social relations .3 In both, the idea of community is limited to those human 
relations governed by constitutionalism and traditional rules of 
association. However, while Hayek seems to deny the national basis of 
society and traditions, looking forward to an internationalist Great Society, 
Oakeshott looks to the British case as the optimal example of a political 
community. Oakeshott believes that patriotism is a conservative virtue, 
showing a greater awareness of the national character of traditions and 
institutions than Hayek. In "On Being Conservative", Oakeshott describes 
conservatism as a preference for the familiar and an aversion to 
fundamental change (Oakeshott, 1962, pp. 168-196). The conservative values 
man's identity as a member of a national community and fears any change 
which will radically undermine this identity. 
The conservative regards politics as a limited activity and opposes 
rationalist or ideological projects to govern society according to end-state 
goals. The British constitution illustrates this limited politics for the rule 
of law, with its emphasis on individual freedom and balanced government, is 
the basis of British political tradition. A society developed along these 
lines is a "civil association", organized on "moral" practices of allegiance 
to authoritative, traditional rules. Legalistic "modes of association" are 
those based on the recognized authority of, and obedience to, known, non- 
instrumental rules. His focus is on the authenticity of the authoritative 
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legal body (Olex"), rather than on the Justice ("Jus") of its pronouncements 
(Oakeshott, 1983). This civil association compares favourably with "entreprise 
association" which is founded on the pursuit of the "common interest" and 
so extends the scope of the political, threatening limited government and 
individual freedom. 
"The rule of law bakes no bread, it is unable to distribute loaves and 
fishes (it has none), and it cannot protect itself against external 
assault, but it remains the most civilized and least burdensome 
conception of state yet to be devised. " (Oakeshott, 1983, p. 164). 
Again we have an account of society drawing on the liberal-conservative 
theme of the traditional authority of government by established legal rules. 
The idea of ordered liberty fuses the conservative attachment to tradition 
and authority with the liberal values of individual freedom and limited 
government. Community is limited to common membership of the legal-political 
association and a shared acceptance of the authority of traditional rules 
and institutions. Civil association rests on impersonal law and legal 
citizenship, not on "rationalist" projects such as pursuit of the common good 
or transcendental community. Government should be a limited activity not 
one based on "rationalist" goals: socialism, nationalism and communitarian 
values are alien to the British political traditions of ordered liberty and 
pluralism. In examining the development of modern European states, Oakeshott 
again distinguishes between civil association (11societas") and enterprise 
association ("universitasm) (Oakeshott, 1975). The Ouniversitas" is a corporate 
mode in which the state seeks to bond people in a common purpose such as 
the creation of national solidarity or an exclusivist nation (alsolidarite 
commune'r). The alternative model of state development, "societas", is based on 
a plurality of groups all recognizing constitutional authority. 
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Oakeshott's commitment to British institutions means that his idea of 
political association is one linked to the national through his belief in 
the virtue of patriotism as an expression of allegiance and respect for 
tradition. To a greater extent than in Hayek's thought, Oakeshott accepts the 
existence of the nation-state as the social arena in which traditions 
develop meaning and content. Again though this "political nation" is only a 
sub-category of the "conservative nation" as it lacks the emphasis on the 
nation as a community in which man's social character is expressed and in 
which his relations with his fellow man gain content through shared 
identity and values. A conservative critic for "The Salisbury Review" thus 
noted that: 
"In Oakeshott, generally speaking, social life seems too scattered and 
diffuse a thing to compel much positive allegiance. It is merely a 
congeries of private or group activities without any common focus. That 
is, it is not a culture, a nation or a state, but simply an amorphous, 
fissiparous 'freedom', a form without a content. " (Grant, 1988, p. 283). 
For Oakeshatt, quests for community as a basis of fraternal relations, 
social solidarity and shared ends are "rationalist" projects. Rationalist 
attempts to build up the nation as something more than the sphere in which 
individualism and traditions of limited government develop illustrate the 
dangers of rationalism. The nation is not valued as the dominant community 
but as one grouping among many in a pluralist society. Rein Staal is 
critical of Oakeshott for divorcing conservatism from its belief in 
political association as a form of community (Staal, 1987). But the liberal- 
conservative "political nation" regards communal solidarity as a threat to 
individual liberty. This limited, legalistic account of political association 
found in Hayek and Oakeshott moves away from the Burkean concept of the 
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conservative nation by incorporating a liberal individualist ethos at the 
expense on the conservative stress on the social and pre-political .4 The 
authoritarian branch of New Right thought tries to redress this by focusing 
on the cultural or pre-political roots of association, but again goes beyond 
the boundaries of the moderate conservative account of the nation (Covell, 
1986; Rayner, 1986). While liberal-conservatives tend to emphasize individual 
autonomy at the expense of its cultural or social content, cultural 
conservatives stress the organic and cultural character of the national 
community at the expense of individual freedom and diversity. 
Scruton and the "Cultural Nationu. 
The major f igure in the emergence of this authoritarian and cultural 
conservatism on the New Right is Roger Scruton. His major political work 
"The Meaning of Conservatism" is a statement of conservative thought which 
emphasizes traditional themes of authority, organicism plus community, and 
attacks the individualist ethos of liberal-conservatism (Scruton, 1984). 
Scruton has also been influential as editor of "The Salisbury Review", the 
leading intellectual journal of cultural conservatism, whose contributors 
have included John Casey, Enoch Powell and Ray Honeyford. His importance for 
this study rests on his espousal of a cultural account of the nation in 
which man's social identity is expressed through his membership of a 
cultural community rather than through his citizenship Ue membership of a 
political association). 
Scruton's political thought echoes many familiar conservative themes, but 
seeks to divorce these from the liberal emphasis on individual freedom and 
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plural society, giving his conservatism its authoritarian f lavour (Scruton, 
1984 & 1988). Individual freedom is only of value when tied to established 
traditions and allegiances, not as an abstract concept. While liberals relate 
individual freedom to interests or autonamy, conservatives locate it in the 
social institutions which foster it. In comparing liberalism and 
conservatism, Scruton asserts that liberalism adopts a "first-person 
perspective" in which the sovereignty of the individual serves as the basis 
of political order and the Just society. In contrast, conservatism adopts a 
"third person perspective" in which people are seen as social animals, 
immersed in the shared culture of the community (Scruton, 1984, p. 195). 
Freedom for Scruton's conservatism can only be understood in the context of 
authority and social unity. 
"Freedom is comprehensible as a social goal only when subordinate to 
something else, to an organization or arrangement which defines the 
individual aim.. One major difference between liberalism and conservatism 
consists, theref are, in the fact that, f or the conservative, the value of 
individual liberty is not absolute, but stands subject to another higher 
value, the authority of established government. " (Scruton, 1984, p. 19). 
Already the philosphical differences between the liberal-conservative 
"political nation" and the "cultural nation" espoused by Scruton are 
becoming clear. For proponents of the "political nation", the nation is only a 
limited community, based on political association or legal contracts such as 
citizenship. In the "cultural nation", the freedom and interests of the 
individual cannot be abstracted from the interests of the whole or from the 
community of culture, tradition and allegiance in which man's life attains 
social meaning. For Scruton, man is a social animal rooted in his community. 
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"A man stands in a current of some common life. The important thing is 
that the life of social arrangements may become mingled with the life 
of its members. They may feel in themselves the persistence of the will 
that surrounds them. The conservative instinct is founded in that 
feeling: it is the enactment of historical vitality, the individual's 
sense of his society's will to live. " (Scruton, 1984, p. 21). 
Society is an organism, something greater than the aggregate of its 
individuals and the conservative's task is to maintain the unity and 
traditions of society. Crucially, Scruton's conservatism regards society as an 
end in itself, rather than just a means to some other end such as individual 
freedom or social justice. The cement of society, binding individuals into a 
collective whole, is allegiance to established authority, whether it be the 
common culture or constitutional traditions. Social unity emerges from a 
common culture: it is this which structures and gives content to the actions 
of each person. A common culture is made up of shared traditions, histary and 
experiences, and from this national institutions grow. This echoes Burke's 
idea of the "national essence" linking state and civil society. Patriotism 
and allegiance to national institutions act as a bridge between civil 
society: it is patriotism which gives the individual a sense of belonging in 
the wider collective whole. Scruton argues that there are strong links 
between his brand of conservatism and patriotism because conservatism's 
focus is on a particular nation and its character, not on universal 
principles. Also, this conservatism stresses the role of common culture in the 
development of shared understanding and communal solidarity (Scruton, 1984, 
pp. 36-38). 
The cultural nation is a community transcending the individuals within 
it. It links civil society and state through the allegiance arising from 
submission to authority. Following Hegel, Scruton regards allegiance to the 
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nation as a step on from the authority exercised within the family unit. r- 
5 
The family is a non-contractual body, arising from necessity and natural 
bonds. Membership of the national community is similar in that it emerges 
from a recognition of necessity and dependence on an outside will (Scruton, 
1984, pp. 31-33). The dangers of this "cultural nation" are obvious: the 
submergence of individual identity in the collective whole, the potential for 
social tyranny in a society seeking cultural unity, and the threats to 
individual autonomy and the plural society. 
Scruton's cultural concept of the nation is in evidence in his article 
"In Defence of the Nation" in which he is again critical of liberal accounts 
of state and society (Scruton, 1990). r- Liberal theories of the state neglect 
concepts of social unity or communal membership, seeing the state itself as 
the source of unity. This criticism applies to both mainstream liberal theory 
and the "political" account of the nation espoused by the liberal- 
conservative wing of the New Right. Both lack an account of the nation as a 
community, focusing instead on the political association as the arena in 
which social identity is developed. For Scruton, the nation is a pre- 
political entity based an shared language, history and association and a 
common culture (Scruton, 1990, p. 71). Membership of the national community is 
self-conscious and hence of moral worth: 
"This self-consciousness of a nation is part of its moral character. It 
endows nations with a life of their own, a destiny, even a personality. 
People who think of themselves as a collective 'we' understand their 
successes and failures as 'ours' and apportion collective praise and 
blame for the common outcome. " (Scruton, 1990, pp. 71-2). 
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National identity emerges through shared values and experiences which 
gain content through the medium of a common culture. A common culture 
wimpresses the matter of experience with a moral form* (Scruton, 1990, p. 60) 
by providing a framework in which individual actions can be Judged in 
terms of traditional, collective values. Man. is not an isolated individual in 
an atomized or pluralistic association, but is a social creature. Membership 
of human collectives is not political Ue based on social contracts or 
voluntary citizenship) but social, existing prior to and independent of the 
state. Scruton takes the attachment to a non-political form of membership to 
be a core conservative trait, and one distinguishing the conservative from 
the liberal. States which lose the national idea as a basis of unity often 
try to restore communal solidarity through collective or nationalist 
ideologies: national identity is to be valued, but expansionist nationalisms 
are dangerous. National identity provides the moral values of identity and 
unity lacking in the liberal separation of state and civil society. The 
nation-state is "the state at the extreme of self-consciousness" (Scruton, 
1984, p. 185). 
"The identity of a nation over time has a clear moral aspect, and the 
reaffirmation of this identity, through acts of pride and contrition, is 
part of belonging, and of living under immovable obligations. " 
(Scruton, 1990, p. 75). 
The nation is important as the community in which man's pre-social 
ties of unity and allegiance are rooted. It bridges the gap between the 
state, whose political institutions are related to the national character, and 
civil society in a way in which liberalism cannot match. Scruton's 
conservatism follows Burke in seeing the nation as a link over time by 
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means of shared traditions and Hegel in emphasizing the links between 
family, civil society and the state. 
"The legitimacy of the state depends upon its ability to overcome the 
seperation inherent in civil society, and to recuperate in free and legal 
form the sense of belonging which surrounds us at birth, and nurtures 
our identity-Our existence as political beings does not derive from the 
state, but from spheres of social loyalty, and it is by means of such 
loyalty that the state persists. " (Scruton, 1990, p. 84). 
But Scruton's cultural account of the nation moves away from the 
Burkean ideal of the conservative nation by stressing common culture and 
the unity of the collective, mirroring the authoritarian elements in his 
wider political thought. O'Sullivan, a proponent of the political account of 
the nation, criticizes Scruton for the "anti-constitutionalism" implicit in 
his ideas of pre-political unity and his cultural nationalism (O'Sullivan, 
1989, a). He argues that rather than the optimal rule of law, the Udesire for 
the company of one's kind" is Scruton's basis for association. The quest for 
collective identity and national unity, plus his stress on overcoming 
alienation through shared culture, are more akin to the rationalist or 
collectivist goals of "activist politics" than to the "limited politics" of 
moderate conservatism (O'Sullivan, 1975). Gray argues that the common culture 
and traditions of England venerated by Scruton are in fact essentially 
individualist and that Thatcherism, of which Scruton is critical, attempts to 
restore the cultural preconditions of individuality (J. Gray, 1990). 
Rayner argues that for cultural conservatives, the individual is not an 
autonomous being but one conscious of his identity only through cultural 
practices, which thus become valued and authoritative in their own right 
(Rayner, 1986) Because of his reliance on common culture as the basis of 
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social unity, the cultural conservative resorts to myths and ideology. Scruton 
himself recognises the importance of myths and symbols for allegiance to 
and membership of the national community with the monarchy a particularly 
important symbol of nationhood. A person's allegiance to the monarch is 
based on: 
"A sense of the monarch as a symbol of nationhood, as an incarnation of 
the historical entity of which he is a part. His loyalty to the monarchy 
requires certain ceremonial enactment, custonary usage, an established 
code of deference-The monarch forms part of that surface of concepts 
and symbols whereby the citizen can perceive his social identity, and 
perceive society not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself. " 
(Scruton, 1984, p. 39). 
But Scruton's idea of the subjective nature of national identity, noting 
its roots in shared traditions and experiences, bLas to rely on myths of 
cultural homogeneity and organic development to counter other accounts of 
nationhood. 
'Under Scruton's editorship, "The Salisbury Review" has limited national 
identity to the preservation of those cultural and moral traditions 
threatened by modernity and individualist doctrines. His political concerns 
flow from his belief in the importance of national unity and common 
culture. Thus immigration is regarded as a threat to the British way of life 
and its political and cultural traditions of allegiance to the constitution. 
Discussing the implications of the Salman Rushdie affair, Scruton described 
British national identity as shaped by a common language and history, and 
crucially by legal and constitutional traditions. 7 England is only a part of 
the legal British nation-state, but is the focus of its ethnic and cultural 
identity. Scruton's stance on the Rushdie affair further illustrated his 
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doubts at the improbability of those "purporting to be British" becoming 
integrated into the British legal, cultural and political traditions which 
make up national identity. His contributions to "The Salisbury Review" also 
reveal an antipathy to internationalism in foreign affairs (Scruton, 1981). 
Foreign policy should not be based on abstract principle or liberal 
internationalism (as President Carter's US foreign policy was), but on the 
protection and promotion of the national interest. This isolationist account 
of the national interest is again defined in terms of the overriding 
principles of the preservation of national unity and the common culture, 
leading the Salisbury Group to reject moves towards closer European 
integration. 
Scruton's authoritarian conservatism and cultural account of the nation 
is representative of the thought of the Salisbury Group. The groups' journal 
"The Salisbury Review" has published several important essays on the 
concept of the nation. Graham Dawson's discussion of the nation and the 
individual in his article "Freedom, State and Tradition" is worth quoting at 
length as it expresses much of the sentiment of the Salisbury Group. For 
Dawson the state is merely a means of regulating relations between 
individuals, but the nation is of crucial importance, shaping the very nature 
of the individual-His is a deterministic view of the nation as a natural and 
organic growth, a pre-political unity shaping the individual. 
"Vhat makes a nation the nation that it is, is the congeries of customs 
and traditions which it has inherited. And so it is these customs and 
traditions that constitute at least in part its people as the people 
they are. It follows that a person would not be the person he is if it 
were not for the customs and traditions which have given him his 
passions and prejudices, his instincts and intuit ions. VI tbout wbat be 
owes the-nation in wbicb be was born, an Individual is less than fully 
human beingliberals and libertarians alike fail to give due weight to 
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this consideration. In their different ways they both aim to make the 
individual the be-all and end-all of society but succeed only in 
diminishing him. " (Dawson, 1984, pp 47-48) Ctalics added). 
Casey's "One Nation-The Politics Of Race. " 
One of the most important and controversial articles published by "The 
Salisbury Review* is John Casey's "One Nation: The Politics of Race" 
(Casey, 1982). As with Scruton, Casey's writings are primarily concerned with 
aesthetics, but his political thought reveals a conservatism which is 
cultural and authoritarian in tone. He focuses on common culture, authority, 
tradition and allegiance as the key conservative values, and the ones which 
distinguish the conservative from his liberal opponents (Casey, 1978). 
*To see customs and institutions as purely instrumental to some good 
envisaged for man as an isolated, atomic being can be seen from both 
the Marxist and cultural points of view as making it impossible for 
man to regard himself as either part of the community or as part of an 
historical continuity. u (Casey, 1978, pp. 90-91). 
Conservative man achieves access to the world and communal identity 
through national tradtions and common culture. Casey's cultural conservatism 
mirrors Scruton's in its emphasis on "piety" or man's capacity for respect 
and allegiance to place, age and forms of social institutions which act as 
the bridge between civil society and the state (Casey, 1978; Covell, 1986). 
Casey's article on the concept of the nation criticises the "rootless 
individualismu of liberal theory and stresses the centrality of the nation 
to social and political life. He draws on the Burkean definition of a nation 
as a partnership across generations, held together by national traditions, and 
adds to it an emphasis on the centrality of common culture to national 
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community and identity. Coleridge and Burke are cited as exponents of a 
conservative tradition of cultural nationalism, but one which has declined 
within the Conservative Party and is often criticized as "racialist" (Casey, 
1982, p. 24). The Conservative Party's conversion to market economics has 
resulted in a decline in its use of the language of community and nation 
and its loss of credibility in its claims to be the "national party". He 
follows Powell in arguing that Northern Ireland must remain a part of the 
United Kingdom because a majority of its citizens consider themselves to be 
British. The same subjective definition of nationality is for Casey 
applicable to the Falkland Islanders who though, not legally British under 
the terms of the British Nationality Act, were British in terms of "language, 
custom and race" (Casey, 1982, p. 25). For Casey, then, nationality is a sentiment 
springing from a common cultural milieu of shared traditions, allegiance and 
respect for authority. 
wIn the case of the English, and the British, it seems certain that the 
sentiment of nationality is inseparably bound up with shared history, 
law, custom and kinship.. The moral life finds its fulfilment only in an 
actual, historic human community, and above all in a nation state. The 
'sentiment' of nationality is actually one's ability to see the 
community in which one lives, in all its variety of customs and 
practices, as issuing in a nation, and to see that as a moral idea. " 
(Casey, 1982, p. 25). 
Loyalty and allegiance to one's own people and community is a "moral 
and noble idea" for cultural conservatives such as Casey and Scruton. 
lationhood for Casey as for Dawson is a natural and noble thing which must 
be fostered in the present climate of declining community, authority and 
morality. 
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"The state of nationhood is the true state of man and the danger of 
ignoring the sentiment of nationhood is actually the danger of the 
destruction of man as a political animal. " (Casey, 1 982, p. 28). 
Casey's conservatism is similar to Scruton's in that both find 
authoritative traditions and collective meaning in a common culture. Both 
imply that cultural homogeneity is the optimal state of affairs and that 
plural societies lose the traditional bonds of national identity. Casey's 
article aroused controversy for its discussion of coloured immigrants 
within the United Kingdom as "structurally likely to be at odds with 
English civilization" (Casey, 1982, p. 25). This and similar sentiments 
expressed by other contributors to "The Salisbury Review" in particular 
produced the "New Right, New Racism" thesis which will be discussed below. 
Casey sees British national traditions as based on an acceptance of 
authority, but believes this is being undermined by the growth in the number 
of West Indian immigrants living in the inner cities, "alienating" the 
cities from the rest of national life. Differences in culture between the 
Vest Indian and British are of concern for Casey, but the main perceived 
*problem" is that West Indian immigrants and their families form an 
identifiably separate community. Casey associates Vest Indians with a 
political culture opposed to authority and thus anathema to the British 
political tradition. To him, the phrase "black Englishmen" is paradoxical. 
"I do not wish to say that the problem about the West Indian community 
is just a problem about the possible destruction of civilized life in 
the centres of the big cities. (Although this is what is happening. ) It 
is also that all this offends a sentiment- a sense of what English life 
should be.. What it offends is the sentiment that 'this is our 
country'. " (Casey, 19 82, p. 26). 
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For Casey differences in culture and the size of the coloured. immigrant 
community precludes integration, and he believes that the majority of people 
are hostile to the concept of a multi-racial society. Those from "alien" 
cultural backgrounds cannot fully understand or develop the allegiances and 
values of the English way of life. National identity cannot be artificially 
created but is a natural development of man's immersion in the culture and 
traditions of a historical community. Casey proposes the repatriation of a 
proportion of the immigrant population to prevent what he perceives as a 
threat to "Englishness" and the essence of the national community. 
Other contributors to "The Salisbury Review" have also emphasized the 
importance of the concept of the nation to cultural conservatism, and have 
again attacked ideas of multi- cu ltura 1 ism. Richard Cronin thus shares Casey's 
diagnosis of the decline of national identity as a symptom of Britain's 
wider decline (Cronin, 1 987). The nation is seen as important in shaping the 
character and moral values of the individualfthe decline of patriotism is 
bound up with a widespread loss of respect for authority and the decline of 
traditional moral values. The nation is also the arena in which shared 
values are generated and spread. Patriotism and national sentiment allow the 
individual to feel part of a community, preventing his alienation. 
"The real value of the nation-state seems to me moral and aesthetic. 
Just as the family offers me the arena in which my demand for an 
intense imaginative life is best exercized, so that nation organizes my 
need for an imaginative life that is wide and various. " (Cronin, 1987, 
p. 46). 
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Clive Ashworth presents a sociological account of the nation, but one 
again conforming to the values of cultural conservatism. Nat ional ism is 
depicted as a natural state, linking the individual with his fellow 
countrymen within the national territory and across the generations. The 
nation is a natural focus of allegiance, with patriotism the ultimate focus 
of loyalty and communal solidarity. 
0 Ve may say that the nation is ubiquitaus, and that human beings live 
in nations with the same certainty and compulsion as certain species of 
fish live in shoals, and certain species of dogs live in packs.. Because 
of their ultimate nature, nations require of their members a 
transcendent loyalty which knows nothing higher, and which all lower 
loyalties presuppose, and that therefore nationalism-is a perfectly 
justifiable attitude, indeed an unavoidable one. " (Ashworth, 19 83, p. 8). 
Fationalism survives in concrete form through the propogation of myths 
and the "subjective compulsion" generated by transcendental experiences of 
nationhood. Kyths produce the "collective consciousness" of nationhood and 
the "corporate imagination" of shared experiences. These experinces are 
natural and overwhelm ing, thus having "the character of God about them" 
(Ashworth, 19 83, p. 11 ). Strong traditions and a developed sense of nationalism 
are the hallmarks of successful nation-states. 
"New Right. New Racism. " 
The authoritarian branch of the New Right has produced a cultural 
concept of the nation in which the nation is seen as a natural unit, a 
crucial element of which is allegiance to the shared culture. There are 
significant tensions between this cultural account and the Burkean ideal of 
the conservative nation. The former looks to cultural homogeneity as the 
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key to national unity, and its stress on the paramount importance of loyalty 
to the collective whole undermines the freedom of the individual. Vhereas the 
i 
conservative nation def ines national identity as a subjective experience 
based on shared values, trad it ions and loyalty, the cultural account of the 
nation offers a more explicitly ethnic account of nationhood. Implicitly the 
conservative nation's focus on the shared traditions of a historical society 
as the basis of national identity mean that those people having alternative 
allegiances may be incompatible with membership of the national community 
(Reeves, 1 983, ch. 5). The cultural account of the nation goes much further 
than this by arguing than national identity and the unity of the nation are 
undermined by the incorporation of alien cultures into society. Membership of 
the national community is open to those whose values and experiences are 
shaped by the common culture. Man's crucial loyalties and social identity 
emerge not from his , experiences in an artificially-created political 
association but from a framework of traditional, pre-political values. 
The cultural account of the nation has been interpreted in some 
quarters as a new type of racism in which the concepts of culture, nation 
and race are fused (Barker, 1981; Gordon & King, 1 986). Parekh identifies four 
key propositions of New Right accounts of nationhood; (D a state is held 
together by national unity; (ii) nationality is a sentiment found in those 
of common stock, implying that homogeneity is essential for strong national 
identity; (iii) black communities are from different national traditions and 
thus cannot be successfully integrated into the British (cultural) nation; 
(iv) the preservation of nationhood is of supreme moral importance and thus 
justifies policies of repatriation or assimilation (Parekh, 1986, p. 39). 
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Articles by members of the Salisbury Group conf irm. that cultural 
conservatism regards cultural homogeneity as necessary for a strong 
national identity. Casey, Honeyford and others have attacked "anti-racism" 
and Onulti-culturalism" as anathema to "natural" or "common sense" 
understanding of nationhood. The "New Right, New Racism" thesis argues that 
cultural conservatism regards the nation as the core social unit, 
membership of which is natural and inevitable. The national community is 
founded on a common culture and it is an irreversible feature of human 
nature that 3nan should wish to live with those who share his culture. Powell 
and Honeyford claim that the desire to live with people of "one's own kind" 
is not a racist sentiment, but a natural one rooted in human nature and 
Ncommon sense". This appeal to common sense or human nature allows the 
cultural conservatives to claim that they are not racist, but merely 
expressing suppressed truths. The notion of racism is turned an its head so 
that those who advocate a multi-cultural society are presented as running 
against the grain of human nature. The white majority in Britain are 
depicted as the real victims of racism because liberal immigration policies 
have undermined cultural homogeneity and national unity. Positive 
discrimination and anti-racist education are regarded as forms of 
winstitutionalized racism" by the liberal establishment against the white 
majority (Gordon & King, 1986, pp. 13-41) 
Ray Honeyford, the headmaster of a Bradford school primarily made up of 
ethnically Asian pupils caused much public controversy in the mid-1980s 
when he claimed that multi-ethnic education was damaging the prospects of 
white children (Honeyford, 1983; Raridall, 1988). 13 For Honeyford, the teaching of 
minority cultures and languages within British schools was producing a 
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mmulti-ethnic nightmare", while positive discrimination was leading to lower 
standards. Schools should instead teach British history and culture f or "the 
natural, organic location of a minority culture is outside the school, within 
the minority group itself" (Honeyford, 1983, p. 13). Honeyford and other critics 
i 
argue that the integration of ethnic minorities into British society is 
hindered rather than helped , by anti-racist strategies as these patronize 
black people, making them more self-conscious of ethnic dif ferences. Critics 
have turned anti-racist arguments on their heads by claiming that the anti- 
racists are the true racists, grouping people according to their colour and 
thus denying their individuality. Dennis O'Keefe and Anthony Flew have 
claimed in "The Salisbury Review" that special treatment for immigrants is 
equivalent to "institutionalized racism" against whites, and that anti-racist 
strategies are the real cause of ethnic tensions because they rather than 
the cultural conservatives insist on a wide definition of the tern "race" 
which fails to note the differences between race and culture (O'Keefe, 1989; 
Flew, 1989). Flew argues that the Commission for Racial Equality undermines a 
colour-blind perspective on British society by grouping people according to 
race. He calls for its abolition as it is engaged upon an "assault on 
Britishness" by promoting nulti-cultural education. A multi-racial society is 
an unwelcome burden on Britain's welfare and education services, and is 
undermining the national community (Mishan, 1988). "-' 
The cultural conservatives of the Salisbury Group share Enoch Powell's 
diagnosis of the detrimental effects of immigration and multi-culturalism 
on national identity and social order. Casey argues that Vest Indians are ill 
at ease with the British tradition of respect for authority, while Honeyford 
and others claim that the educational achievements of West Indian children 
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do not match those of their white counterparts. There is a perception among 
cultural conservatives that the concentration of ethnic minorites in urban 
areas has undermined the character of the inner cities and contributed to a 
rise in crine. Although cultural conservatives share a similar diagnosis 
about the damaging effects of immigration on national identity, they are 
divided on how to respond. Casey argues for repatriation and reducing the 
status of blacks to that of guest workers. Powell saw repatriation and a 
complete halt to immigration as essential steps. But the existence of settled 
black communities, who now have British citizenship, makes these strategies 
unworkable and inappropriate. Parekh sees Powellism as an "assimilationist" 
strategy which demands that ethnic minority communities be forcibly 
assimilated into the "British way of life" (Parekh, 1990, b). This approach 
rejects the integrationist belief in the virtues of a diverse and ýtolerant 
society, arguing that immigrants must be prepared to give up their own 
national and cultural traditions if these clash with British culture and 
prevent-full allegiance to the British way of life. 1deas of assimilation are 
present in Powellism and cultural conservatism, but fit uneasily with the 
belief in national homogeneity and the impossibility of integration. Parekh's 
confusion - he argues that the New Right believe that blacks can never be 
British in the cultural or subjective sense, yet also claims that their's is 
an assimilationist strategy - reflects the tension between exclusivist and 
assimilationist strategies in cultural conservatism. 
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The "New Right, New Racism" thesis is a useful one because it outlines 
the move away from the traditional conservative nation towards a cultural 
account of the nation in which common culture is a key element of 
nationhood. However, the extent to which the cultural nation looks at race as 
the basis of membership of the national community is exaggerated by this 
account. The concern of Salisbury Group members is the protection of 
"Britishness*, understc3od as national identity and a shared common culture. It 
tends towards seeing national identity in both ethnic and ideological terms 
ie full membership of the national community depends upon acceptance of the 
culture and traditions of the dominant ethnic group. The racial 
discrimination inherent in cultural conservatism does not arise f rom a 
stated belief in the superiority of a particular racial group, but from a 
belief that not all cultures are of equal value and that cultural 
integration is undesirable and unworkable. By claiming , that cultural 
homogeneity is essential to a strong sense of national identity and unity, 
cultural conservatives necessarily believe that any action promoting 
cultural pluralism undermines the nat ion. Discuss ions of culture become 
explicitly concerned with race issues because alternative cultures are seen 
as alien and incompatible with the British way of life and the desire to 
live in a homogeneous (ethnic) national community is'perceived as rooted in 
human nature. Casey's claim that Vest Indians culture is incompatible with 
respect for authority or his refusal to accept that there could be "black 
Englishmen", plus Haneyford's argument that ethnic minority pupils are of 
lesser ability than whites, are examples of explicitly racialist themes. 
However, the claims of the "New Right, Wew Racism" thesis are weakened by its 
-120- 
proponents sharing the same lack of conceptual clarity concerning the terms 
"race" "nation" and "culture" as the cultural conservatives they attack. 
A 
I argued earlier that the cultural account is unacceptable as a moderate 
conservative concept of the nation because of its intolerance of diversity, 
its emphasis on loyalty to the nation at the expense of individual freedom, 
and its belief that a common culture (in the sense of allegiance to 
traditional institutions and political culture) is the bedrock of the 
national community. The Burkean account of the nation linked political 
allegiances with membership of a traditional, historical community. The 
cultural nation claims that man's identity and social character emerges 
from the matrix of a common culture, with those individuals having a culture 
"alien" to this permanently excluded from membership of the national group. 
In the hands of the cultural conservatives, the nation becomes an 
exclusivist and ethnic entity, and one which is dangerously racialist when 
demands of cultural homogenity are used to Justify repatriation and an end 
to the plural society. The cultural definition of nationhood explicitly 
focuses on the problems of incorporating other groups into the national 
community which are only implicitly recognized in the conservative values 
of tradition and organicism. The claims of the "New Racism" thesis that 
Thatcherism marks a move towards a racialization of British politics will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight. At this stage though it is 
interesting to note that the same problems of conceptual clarity occur here 
and the practical influence of the cultural conservatives on the policies of 
the Thatcher governments was negligible. 
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The political account of the nation also departs from the Burkean model 
of the conservative nation, moving towards a liberal focus on the individual 
and an associated rejection of the claims of community. This is particularly 
evident in the thought of Hayek, for whom the nation seems a momentary 
obstacle to the ideal of a universal Great Society. For both Hayek and 
Oakeshott society is an aggregate of sovereign individuals, held together by 
the rules of a limited political association, and not by communal solidarity. 
In the chapter on Thatcherism, I will note how the political and cultural 
accounts of the nation have been fused into an uneasy doctrinal alliance 
which narks a departure from the "national strategies" of Disraeli and 
Baldwin. Before that though, the next chapter assesses Powellism as a new 
Onationalist" strategy based around policies on immigration, Europe and 
Northern Ireland. 
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Renewed interest in the conservative concept of the nation f ound its 
most significant expression in the speeches and writings of Enoch Powell 
from the late 1960s onwards. Powellism offered the Conservative Party a new 
"nationalist strategy*, built on a redefined concept of the nation, and an 
avowedly nationalist approach to some of the key issues facing British 
governments in the period. Powell approached political issues from a 
nationalist position: his main concern was to defend the identity and 
interests of a clearly-defined national group. Powellite discourse is notable 
for the clarity and consistency of its concept of nationhood, and from this 
idea, Powell constructed a strategy geared towards a reassertion of national 
identity and self- government. The main planks of this nationalist strategy 
were a reduction in immigration, a call for new citizenship rules, opposition 
to British membership of the European Community GO and a commitment to 
the Union with Northern Ireland. 
Powell began espousing a nationalist strategy in the mid-1960s, though 
earlier he had supported British applications for membership of the EC and 
been a committed imperialist. He was also the first significant Conservative 
politician to advocate a New Right commitment to a minimal role for the 
state in economic affairs, his opposition to high levels of public 
expenditure prompting his resignation from the Treasury in 1958. But his 
belief that the state had a role in providing a minimum standard of social 
services was countered by his ideological opposition to egalitarian ism. Both 
his laissez-faire economics and his calls for repatriation broke with the 
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prevailing consensus and challenged the "Right Progressives" dominant role 
in the Conservative Party (Gamble, 1974). In the mid-1960s, Powell argued that 
the' Conservative Party had to be "the party of free choice, free competition 
and free enterprise-the party of capitalism" if it was to have anything 
relevant to say (Powell, 1965, p. 24). The Powellite mixture of economic 
liberalism and a revived language of nationhood is also important as a 
forerunner of Thatcherism, although the tensions between the two branches of 
thought are less apparent in Powellism. Ken Phillips argues that Powell's 
support for the capitalist economy, for minimum standards of social services 
and for a revived national identity form a coherent doctrine. 
"The consistency between Powell's dimension of corporate philanthropy 
and nationalism lies in the interconnection between his portrayal of 
society as a community and of the nation as an organic entity.. 
Corporate philanthropy is the expression of the national community's 
care and compassion for its memberspationalism is the psychological 
and cultural component that weds a society to its political form, the 
nation. " (Phil 1 ips, 1 977, p. 117). 
At the heart of Powell's political thought is his quest f or a revised 
national identity. Powell recognized that national identity, Britain's role in 
the world, and the philosophy of the Conservative Party were all facing 
major challenges, yet believed that little thought was being directed to 
adapting to such changes. He thus constructed a nationalist strategy which 
redefined British national identity and offered a means through which the 
Conservative Party could resume its place as the "nationalist party par 
excellencell. This concern with national identity in the face of Britain's 
decline from world-power status was first presented in his speech at 
Trinity College, Dublin in 1964. Here he argued for a "realistic" understanding 
of modern national identity, to be arrived at through a conscious process of 
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myth selection and reject io-n. Powel 1 had come to believe that myths of 
empire and British economic strength were key reasons behind national self- 
doubt and hindered modern izat ion. To recover, the British needed a new 
national identity, redefined in the light of the post-war world. 
The Powellite concept of the nation draws on familiar conservative 
themes, but presents them in a new configuration which adapts them to 
changed circumstances and adds its own myths. Powell stresses the organic 
nature of British constitutional evolution and the parliamentary nature of 
its political culture. The British people are linked with their insitutions 
through the parliamentary nature of national identity. Patriotic allegiance 
and constitutionalism are fundamental features of the national character, 
cementing strong bonds between people and state. Also present in Powellism 
is the conservative belief in the role of tradition and the past in shaping 
the collective mind and providing a repository of wisdom which can be 
drawn upon when addressing contemporary problems. Powell views man as a 
social animal and society as an organic community rather than an aggregate 
of atomistic individuals. Powell's focus is more directly on the primacy of 
the national community than is the case with Burke or Baldwin, hence 
Powell's status as a nationalist. The nation is the dominant form of 
community, shaping man's identity and values. 
"In order to live a full and satisfying life, a man needs to have a 
picture not only of the community to which he belongs and of his place 
in it, but also of the place and destiny of that community in the 
outside world. " (Powell, 1965, p. 7). 
Powell also departs from the traditional conservative nation by 
rejecting old myths of empire and world responsibility, replacing them with 
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his own brand of mysticism built an parliamentary sovereignty, national 
homogeneity and British isolation. For Powell, the nation is a subjective and 
transcendental entity, held together by the "corporate imagination". Instead of 
defining a nation in terms of objective features such as its territory or 
language, Powell looks to a nation's history, the homogeneity and unity of its 
people and their shared experiences as the root of nationhood. "The life of 
nations, no less than that of men, is lived largely in the imagination. " 
(Powell, 1965, p. 136). As social beings, individuals identify with their nation, 
so that in periods of national decline or self-doubt, all patriots share in 
its "psychosomatic illness". National consciousness is built around the 
corporate imagination of a nation's past, which expresses itself in the form 
of myth. 
"All history is myth-The moment a fact enters into history it becomes 
mythical because it has been taken and f itted into its place in a set 
of ordered relationships which is the creation of the human mind. A 
nation lives by its myths.. my particular thesis is that some of the 
British people's most important myths in this period of time are bad 
myths, harnful myths, and that they need urgently to be replaced by 
better. " (Powell, 1965, p. 137). 
Powell's redefinition of British national identity rejects the 19th 
century myths of empire and industrial strength: they are falsehoods or 
fictions and must be replaced by a "realistic" view of nationhood. He claims 
that the British people were largely unaware of the empire until its decline 
began, producing a false belief in an imperial "golden age". "The British 
Empire as we know it in political mythology, was an invention. " (Powell, 1965, 
p. 139). It was a deliberate creation of the age of Disraeli and Chamberlain 
whose ideas of imperial union were *castles in the air", fallacies designed 
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to mask Britain's decline by offering illusions of racial union or working- 
class prosperity. 
The second myth to cause modern Britain's self-doubt or psychosomatic 
illness is that of Britain as the "workshop of the world". This was also 
invented in the 1880s to conceal long-term economic decline behind a facade 
of industrial strength. The significance of the myth for modern' Britain is 
that it has produced a false belief that Britain's economic weakness is a 
new phenomenon -indicating national decline. This was Britain's "private hell" 
with empire as a soothing 'myth or "private heaven". The British corporate 
imagination is rooted in delusion: the nation must learn to know itself 
again. 
Powell's "realistic" national identity is, though, still built upon myth. He 
seeks the essence of British national identity in its unique parliamentary 
traditions, the continuity of its history and the homogeneity of its people. 
This view of English history as a unique and continuous procession of 
rights and duties within a framework of parliamentary sovereignty is a 
consistent theme in Powell's account of the British nation. Britain is a 
"parliamentary nation": the Vestminster parliament is the symbol of the 
nation's constitutional development and, as a sovereign body represents 
national homogenity in the sense of common allegiance to a single 
sovereign. As I shall explore in greater detail below, Powell argued that 
joining the EC undermined the sovereignty of parliament and thus Britain's 
identity as a parliamentary nation, while immigration undermines common 
allegiance and acceptance of one sovereign authority (Powell, 1991, p. 25-37). 
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Powell is nostalgic for a lost England of constitutional balance and 
national homogeneity. 
"The unity of England, ef f ortless and unconstrained, which accepts the 
unlimited supremacy of the Crown-the homogeneity of England-the 
continuity of England, which has brought this unity and this homogeneity 
about by the slow alchemy of centuries. The unbroken life of the English 
nation over a thousand years and more is a phenomenon unique in 
history. Institutions which elsewhere are recent and artificial 
creations, appear in England almost as works of nature, spontaneous and 
unquestioned. " (Powell, 1965, p. 145). 
Powell expresses the familiar conservative organic view of English 
history, focusing on unity, continuity and homogeneity. Parliament and the 
Crown are at the core of this concept of national identity. Hationhood and 
national consciousness are subjective phenomena, rooted in history and the 
national past. 1ineteenth century myths may have been rejected as 
inappropriate to the reality of postwar Britain, but Powellism relies heavily 
on an exaggerated account of the importance of parliament to British 
national identity. Powell's focus on the sovereignty of the Westminster 
parliament is at the heart of his opposition to EC membership and his 
fervent Unionism. This attachment to parliamentary sovereignty itself takes 
an an air of myth in its reading of constitutional history and its 
preoccupation with indivisable sovereignty. Powell views parliament as the 
repository of the civil liberties of the British people and admits to a 
belief in "the magic of the free Parliament of a united nation" (Powell, 
1991, p. 502). Through the immigration issue, Powell popularized his nationalist 
strategy. but his belief in parliamentary democracy as a source of national 
identity and unity reveal that Powell was essentially a parliamentarian who 
achieved brief status as a populist figure when he broke away from the 
careful managament of race issues fostered by both main parties (Schoen, 
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1977). Powell's belief that the British people would rally to defend their 
parliamentary inheritance against the EC signalled a profound weakness in 
his nationalist strategy and a misunderstanding of the potency of national 
identity. 
The myth of parliamentary sovereignty is related to Powell's belief 
that Britain will prosper from isolation ism, reject ing membership of the EC 
and abandoning its fictional commitments to the Comonwealth. As Shadow 
Defence Secretary, Powell argued that Britain should withdraw from many of 
her world commitments, especially in the Far East, as these were remants of 
the imperial age and no longer appropriate for Britain's declined status. A 
rational assessment of British power and capabilites showed the futility of 
the Commonwealth which was built on imperial memories and unrealistic 
expectations of Britain's world role. The Commonwealth encouraged misplaced 
paternalism in terms of overseas aid and commitments to immigration and 
fictional citizenships. Only a complete withdrawal from imperial commitments 
could prevent national humiliation and further damage to the national 
interest (Powell, 1969, pp. 246-280). Iscilation would also free Britain from the 
unwelcome influence of the United States, ant i- Americanism being a 
consistent theme in Powell's writings. 
Powell depicted parliamentary sovereignty and British nationhood as 
threatened by British moves towards membership of the EC in the early 
1970s, though he had supported earlier British applications for trade 
reasons. He turned against membership of the EC when it became apparent 
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that the ultimate goal of the Community was economic and monetary union, 
which would inevitably bring a large degree of political union. The formation 
of the Common Agricultural Policy in 1969 also moved the EC away from its 
free trade ideals. The price of any economic benefits of membership, and 
Powell argued that there were few such benefits, had then to be measured 
against the costs of economic and political union. The inevitable consequence 
of EC membership was the loss of national sovereignty, with the British 
people - forming only a fraction of the European electorate - unable to 
control their own national affairs. 
"Parliament, and in particular the House of Commons, would no longer be 
the body which took the principle decisions which govern the economic 
and social life of the people of this country and which determines its 
safety and even its existence. " (Powell, 1973, pp. 41/2). 
Powell believed that under the Treaty of Rome, parliament would lose 
its legislative supremacy in Britain. This is a crucial concern for he 
believes that the legislative sovereignty of parliament is at the heart of 
the nation's independence and identity. By joining the EC, Vestminster is 
forced to forfeit exclusive control over taxation and public expenditure, 
while the independence of the Judiciary is also lost. EC membership entails 
the loss of national sovereignty, which he defines as "political independence 
and self-government" (Powell, 1991, pp. 474-480). Powell recognizes that no 
nation is free to do what it wishes, that nations are mutually dependent and 
that signing treaties is an expression of national sovereignty not its 
denial. However membership of the EC is fundamentally different. 
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"A nation may enter into contract or associations or agreements and 
thereby voluntarily limit its freedom, as does any individual who signs 
a contract. But this is totally different from deliberately giving up for 
all time the freedom in future to take a decision. In a political and 
economic union of Europe it would be contradictory to speak or think of 
national sovereignty in the sense in which it exists at present. " 
(Hansard, v. 809, cols 1372-3,1971) 
Sovereignty cannot be pooled or shared in the EC for Britain would lose 
its character as a "parliamentary nation", whose membership is based on 
common allegiance to the sovereign authority of the Crown- in-Parliament. 
Powell was particularly critical of the way in which British membership was 
negotiated by the Heath government. In the 1970 election campaign Heath had 
promised that British membership would only come about "with the full 
consent of parliament and people" and the Conservative manifesto had 
commited the party only to negotiation. However once in power the Heath 
government accepted the Community rules before negotiations began and 
membership was achieved without the mandate of the people and with only 
slim parliamentary majorities after "guillotined" debates. Powell's bitter 
relations with Heath and the party leadership at the time saw him accuse 
Heath of breaking the "compact between parliament and people" and then 
leave the Conservative Party, encouraging people to vote Labour in the 
February 1974 election in the hope of ending British membership of the 
Community. Powell also opposes Britain's membership of the Community on the 
grounds of this country's traditional separateness from continental Europe. 
"In respect of our nationhood, j say we are not part of the continent of 
Europe. The whole development and nature of our national identity and 
consciousness has not been merely separate from that of the countries 
of the continent of Europe but actually antithetical. In our history-the 
principal events which have placed their stamp upon our 
consciousness-were the moments in which we have been alone, 
confronting a Europe which was lost or hostile. " (Hansard, vol 809, 
p1376). 
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Britain's political separateness from continental Europe is again 
related to the sovereignty of parliament and the refusal to accept authority 
from outside the realm. Britain's political tradition is different from that 
of continental Europe, and though rarely talking of the nation in terms of 
mculture", such arguments imply that cultural differences also set Britain 
apart. Membership of the Community would mean the surrendering of the 
"highest political good", namely national independence, and would also 
undermine the basis of British national identity. Powell opposed direct 
elections to the European Parliament and viewed extensions of its powers as 
incompatible with the sovereign authority of the Vestminster parliament as 
the only body representing and making law for the British nation. The 
Community's legal system has also undermined the authority of the British 
courts: 
OThere is a name for appealing over the head of the Crown to an 
authority outside the realm, and that name is treason., consciously or 
not, the British people have withdrawn acceptance from their 
institutions In favour of institutions which are not theirs. " 
(Powell, 1989, p. 61). 
Powell has renewed his attacks on the Community in the face of moves 
towards greater economic and monetary union, directing much of his venom at 
the Conservative Party for supporting such developments and reneging on its 
traditional role as the national party. For Powell the Conservative Party is 
Othe nationalist party par, exellence", associated with patriotism and the 
defence of British nationhood. "A Conservative Party which cannot present 
itself to the country as a national party suffers under a severe handicap. " 
(Powell, 1989, p. 126). Powell saw Mrs Thatcher as a representative of the 
nation in her role as Prime Minister, supporting her handling of the 
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Falklands War. He was though critical of the way in which Thatcher kept 
Britain in the Community despite her support for the principle of 
nationhood and her recognition of Britain's historical difference from 
continental Europe (as expressed in the Bruges Speech). Thatcher failed to 
understand the centrality of parliamentary sovereignty to national 
independence, being more concerned with the defeat of socialism. 
Powell interprets the Northern Ireland issue in terns of nationhood 
and parliamentary democracy. Nationhood is a subjective status, so a nation 
only exists when its people demonstrate their unity and see themselves as 
part of a wider community with a common idea of itself. 
OVe can identify a nation, as it were, only after the event. Ve cannot 
identify a nation by historical, sociological and cultural studies. A 
nation is a people who have made good the right to be a nation - not 
necessarily by force, but, according to our institutions, by proving 
overwhelmingly that we are not content to remain part of another 
state. " (Hansard, vol 922, cal. 1819). 
The Ulster issue is then "to decide who we are, to establish or re- 
establish our identity as a nation. " (Powell, 1 972, p. 177). The majority in 
Northern Ireland consider themselves to be an integral part of Great 
Britain rather than a separate nation. The province is British because the 
majority of the people regard themselves as such. The IRA are the enemies of 
this claim to nationality and their defeat is essential if the British 
nation is to prove itself concerned with the protection of its own identity. 
Powell recognizes that a sense of nationhood becomes more acute when its 
basis is challenged by an enemy whether external or internal, hence his 
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verbal assaults on the IRA, the lethargic British government (especially 
after government meetings with IRA representatives in the mid 1970s) and 
the immigrant "enemy within". The Unionist assertion that they are British 
entitles then to play a full role in the British nation and be fully 
integrated into the British nation-state rather than being isolated and 
denied their rights to a say in decision-making. It is this assertion of 
British nationality which linked the Ulster Unionists to the Conservative 
Party and saw Powell elected as Official Unionist MP for Down South after 
his resignation from the Conservatives in 1974. The Unionists' break from 
the parliamentary Conservative Party was welcomed by Powell as he believed 
that the Heath government had failed the people of Ulster by removing their 
democratic rights (with the ending of the Stormont parliament and 
imposition of direct rule) and offering only conditional support for the 
maintenance of the Union. His criticism escalated in the Thatcher era, with 
Powell claiming that the Conservative Party had reneged on its "national" 
role by signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement which he depicted as foisted upon 
the government by American pressure (Powell, 1991, 'pp. 507-510), He condemns 
the "conditional" nature of British sovereignty in Northern Ireland as 
proof that the British government no longer regards Ulster as its cause. 
The 1976/7 parliamentary debates on devolution and the establishment 
of legislative assemblies in Scotland and Vales saw Powell fearful of its 
effects on the sovereignty of Westminster and the territorial integrity of 
the United Kingdom. he believed that the essence of the UK was parliament's 
exclusive power to make laws covering the whole country. He was critical of 
devolution proposals but argued that should Scottish and Welsh nationalism 
become irresistible, London could not stand in their way. He rejected Wilson's 
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description of Scotland and Vales as "political nations" which should not 
have the right to levy their own taxes, claiming that true nations had a 
right to self-government (Hansardvol. 922, col. 18 0 9- 182 0). Devolut ion indicated 
the general decline in British identity and the need to re-establish a 
viable sense of nationhood. - 
For Powell, nationhood, is defined both by subjective feelings of what 
sort of people the British are, and by the identification of alien threats to 
nationhood -Chief among the perceived threats to British identity is the 
*alien wedge" of New Commonwealth immigrants living in Britain. Powell's 
attacks on immigration established him as a populist politician, breaking 
with the liberal consensus an the management of race issues, and produced 
the first "ethnic- ideological" account of British national identity. Powellism 
was instrumental in fostering a climate in which ethnic minorities were 
seen as a problem, the prejudices of the white population were legitimized, 
and the concepts of race, culture and allegiance were fused in a populist 
account based on "common sense" desires to live with "people of one's own 
kind"Although Powell himself was careful to avoid using or defining the 
terms "race" and "culture", and was concerned with national identity rather 
than racial purity or superiority, his populist nationalism marked a 
racialization of the conservative concept of the nation and of British 
politics in general. An ethnically homogeneous nation was desirable because 
only it could secure common allegiance to a single sovereign, shared identity 
and a common idea of the national community. Such mysticism meant that 
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myths of empire were replaced by those of national homogeneity and 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
Powell used f orceful, emotive language to express his fears about race 
relations, calling f or tough immigration laws and voluntary repatriation. 3 
His Birmingham Speech of 20th April 1968 notoriously broke with the 
prevailing consensus on race relations, establishing Powell as the populist 
alternative and ending his chances of holding high office again. The emotive 
rhetoric of the Birmingham speech, including his unproven story of an old 
woman having excrement pushed through her letterbox by "wide-grinning 
piccaninnies", and his "river of blood" prophesy, broke with Conservative 
statements on the issue although Powell's proposals for a limit on 
immigration differed little from the official line. In the speech Powell 
claimed to be representing the "common sense" views of the average citizen, 
establishing his populist credentials and dressing his arguments in the 
rhetoric of common sense and legitimate concern. Common to his discourse on 
immigration is the "numbers game", the belief that the high birth rate of the 
existing New Commonwealth ethnic population would lead to large areas of 
the inner cities becoming exclusively black areas-Powell used figures on the 
immigration rate to give his forebodings a veneer of respectability, but the 
statistics on the size and integration of the ethnic minority population 
actually illustrated the impracticality of the repatriation option. 
"The supreme function of statesmanship is to provide against 
preventable evils.. Ve must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be 
permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependents, who are for the 
most part the material of the future growth of the imm. igrant- descended 
population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up 
its own funeral pyre. " (Powell, 1969, p. 281,283) 
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Powell's scare tactics continued with his premonition of "the River 
Tiber foaming with much blood", and his references to violent racial clashes 
in the United ptates. Powell subsequently argued that the 1971 Immmigration 
Act did not deal with the problem because it failed to introduce voluntary 
repatriation to reduce the existing immigrant-based population of the inner 
cities. Integration of the existing ethnic population had for Powell proved 
to be impossible as they were an ualien wedge", unable to be integrated into 
British culture and the "British way of life"Sationhood is a subjective 
experience developed through immersion in the traditions and values of the 
national community. Immigrants are "alien" to the British way of life and the 
subjective experiences which make up "Britishness" so they can never be 
truly integrated into the national community or share the allegiance to 
nation, culture and sovereign present in the indigenous population. By 1980 
Powell was warning that if immigrant communities made up one-third of the 
population of the major cities: 
NEngland would be unlivable and ungovernable. It would not merely be 
inconceivable to us because of our past habits, it would be inconceivable 
in reality; and its inconceivability would be resolved in civil discard 
and violence. " (Hansard, vol. 980, p. 1045). 
Powell's emphasis on parliamentary sovereignty as a major factor in 
British national identity again works it way into his nationalist strategy. 
National homogeneity in political terms -means common allegiance to the 
sovereign -authority of the historical community. "Inside the nation you 
cannot contain elements which are foreign to it in the sense that they 
cannot share that devotion to the whole as against the parts" (Powell, 1991, 
p. 35). The ethnic minority populations of the inner cities are perceived in 
this light. They are not part of the British historical community and lack 
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the traditional values and allegiances of the British way of life. 
Membership of the nation becomes a matter of shared political values, an 
ethnic- ideological account stressing allegiance and loyalty which only 
naturally occur in the native population. Powell believes that allegiance or 
primary loyalty to the nation is the basis of citizenship, and called for a 
redefined British citizenship. He frequently talks of the willingness of the 
patriot to sacrifice himself for his nation, even claiming, when asked how he 
would like to be remembered, that "I should like to have been killed in the 
war" (1986 interview with Anne Brown, in Pawell, 1991, p. 52). This devotion to 
the nation cannot for Powell ever be reciprocated by those from different 
cultures, brought up with different values, trad it ions and loyalties. 
Implicit in Powell's political definition of national homogeneity as 
common allegiance to one sovereign body, lies a myth of cultural homogeneity 
and a perception that groups "alien" to the British political culture or 
away of life" are a "problem", undermining national identity and unity. 
Immigration undermines the homogeneity of the British nation and makes the 
forging of a new national consciousness more difficult. Unity as a positive 
attribute of nationhood is Joined by "difference" as a means of 
distinguishing that which is integral to Britishness from what is alien to 
it. Powell's belief in the continuity of the British nation and the 
importance of the past inevitably made him hostile to what he perceived as 
alien elements within the state, whether racial groups or left-wing 
intellectuals. Parekh links nationalist and assimilationist New Right 
strategies, but for Powell assimilation poses almost as many problems as 
integration (Parekh, 1990, b). Assimilationists argue that immigrants can only 
be part of the national community if they abandon any elements of their 
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identity which would be incompatible with Britishness. But Powell does not 
focus on culture explicitly: his belief is that separate identities mean 
separate loyalties, and these are deep-rooted. Powell and many on the Tory 
Right reject the possibility of a "black Englishman". 
OThe Vest Indian or Indian does not, by being born in England, become an 
Englishman. In law he becomes a United Kingdom citizen by birth; in fact 
he is a West Indian or an Asian still. " (Speech at Eastbourne, 16th 
November 1968, quoted in Foot, 1969, p. 119). 
Powell here argues that citizenship and nationality are distinct 
categories -Membership of the political community is not the same as 
membership of the national community. Immigrants can not be fully integrated 
or assimilated into the national community because they do not share the 
values and loyalties of the indigenous Ue white) population. Nationhood is 
based on ethnic- ideological factors: only the ethnically British have deep- 
rooted allegiance to national traditions, institutions and culture. Citizenship 
is only a legal category, but even here Powell argues that it should include 
vows of allegiance. But given that' repatriation is not a realistic option and 
that many immigrants are British citizens and have become more fully 
integrated into British society (economically and through mixed marriages), 
Powellism is left floundering, lacking any viable alternative to the reality 
it chooses to Ignore. 
Powell though enjoyed significant popular support for his stance on the 
immigration issue, though as Schoen points out Powell's populist appeal was 
confined to this single issue (Schoen, 1977) .4 His campaign against EEC 
membership failed to ignite such intense popular support. Powell appeared as 
an alternative to the postwar consensus at a tine of high levels of public 
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disillusionment, and he was able to mobilize people on the emotive issue of 
immigration, working on pre-existing fears. Powell's speeches on immigration 
and Tony Benn's subsequent attack an him are often seen as affecting the 
outcome of the 1970 election (Deakin & Bourne, 1970). His resignation from 
the Conservative Party and revelation that he would vote Labour because of 
their cautious attitude towards the EC, may also have been significant 
factors in the closely-fought February 1974 election. 
Powell's concern with the revitalization of national identity coupled 
opposition to immigration with calls for the reform of citizenship laws. 
Before 1948, according to Powell, British nationality was based on allegiance 
to the Grown: "allegiance is the very essence of nationhood-Nationhood 
means that a man stands to one nation, to one loyalty, above all others. " 
(Hansard, vol. 997, p. 967). Allegiance falls within the parameters of nationality 
by birth or lius soli". However the 1948 British Nationality Act altered the 
basis of nationality, establishing nine separate citizenships plus a 
citizenship of "the United Kingdom and its Colonies". This was a fictional 
entity and failed to base the rights and duties of nationality upon 
citizenship or membership of one sovereign nation-state. In his speech on 
the 1953 Royal Titles Bill, Powell criticized the removal of the word 
"Britishm from the monarch's title and its replacement by the "meaningless" 
terms "Commonwealth" and "Realms" (Hansard, vol. 512, cols. 240-248). 
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Powell criticized the Thatcher government's 1981 British Nationality 
Bill for sticking with *rag-bag principles" of citizenship and nationality. 
Its definition of British citizenship continued to ignore concepts of 
rights, duty and allegiance which Powell regarded as the time-honoured bases 
of British subject status. The 1981 Bill proposed a combination of Nius soli" 
(citizenship by virtue of birth within the sovereign territory) and 'lius 
sanguinis" (citizenship by virtue of one's blood or parents). Thus, a British 
citizen would be someone barn to a British citizen, but with the 
qualification that the parent was settled in the UK at the time of his/her 
birth. Powell argued that this created problems of dual nationality and thus 
of allegiance. On the Hong Kong question In 1985, Powell was critical of 
British nationality laws and proposals to grant British citizenship 
without automatic right of abode. For Powell the failure to produce a 
coherent concept of British citizenship in the 1940s was a root cause of 
the immigration and nationality problems which emerged in the 1960s 
(Powell, 19 88, b). He believes that British citizenship does not automatically 
confer membership of the national community on a person. Nationhood is a 
complex of subjective feelings of loyalty and identity which Powell 
suggests are only found in the historical ethnic community (ie the white 
population of Britain). 
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Powell is the most clearly identifiable conservative nationalist of the 
post-war era, presenting a theoretical account of British nationhood and 
interpreting important political issues in terms of a quest for a redefined 
national identity. For a time in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Powellism 
was a politically signif icant, populist nationalism, coupling crude and 
emotive appeals for an end to immigration with a rigourously-defined, 
intellectual concept of the nation. As a nationalist strategy, Powellism had 
some success in linking together a number of policy areas under a populist 
umbrella, but his ability in putting together a nationalist package was not 
mirrored in the wider political arena. Powell's status as spokesman for a 
popular conservative nationalism was shortlived, with his popularity tied to 
his hardline views on immigration. Powell himself regards the fight against 
EC intrusion into British sovereignty as the most important plank of his 
nationalist strategy, but in this respect his record is largely one of 
failure to prevent further integration or persuade the British people of the 
negative implications of EC membership. 
Ultinately, the Powellite nationalist strategy has to be Judged as a 
failure because it was inappropriate to the politics of the Conservative 
party and to the realities of governing a multi-ethnic society. Powellism 
was an oppositional strategy - which, like the nationalism of the Edwardian 
Right, emerged at a time of popular dissatisfaction and internal disputes 
about policy direction in the Conservative Party. Its brand of populist 
rhetoric and ideological politics was incompatible with the moderate and 
pragmatic politics needed to govern a plural society. Although some of 
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Powell's proposals on immigration were not far removed from the official 
leadership position, his break with the cautious management encouraged by 
the dual party consensus on race politics ensured his isolation from 
effective decision-making. His laissez-faire economics and position as 
unofficial leader of backbench revolts on British membership of the EC 
maintained his maverick role in the Conservative Party, though for may he 
appeared the most likely alternative to Heath's leadership. The language of 
Powellism was at best impolitic, at worst inflammatory and explicitly 
racial ist, divid ing society into native and "alien" groupings, legitimizing 
the prejudices of the former and depicting the latter as a threat to the 
nation. 
Powellism recognized the need for a redefined sense of British national 
identity which would reflect Britain's changed world role and changes in 
British society-Its most useful contribution to the conservative nation was 
its exposure of the damaging nature of myths of imperial and economic 
might, but Powellism is fundamentally flawed because of its espousal of 
damaging myths of isolationism and national homogeneity. Though Powell 
draws on conservative themes of organic ism, trad ition, community and identity, 
his nationalist strategy is divisive and extremist. His focus on the 
parliamentary character of British political culture is undermined by his 
belief that sovereignty is an absolute which is best safeguarded through 
vigorous isolationism. But Powellite nationalism's most damaging diversion 
from the moderate conservative nation was its stance on the politics of 
race. powellism fostered a climate in which prejudice was legitimized 
(through the "numbers game" or appeals to "common sense" and the universal 
desire in human nature to live with "those of one's own kind"), ethnic 
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minority communities were depicted as "alien" and unwelcome, and references 
to cultural difference were transformed into statements on race relations. 
Though careful to avoid explicit references to Orace", Powell's belief that 
national homogeneity is required for a shared idea of the nation and common 
loyalty to a single sovereign authority, is implicitly equated with an 
ethnic- ideological definition of nationhood in which only the indigenous 
ethnic population, imbued with traditional values and loyalties, are full 
members of the national comunity. The populist nature of his nationalism 
also means that the legitimate prejudices of the majority population should 
be taken into account when deciding the membership of the nation. The desire 
to live with "People of one's own kind" produces a situation in which the 
native population reject immigration, thus exercising their right to decide 
the make-up of the national community Powell Is calls for repatriation and 
rejection of the integrationist option illustrate the racialist nature of his 
nationalist strategyand its unsuitability to a plural society in which many 
wimmlgrants" are British citizens and integrated into British society. 
Although Powellism is fundamentally flawed both as a redefinition of 
the conservative concept of the nation and as a nationalist strategy, its 
influence on Conservative politics has been cons iderable. Thatcherism Is 
doctrinal blend of free-market and authoritarian politics has clearly drawn 
on Powellism, while the populist nature of its approach to the politics of 
race is also a legacy of Powell. However, Thatcherism had to react to issue 
from a governmental standpoint, something which Powell's essentially 
oppositional nationalist strategy had to do, hence differences between the 
two an repatriation, citizenship, Ulster and British membership of the EC. 
Powell himself has been critical of Thatcher for not developing her gut 
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nationalism into a coherent strategy, betraying her concern f or the nation 
by keeping Britain inside an EC fast moving towards further integration, 
and by signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Yet although significant 
differences of policy exist between the two, it is undeniable that 
Thatcherism's revival of the language of nationhood owes much to the 
message and impact of Powell's populist nationalism. 
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The f irst part of this thesis argued that historical ly, Brit ish 
conservatism has developed a distinctive concept of the nation, based on 
values of tradition, organic change, community and hierarchy. This conservative 
nation can be seen, in different guises, in the works of conservative thinkers 
from Burke to Scruton. It has also taken an considerable political and 
electoral importance when utilized by the Conservative Party, the most 
important forum in which conservative ideas are translated into political 
strategy. Party policy is necessarily more flexible than political doctrine 
would suggest as it is closely tied to the realities of electoral 
competition, political limitation and changing circumstance. From the time of 
Disraeli, the Conservative Party has used the themes of the conservative 
nation to gain political support and act as a national-integrative rather 
than sectional party. But political realities have often prevented the themes 
of the conservative nation being translated into coherent policy strategy. 
This chapter will assess the extent to which Thatcherism has utilized the 
themes of the 'conservative nation and developed a politics of nationhood. 
In the late 1960s two alternative "national strategies" were available 
to the Conservative Party, one pragmatic, the other ideological. 
(i) An integrative "one nation" strategy in which the Conservative Party 
aims to bring social cohesion and consensus, thus minimizing the effects of 
class and territorial divisions within the nation-state. This national 
strategy is ideologically weak, lacking a coherent nationalist agenda or 
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course of action. Policies are arrived at pragmatically: conservative values 
are important but are guided by considerations of electoral competition 
and the need for strong government. The Conservative Party is presented as 
the national party, seeking national unity rather than representing sectional 
interests. The party's traditional support for national institutions together 
with its patriotic image and rhetoric are electorally important in 
persuading voters that the party is best placed to act for the interests of 
the nation as a whole. This has been the dominant national strategy of the 
Conservative Party, as espoused by Disraeli and Baldwin, but was severely 
weakened by the crisis of, one nation conservatism in the late 1960s. 
(ii) A nationalist strategy in which a coherent concept of the nation and 
its interests determines policies in the wider political arena. Here, the 
Conservative Party claims to be the national party because it has a well- 
developed theory of who constitutes the nation and what courses of action 
should be taken to defend its political independence, unity and sense of 
identity-It is predominantly ideological rather than pragmatic or electoral 
in its orientation. In a largely non-ideological party such as the British 
Conservatives, this nationalist strategy is rare and usually espoused by 
internal opposition rather than the party leadership. Cons iderat ions of 
statecraft tend to override those of doctrinal clarity, but nationalist 
strategies have been adopted on the Conservative Right at times of crisis 
or national redefinition. The most significant recent manifestation of a 
nationalist stategy within the Conservative Party was Powellism, which 
sought to replace the consensual middle way conservatism of the 1960s with 
a conservative strategy based an the reassertion of national identity and 
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self- government. An earlier nationalist strategy arose in the early part of 
the 20th century on the "Diehard* imperialist wing of the party. 
This chapter argues that Thatcherism has marked a move away from the 
integrative "one nation" strategy of past Conservative governments. However 
it has not been able to formulate or implement an alternative ideological 
account of nationhood. My concern is with Thatcherism's "politics of 
nationhood" ie those areas of doctrine and policy concerned with defining 
and protecting national identity. The scope of a "politics of nationhood" 
thus covers doctrinal expressions of nationhood (outlining the key features 
of the national community) and government policy in areas which are 
identified as crucial to national identity and interests (eg the 
Union, relations with the EC and race politics). In assessing Thatcherism's 
relationship to a politics of nationhood, I will draw on three main areas of 
analysis used by political scientists. These interpretations are: (a) the 
personal values of Xargaret Thatcher; (b) the tensions between ideas of the 
nation in the free market and strong state strands, of Thatcherism as a 
political doctrine; (c) the more pragmatic elements of Thatcherite 
statecraft and issue management, particularly in the areas of social and 
territorial cohesion, race and policy on Europe. Taken individually, these areas 
of analysis are useful in assessing the concept of the nation employed by 
Thatcherism and its application in particular policy areas. However, for an 
overall account of Thatcherism's politics of nationhood it is best to use 
all three approaches simultaneously, recognizing the shortcomings of each of 
them to build a clearer overall picture. First though I will examine the 
environment in which Thatcherism and its ideas of the nation evolved. - 
-149- 
By the late 1970s, the Conservative "one nation" strategy and the values 
of the conservative nation were being undermined by developments within the 
British state and in the wider international arena. Within the Conservative 
]Party itself, the earlier middle way strategy of Macmillan and Butler was 
losing support. Heath's "Selsdon Man" period marked a shift to the Right on 
economic and social affairs, but the impetus was lost by the 1972 U-turn. 
Heath's return to policies of government intervention stiffened the resolve 
of neo-liberals like Sir Keith Joseph. Thatcher's leadership election victory 
was won despite the lack of a sizeable neo-liberal faction, and despite 
concern about the political bankruptcy of the "middle wayu, the majority of 
the party never became converts to Thatcherite doctrine (Worton, 1990). ' For 
the Conservative Party, Thatcher brought a new leadership style and a 
populist ideology merging economic liberalism and traditional Tory 
morality. 
Thatcherism promised an end to economic decline, a restoration of law, 
order and traditional values, a reduced role for the state and a revival of 
pride in British nationhood. It identified the failings of collectivism and 
the "one nation" strategy, but was unable or unwilling to produce a coherent 
national strategy or politics of nationhood. The British state and national 
identity were under threat in the political environment from which 
Thatcherism emerged. Sub-state nationalisms in Vales and Scotland plus the 
crisis of authority in Northern Ireland threatened the territorial integrity 
of the United Kingdom. Thatcherism inherited a Conservative Party without a 
clear national strategy. The short-term decline of the devolution issue after 
the 1979 referendums in Scotland and Wales gave the new government a 
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respite from having to review the Conservatives commitment to Union, but the 
issue would rise again in the late 1980s. 
On European issues, the Conservatives had long supported closer links 
with the continent, though an isolationist rump continued to voice its 
opposition. The Heath government had negotiated British membership a decade 
after Macmillan had first sought it. The 1975 referendum an EC membership 
answered those critics within the party who claimed that Heath has acted 
without a specific electoral mandate. However, the first Thatcher government 
inherited a number of problems arising from Community arrangements 
structured without reference to British interests or traditions. 
Conservatives were also concerned by what they saw as problems of race 
relations and immigration. Immigration controls had been tightened in the 
early 1970s, but racial tensions were a worrying feature of British politics, 
particularly as electoral support for the racist National Front grew. The 
first Thatcher government was placed in the difficult position of on the 
one hand, seeking to improve race relations, and on the other, addressing fears 
of the Conservative Right and general public about immigration. 
National identity, community feeling and social cohesion were all under 
strain in 1970s Britain. Thatcherism blamed British economic woes and the 
decline in patriotism, civic values and national identity on too much state 
intervention and on corporatist economic relations. Since the end of empire, 
Britain's world role had been unclear, while domestically national unity, 
authority, m oral ity and patriotism were no longer respected values. 
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In subsequent chapters I will examine Thatcherism's approach to 
relations with the EC and to the management of race relations in a plural 
society. The rest of this chapter focuses on Thatcherism and the politics of 
nationhood in more general terms, looking at Thatcher's personal nationalism, 
Thatcherism as political doctrine and Thatcherism as statecraft. 
Tbatrherism as Mrs ThatcherIg Personal Values. 
The most simplistic account of Thatcherism claims that it is little 
more than a collection of English middle class values and prejudices, as 
expressed by the personal beliefs of Margaret Thatcher herself. Peter Riddell 
claims that: 
OThatcherism is essentially an instinct, a series of moral values and an 
approach to leadership rather than an ideology. It is an expression of 
Mrs Thatcher's upbringing in Grantham, her background of hard work and 
family responsibility, ambit ion and postponed sat is fact ion, duty and 
patriotism. u (Riddell, 19 83, p. 7). 
Alan O'Shea's account of Thatcherism also focuses on the values and 
beliefs of Thatcher herself (O'Shea, 1984) He draws an her speeches to 
illustrate his thesis that Thatcherite nationalism emerges from Thatcher's 
populist Ue anti-statist) rhetoric in which "the people" are seen as 
individuals linked by their membership of a historic national community. 
This mode of analysis emphasizes the role of Kargaret Thatcher, arguing 
that the major themes and policies of the Thatcher era are best understood 
by reference to its leading f igure. It stresses her leadership style and 
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conviction politics, but ignores the constraints of office, party and 
circumstance which limit any leader's scope for action and conspired to 
bring about Thatcher's downfall. Accounts of Thatcherism's importance for 
British politics and conservative thought cannot be undertaken solely from 
this perspective. The study of Thatcherism must involve more than political 
journalism or biography in order to reflect the large number of inputs in 
the policy making environment and the constraints on leadership. But 
Thatcher's own style and beliefs are important to an account of Thatcherism 
and the politics of nationhood because her instinctive nationalism has 
often been politically significant-She was never the guiding intellectual 
force behind the doctrine which took her name, but because of her position 
as Prime Minister and style as a "conviction politician", Thatcher's own 
values take on extra significance. Thus her instinctive English nationalism 
reintroduced the language of nationhood into the political arena even though 
it lacked the theoretical coherence of Powellism. Although her views do not 
make up a consistent concept of the nation, they were politically significant 
on European issues and during the Falklands Var. 
Mrs Thatcher's speeches often draw on her personal values: the moral 
superiority of the free society, the importance of traditional values and the 
need to restore patriotism and Britain's world role. As early as 1968 she 
was emphasizing the now recognizably Thatcherite themes of the detrimental 
effect the over-extended state had on personal responsibility (Thatcher, 
1968). Her early speeches as Conservative leader raised the same themes of 
reducing the role of the state and allowing the free market to aid 
individual self-government -A healthy nation needs responsible individuals 
because "the virtue of a nation is only as great as the virtue of the 
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individuals who compose it" (1981 in Thatcher, 1 989, p. 122). Self-regard is 
not, for Thatcher, antithetical to communal feelings, but is its foundation. 
"There is not and cannot be any hard-and-fast antithesis between self- 
interest and care for others, for man is a social creature, born into 
fam i ly, c lan, community, nat ion, brought up in mutual self -dependence. " 
(1977 in Thatcher, 19 89, p. 53). 
Socialism and the interventionist state are blamed for the decline of 
the traditional Tory values of patriotism, social cohesion and national 
pride. The healthy society, according to a speech in Liverpool in 1976, 
requires the three "complementary ideals" of personal responsibility, 
membership of a community and family-life. The socialist state undermines 
personal responsibility and independence which in turn reduces communal 
confidence and solidarity. The Conservative Party 'represents traditional 
values and institutions which help provide social cohesion. 
Among the most revealing of Margaret Thatcher's speeches are those in 
which she addresses herself to the relationship between religion (more 
specifically her own Methodist values) and politics. In a 1981 speech at St 
Lawrence Jewry in the City of London she spoke at length about the 
religious basis of British national character. Here Thatcher claimed that 
"the concept of the nation is at the heart of Old Testament Judaism" (in 
Thatcher, 19 89, p. 123) but is crucially linked to the theme of individual 
moral respons ibi lity. lat ions are "enlarged families" binding their members 
together through mutual dependence and common customs. British national 
character derives its morality from the twin Christian ideals of personal 
responsibility and commitment to social welfare. As Christian values and 
traditional moral values come under threat, social solidarity and the sense 
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of "national purpose" are undermined. There is then a close relationship 
between traditional Christian values, patriotism and the health of the 
national community. 
Mrs Thatcher returned to the subject of the links between religion and 
politics in her controversial 1988 "Sermon on the Mount" speech to the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh. Again she stressed 
the central role of individual moral responsibility, arguing that Christian 
ethics state that a man has a moral duty to work and use his talents, but 
must not covet wealth or seek to make money for its own sake (in Thatcher, 
1989, p. 252). 2 The state must should seek to relieve hardship and provide 
education plus basic social services, but must not undermine individual 
responsibility. Thatcher continued to emphasize the Christian basis of 
national character, quoting from the hymn "I vow to thee my country" to 
illustrate this. 
The moral values of Margaret Thatcher emphasize the importance of 
individual responsibility and national cohesion. Thatcher's instinctive 
nationalism is based on these values and has been developed in her 
attitudes towards European integration. From the 1987 Bruges speech onwards, 
she has outlined her belief in the continued strength and importance of 
national identity and national self-government. Her speeches on Europe 
contain the familiar Thatcherite values of free enterprise and the need to 
limit the sphere of state and bureaucratic activity. A detailed account of 
Thatcher's views on European integration can be found in Chapter Seven, 
but it is important at this stage to note that her own nationalism or 
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account of the nation is instinctive rather than philosophical, drawn from 
personal values and experiences. 
Mrs Thatcher's views on the politics of race and immigration again 
appear to fit a pattern of instinctive English nationalism. Her infamous 
"swamping" statement in 1978 led to claims that she is racially prejudiced. 
This may be overstated, but her background and experiences make it likely 
that she is unable to empathize with disadvantaged groups in society. Her 
own commitment to English traditions and customs produce an unsympathetic 
attitude towards groups critical of British society and culture. But this 
emphasis on self-reliance and family values accords with Jewish and Asian 
traditions (see Chapter Eight). - 
During the Falklands War of 1982 Thatcher adopted a more overtly 
nationalist rhetoric. Of more interest than her views on, the Argentinian 
claim to and invasion of ý the Falkland Islands are her speeches which point 
to the domestic relevance of the conflict. Thatcher clearly regarded the 
victory of British forces in the South Atlantic as symbolic of a revival of 
British esteem and patriotism. In a speech to a Conservative rally in 
Cheltenham shortly after the conclusion of host ilit ies, Thatcher -noted the 
mood of patriotic fervour which had swept the country. 
"The lesson of the Falklands; is that Britain has not changed and that 
this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through our 
history.. Ve have to see that the spirit of the South Atlantic - the real 
spirit of Britain - is kindled not only by war but can now be f ired by 
peace-The faltering and self-doubt has now given way to achievement an 
pride. We have the conf idence and we must use it. " 
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The Falklands conflict revived the latent patriotism which had been 
damaged by the crisis of confidence and identity produced by 1970s style 
corporatism. For Thatcher, this was highly significant and was used by her as 
a stick with which to, beat the unpatriotic *enemies within" who acted to 
undermine British confidence, cohesion and prosperity. 
Thatcher called herself an "instinctive Unionist", but her decision to 
sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement undermines this claim. In Scotland, she is 
widely regarded as "anti-Scottish" and as an English nationalist. In speeches 
to Scottish Conservatives, Mrs Thatcher repeatedly stressed her support for 
the Union and claimed that "the Scats invented Thatcherism long before I 
was thought ofu (1988, in Thatcher, 1989, p. 236). Here she looked to the 
Scottish economists and philosophers Smith, Hune and Ferguson as the 
originators of theories of the free society and individualism. However 
Scottish critics have argued that Mrs Thatcher was out of touch with 
Scottish opinion, maintaining an overtly Unionist position at a tine of 
general disenchantment with existing constitutional arrangements (Kendrick 
and McCrone, 1989, p. 602). 
Mrs Thatcher's personal values and background then provide a useful 
building block with which to start constructing an account of Thatcherism 
and the nation. Her personal patriotism and opposition to threats to 
national identity and cohesion, whether from European federalists, sub-state 
nationalists or "enemies within'l, illustrate Mrs , Thatcher's instinctive 
English national ism. This differs qualitatively from the coherent and 
ideological account of nationhood upon which Enoch Powell built his 
politics of the nation. Thatcherism though is far more than the values and 
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beliefs of any one person, no matter how central she is to the character and 
policies of the Thatcher governments. It is doctrinally well-developed when 
compared with previous Conservative strategies, drawing on New Right 
thinking and traditional Tory attitudes. 3 The doctrinal elements of 
Thatcherism contain much of relevance to ideas of nationhood, but also 
reveal the tensions and inconsistencies within Thatcherism which undermine 
claims that Thatcherism is hegemonic or ideologically nationalist. 
As a political doctrineThatcherism fuses two long- established strands 
of, British conservative thought in an uneasy alliance: a neo-liberal emphasis 
an individual freedom and the capitalist market, and a more authoritarian 
focus on national cohesion, traditional moral values and common culture 
(Gamble, 1988). The radical-popu list character of Thatcherite doctrine stems 
from its fusion of'the two traditions and their application to contemporary 
problems. For the Conservative Party, Thatcherism marks a shift away from a 
pragmatic, consensual style to an ideological politics which alienated many 
"one nation" Tories. In their accounts of nationhood, these' two doctrinal 
elements often sit uneasily together, undermining claims that Thatcherism is 
ideologically nationalist or potentially hegemonic. 
The neo-liberal elements of Thatcherism have been most clearly 
developed in attitudes towards reducing the role of the state in economic 
and social affairs, thereby increasing individual responsibility and freedom 
within a free market system. In this sense Thatcherism draws on and 
develops sane of the themes inherent in the political definition of the 
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nation examined in Chapter One of this thesis. This political nation adopts 
an account of politics and identity located at individual rather than group 
level. Its dominant themes are those of sovereignty, citizenship, the limited 
state and individual freedom and all of these have been championed, and In 
some cases redefined, by Thatcherism. Monetarism provided Thatcherism's 
initial doctrinal response to economic decline, challenging Keynesian 
commitments to full employment, government intervention and corporatism. 
Thatcherite economics stressed control of the money supply and floating 
currency levels, but strict monetarism was gradually replaced by anti- 
inflationary policies, the control of interest rates, financial deregulation 
and the privatization of state-owned industries. Compet it ion within the free 
market and wider share ownership were encouraged as ways of reviving 
individual responsibility and initiative. 4 
In terns of the social or welfare functions of the state, Thatcherism 
again redefined the relationship between individual and state. The new 
relationship between the two produced a reduction of the "social citizenship 
rights" of the individual (Oliver, 1991; Ignatieff, 1989). Thatcherism extended 
economic citizen rights, but reduced social citizenship ones. The individual is 
treated as a consumer or as an economic unit acting in the free market. This 
stipulates a limited role for the state in economic affairs, reserving the 
market as the sphere in which individual autonomy is realized. The citizen 
has legal and political rights, but social citizenship ideas of welfare 
entitlement are viewed as detrimental to individual responsibility, freedom 
and economic efficiency. Thus Ignatieff claims that: 
"The political counter-revolution that brought Margaret Thatcher to 
power.. can be understood as an attack on the citizenship of equal 
-159- 
entitlement in post-war liberal democratic society-The citizenship of 
shared entitlement came to be understood in the conservative thought of 
the late 1970s as a coercive bargain between strangers which abridged 
the liberties of both rich and poor while infantilising the poor. " 
(Ignatief f, 1989, p. 63). 
The individualist methodology at the heart of Thatcherite neo- 
liberalism regarded theories of community and society (from both left and 
right) as threats to individual autonomy, undermining individual freedom 
with their ideas of the common good or social unity. This interpretation 
regards the nation as little more than a collection of strangers: sovereign 
individuals coming together in economic transactions, to maintain the legal 
system or organize defence against external threats. Thatcher thus claimed 
that "there is no such thing as society, only individuals and their 
families". '- 
Thatcherism's free market economics then emphasize the individual at 
the expense of the community and look to a market-based legal citizenship 
rather than an entitlement-based social citizenship. Neo- liberalism offers an 
internationalist doctrine of free trade and world interdependence rather 
than a protectionist economic nationalism. The British economy has become 
"multi-nationalized" for the state has not acted to prevent the penetration 
of foreign capital into the economy, even at the expense of British 
industrial interests. The Thatcher governments' lifted exchange controls, 
encouraged the development of the European Single Market and sold shares in 
newly-privatised industries to foreign investors. Thatcherism encouraged 
international free trade, seeing the economy as part of a wider world market 
(free from protectionism ideally) in which British financial interests and 
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particularly a deregulated City of London would play a leading role and 
where streamlined British industry could compete across national frontiers. 
The freeing of market forces and the internationalist outlook of 
Thatcherite economics aimed to bring national prosperity and regeneration 
within the world economy. The driving force behind this economic recovery 
are representatives of the British financial and industrial sectors whose 
entrepreneurial talents ultimately benefit the wider society. As in previous 
manifestations of conservatism, a particular section of society (in each case 
a talented elite or minority) represent the interests and values of the 
nation. Their actions both benefit themselves as individuals and increase the 
prosperity and opportunities of others. But it is not a truly "national 
class", being internationalist in outlook with its arena of action extending 
beyond the domestic econamy. Economic interdependence and internationalism 
mean that, unless a protectionist sytem exists, financial and industrial 
sectors cannot be merely national in their outlook or values. Thatcherism 
cannot be reduced to an expression of particular or homogeneous interests 
within the British economy, either financial or industrial. Its doctrine 
merely seeks to create the conditions in which efficient and competitive 
elements can prosper within the domestic market and in the wider economy, 
bringing national recovery. 
Thatcherism's view of individuals as sovereign economic units within a 
free market economy, and its opposition to an interventionist role for the 
state in economic affairs has produced a strategy fundamentally different 
from its predecessors. This "one nation" strategy valued national unity, 
cohesion and consensus and sought to bring it about through a mixed 
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economy and welfare state. It was essentially integrative, whereas Thatcherite 
doctrine and policies have been Ide- integrative" in that national unity and 
consensus are not valued as ends in themselves. Instead, individual freedom 
of action within the competitive market economy is valued above communal 
unity or social cohesion (Krieger, 1986). The free market's competitive nature 
inevitably creates divisions between the successful (or lucky) and the 
unsuccessful or disadvantaged. Thatcherism has meant that divisions between 
"haves" and "have-nots" are exacerbated as social citizenship rights are 
reduced. Jessop argues that this has amounted to a "two-nations strategy" in 
which the gulf between rich and poor widens as Thatcherism rewards the 
productive elements in society and looks to them as its electoral base 
(Jessop et al, 1989). The nation is territorially divided as well: the economic 
gap between the modernizing South and the old-industrial North has widened 
(Smith, 1989). Thatcherism's outlook is shaped by the values of its major 
constituency, the South East of England. Electorally, it does not need to pick 
up many parliamentary seats in the areas suffering most from industrial 
decline (Gamble, 1 988, p. 214). r- The growing divide within the national 
community has undermined Conservatism's traditional relationship , with 
Unionism, while in terns of the politics of race, this de-integrative or 
divisive trend is continued through the marginalization. of some ethnic 
minority groups. 
From the neo-liberal wing of Thatcherite political doctrine arises a 
redefined concept of the nation in which central themes of individualism 
and economic internationalism contrast with the integrative strategy of 
none nation" conservatism. However, these elements in Thatcherism were often 
subordinated to an alternative view of nationhood based on traditional Tory 
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values of community, order and state authority. This is its traditionalist, 
strong state branch, but the relationship between the two branches is often 
a tense one, hindering the development of a coherent concept of the nation. 
The strong state branch of Thatcherite doctrine draws on Tory themes 
of autharity, social order and traditional moral values, all of which are 
regarded as essential for national unity and identity. In economic affairs, 
Thatcherism demands a reduced role for the state and a greater role for 
individuals acting in the free market. In. political terms though the state 
has had to become actively involved in creating the conditions in which a 
market economy can flaurish. The authority of the state in relation to 
economic and sectional interests in civil society has been strengthened 
through centralization and the weakening of alternative power centres (eg 
trade unions and local government). Only by weakening corporatist power 
structures and extending the power of the centre were the Thatcher 
governments able to free market forces (Gamble, 1988). 
The traditionalist or strong state approach is a more identifiably 
conservative account of nationhood than the individualist neo-liberal 
element within Thatcherite doctrine. This is particularly true for ideas of 
community and social cohesion. For the neo-liberals, society is little more 
than a collection of separate, sovereign individuals coming together 
voluntarily in the marketplace. For the traditionalists, the individual is a 
social creature, his oultook and interests shaped by the community and 
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culture in which he is raised. Society is valued because it brings communal 
cohesion and shared identity, not because it represents an arena for 
economic transactions. State authority plays a crucial part in holding 
society together and provides a focus of loyalty and identity. Tory 
collectivists argued that the state ought to provide welfare services to 
ensure national unity and prevent a dangerously wide gap between rich. and 
poor. Though Thatcherism recognises that the state should ensure that nobody 
falls below a social minimum and thus into destitution, the paramount 
importance of both economic efficiency and individual responsibility dictate 
that state intervention should not be structured along the lines of an "end- 
state" view of the Just society or the need for national unity. 
The traditionalist branch had to cede predominance to the neo-liberal 
branch of Thatcherism on economic issues, but had the upper hand in areas of 
law and morality. Individual freedom was encouraged in the economic 
marketplace, but traditional moral and cultural values must be protected. 
There was to be no free marketý of lifestyles or moral values as this would 
produce permissiveness, a weakening of social order and a crisis of national 
culture and identity. 7 Traditional Tory and Christian values were placed at 
the heart of the British way of life and were to be upheld in face of 
threats from radical elements, whether they are libertarian or socialist. The 
development of an ethnically plural society was also perceived as a danger 
to national identity and traditional British values. The state was to have 
ultimate authority in these areas of community life, resulting in a hardline 
approach to immigration and against other disruptive elements (the "enemy 
within"). 
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This manifestation of the Thatcherite concept of nationhood builds on 
the values of community, authority and a national identity supported by the 
state, but extends them along more blatantly exclusivist or ideological 
grounds. Thatcherisn's nation appears to be little more than those upholding 
traditional values and the British way of life and accepting the Thatcherite 
doctrine of free market and strong state. The potential for pluralism in the 
conservative nation, where divisions exist but are tempered by community, 
consensus and shared identity is neglected. Instead society is divided, 
ideologically at least, between the productive and traditionalist on the one 
hand, and the economically or socially unproductive plus cultural minorities 
on the other. So while free market ideology allows economic divides to widen 
by rejecting large scale state-led redistribution, the strong state line 
more actively marginalizes society along ideological and cultural lines, 
continuing the de-integrative trend inherent in the Thatcherite 
interpretation of nationhood. 
Although, the I'de-integrative" nature of the Thatcherite nation meant 
that the "one nation" strategy of social cohesion and consensus was 
demoted, the exclusivist trend within Thatcherism is not absolute. The 
economically unproductive and ethnic minorities are not permanently 
excluded from the Thatcherite ideal nation. The national community is not a 
closed shop: its boundaries are open to those showing productive vigour or 
ideological attachment to Thatcherite values. The politics of race followed 
by the Thatcher governments does not define nationhood solely in ethnic 
terms, but in terms of British identity, culture and loyalties. But integration 
often requires the abandonment of ethnic identities which clash with the 
Thatcherite interpretation of British values. 
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The traditionalist element within Thatcherisn sees the individual as 
more than an economic unit, extending the concept of citizenship beyond neo- 
liberalism's reductionist individualism. The citizen in the traditionalist 
account is linked to the state through civic solidarity, communal identity, 
and shared obligation. The concept of "active citizenship" developed in 
Conservative circles from the time of Douglas Hurd's address to the 1988 
Conservative Conference, developing into a key theme of John Major's 
premiership with the production of the Citizen's Charter. Hurd's idea of 
Nactive citizenshipu emphasized links between citizen, civil society and the 
state. Individuals were not seen as atomistic but as members of different 
communities, with the family the most important. Voluntary activities would 
bridge the gap between state and individual. Welfare provision was to be a 
partnership between, -public provision and private provision (through 
charities and voluntary work in the community). On law and order, individual 
citizens were to be encouraged to take an active concern in their local 
community through neighbourhood. watch schemes and liasons with local 
police. Education was also a major area. -here the emphasis would be an the 
teaching of civic virtue, educating children in the duties and obligations of 
citizenship-As Education Secretary, John MacGregor stated that schools should 
cover three core aspects of citizenship: Q) individual rights and 
responsibilities; (ii) the organization and structure of society, and (iii) 
the role and obligations of citizens in society (Heater, 199 1, p. 149). 
This "active citizenship" developed in the last couple of years of the 
Thatcher governments and in the Major preniership, ironing out the harsh 
edges of Thatcherite individualism. However, its outlook is still rooted in a 
market framework where individuals are located as consumers or property- 
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owners. The "obligations" of citizenship are essentially voluntary and 
apolitical. Social citizenship rights do not figure in this approach: it is not 
a Tory collectivist strategy but an attempt at redress of grievances under 
which individuals can expect higher standards of public service. 
For neoýliberals the workings of the free market must take place within 
a framework of constitutionalism under the rule of law. As noted above, a 
high level of state intervention and centralization was required to bring 
about the conditions under which a free market approach could replace a 
corporatist one-The focus on state authority in the traditionalist aspect of 
Thatcherism. saw the role of the state increase to a level at which the 
minimal constitutional arrangements demanded by neo-liberals have been 
threatened. State intervention may have been reduced through privatization, 
but the autonomy of local authorities was also weakened, notably in financial 
affairs and education. The National Curriculum boosted the role of the state 
in education and allowed Thatcherism to influence the teaching of subjects 
such as history which are crucial in shaping perceptions of identity (Kaye, 
1987). Education Secretary Sir Keith Joseph commented that: 
"History is indispensable to understanding the society we live in; to 
an awareness by pupils of the place of themselves, their families and 
communities in the developing story of the nation. " Joseph, 1984). 
Joseph emphasized the "national" element of history and its importance 
in furthering the shared British values of liberty and parliamentary 
democracy. However in seeking to impose its own vision of British history 
and its favoured traditional style of history teach ing, Thatcherism further 
politicized British history and the interpretation of the past. Rhetorically, 
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Thatcherism popularized its own (Vhig) version of British history, f ocusing 
on the benefits of the free market society, on national greatness, and on 
conservative morality. The Swann Report recommended the development of 
shared values and identity, but Thatcherism was critical of multi-cultural 
education. Its commitment to greater parental choice opened up the 
possibility of white parents removing their children from schools 
predominantly made up of ethnic minority children (see pp. 297-299). 
The strong state emphasis on order, stability and authority was used to 
justify the continued encroachment of the state into civil society. Civil 
liberties were threatened as Thatcherism brought "creeping authoritarianism" 
(Bogdanor, 1989). Thatcher ism stressed the British tradition of parliamentary 
sovereignty (the self-government of the British people) in opposition to 
European centralism, but itself impinged on the powers of parliament to 
check the executive. Increased government and prime ministerial dominance 
over the legislature reduced the accountability of government, and the 
alternative centres of power were undermined. The "active citizen" then 
exists within a structure where individual participation is valued in the 
market place, but not in the political arena. 
The doctrinal approach is important for the analysis of Thatcherism, for 
it illustrates the lack of theoretical coherence at its core. Thatcherism is 
a hybrid of two distinct doctrinal strands, the neo-liberal and 
authoritarian, which do not gel together easily. It does not have a single, 
unilinear docrinal identity, but is rather best seen as an example of uneasy 
ideological cross- f ert 11 izat ion. Thatcherism Is doctrinal approach to the 
politics of nationhood shows the tensions between a neo-liberal emphasis on 
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the unencumbered individual and the authoritarian stress on the communal 
roots of individual identity. 
Inherent in a solely doctrinal analysis of Thatcherism is the danger of 
exaggerating the coherence of Thatcherite doctrine or underestimating the 
limitations posed by political and electoral factors. Stuart Hall's Gramscian 
analysis of Thatcherism. as *authoritarian populism" argues that Thatcherism 
has fused free-market economics and social authoritarian attitudes Into a 
major ideological force (Hall, 1988). As an "authoritarian populist" strategy 
it mobilizes popular support behind populist Right-wing themes (eg law and 
order, nationalism and economic liberty) enabling the construction of a new 
anti-collectivist hegemony to replace the Keynesian welfarist consensus. 
Thatcherism thus fuses both the demands of those in power f or the 
restoration of the authority of the state with populist appeals eg for stict 
immigration controls and curbs an trade union powers, mobilizing support for 
a coherent authoritarian project. 
Hall's analysis though places an undue stress on the doctrinal 
dimensions of Thatcherism, granting it an ideological coherence and 
uniformity which it lacked in practiceJessop rejects Hall's "ideologism", 
arguing that Thatcherism was not a hegemonic project, but rather disparate 
coalition of interests and populist appeals. Thus Thatcherism's commitment 
to monetarist economics was a significant break with the Keynesian 
consensus but strict monetarism was short- lived, undermined by strategic 
problems and the limitations imposed by the need for successful, flexible 
political management. Hall's analysis of Thatcherisn as a hegemonic project 
is inconsistent with its failure to fundamentally alter public attitudes on 
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the stucture of the welfare state. Thatcherite values were more successfully 
disseminated in policy areas such as inmigrationjaw and order, privatization 
and trade union reforms. Popular support for Thatcherism's approach to the 
politics of nationhood reached a peak in the Falklands Var and evident in 
the reaction to Thatcher's claim that immigrants were "swamping" the 
country. However the electorate was unreceptive to the Conservative's anti-EC 
rhetoric in the 1989 Euro- elect ions, while Thatcherite values failed to take 
root in Scatland. The "New Right, New Racismu thesis shares Hall's tendency to 
afford Thatcherism the status of a coherent ideological programme, ignoring 
the differences between the rhetoric of the Salisbury Group or Tory Right, 
and the policies of the Thatcher governments, shaped by the demands of issue 
management. 
Thatcherism should be viewed as more than a fusion of doctrinal thenes. 
The policies adopted by the Thatcher governments are also important part of 
its politics of nationhood. The structural limitations imposed by political 
life mean that Thatcherite statecraft often had to chart a pragmatic course, 
at the expense of doctrinal consistency. The "one nation" strategy of earlier 
Conservative governments was built on the electoral appeal of minimizing 
social divisions and was expressed in the language of nationhood and 
national unity. Bulpitt argues that Thatcherism falls within the tradition of 
Conservative Party statecraft as it prime concern is to maintain the 
autonomy of the centre, though the methods used to do this by the Thatcher 
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governments have not been consistent. (Bulpitt, 1986, a & 1991). In this account 
Conservative statecraft is concerned with party management, winning 
elections and hegemony in political argument, plus establishing a level of 
government competence. Thatcherism then has to deal with these political and 
electoral realities, and must be more flexible than an, exclusively 
ideological approach to government would allow. For Bulpitt, "the first 
Thatcher government was designed primarily as an experiment in government 
survival rather than in economic or political theory" (Bulpitt, 1986, p. 34). 
Requirements of pragmatism and issue management shaped Thatcherism's 
politics of nationhood-The politics of nationhood employed by Thatcherism 
is not only doctrinally inconsistent, but uneven in application. 1t is more 
pragmatic than a strictly ideologically nationalist strategy, but different 
from a "one nation* approach because it does not actively seek national 
unity as its end goal. The Thatcher governments had to react pragmatically 
to developments overseas (eg the Falklands War or European integration), 
while domestic problems involving the Union and the divisions exacerbated 
by government policies and recession have not been addressed along the 
lines of the "one nation" integrative strategy. 
Bulpitt's theory of statecraft is inportant, in noting the limitations 
imposed by political reality: the need to win elections, win arguments and 
adopt workable policies. However, in terms of the politics of the nation, 
Thatcherism has rejected the "one nation" and "nationalist" strategies put 
forward by Conservatives in the 1960s. In this respect, Thatcherism differs 
from previous Conservative statecraft whose electoral fortunes and political 
arguments were rooted in socially integrative "one nation" politics. However, 
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those who see Thatcherism as doctrinally consistent neglect its failure to 
develop a coherent national strategy or redefined concept of the nation. 
Instead, it offered policies which have in some areas promoted the language 
of nationhood (eg on Europe, race relations and at the time of the Falklands 
Var) but also adopted divisive policies weakening national unity and the 
Union. 
In policy areas such as Europe, race relations and territorial politics, 
Thatcherism had significant problems in formulating and applying a 
consistent strategy, illustrating its limited success in developing a new 
national strategy-In statecraft terms, Thatcherism was unable to develop a 
clear, electorally popular national strategy to unite the Conservative Party 
and establish issue hegemony. On Europe, div is ions within the government and 
the wider Conservative Party on EC integration were a key factor in events 
leading to Heseltine's leadership challenge. Thatcher's use of the language of 
nationhood may have had some popular appeal, but the 1989 European 
elections saw the Conservative's "diet of Brusselsu campaign widely 
criticized. 19 Thatcher's maximalist account of sovereignty tied her 
governments' hands in the necessarily pragmatic approach to European 
negotiations, working against the development of' a clear view of Britain's 
world role. On issues of immigration and race relations, the language of 
nationhood has also proved -to be popular on the Conservative Right and 
among the electorate in general. Again though Thatcherism did not produce a 
coherent response to the problems of an ethnically pluralist society, and its 
use of ideas of national identity was divisive rather than integrative. 
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The Thatcher governments' actions in the European and race politics 
areas are more fully examined in subsequent chapters. Here though I will 
examine how Thatcherism responded to a short-term problem in the sphere of 
the politics of nationhood, namely the Falklands conflict, and to tensions 
within Unionist politics. 
In 1982 Thatcherism appropriated the language of nationhood following 
the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands to which Britain had an 
(anachronistic) historical claim. The significance of the Falklands War 
episode for this study lies in the ease with which Thatcherism adopted the 
language of nationhood, and the domestic effects of this. Thatcher's own 
instinctive values and political style were important as she manipulated 
latent patriotism f or political benefits. Thatcherism then briefly 
established its popu list- nationalist credentials, with the government's 
determined pursuit of an ultimately successful military option entrenching 
its position. Several paradoxical strands within Thatcherisn's rhetoric were 
masked by this success. The 1981 British Nationality Act had not given 
Falkland Islanders British citizenship, though Thatcher claimed that the 
islanders were "more British than the British" in terms of their values and 
allegiance. Talk of popular sovereignty and self-determination reflected the 
islanders' desire to remain a British territory, but they had had little 
democratic input into decision-making or earlier attempts to resolve the 
problem diplomatically. 
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Thatcherism seized on a mood of patriotism and national pride to 
attack the "enemies within" (eg the NUR and the BBC) who sought to 
undermine British prestige or undermine British society. The conflict also 
strengthened the hand of the Conservative Right as issues of nationhood and 
national identity returned to the political agenda. Contributors to "The 
Salisbury Review" called for a reassertion of national identity, manipulating 
the "Falklands Spirit" to call for the repatriation of immigrants. On the 
Left, the ease with which Thatcherism appropriated the language of 
nationhood caused considerable concern, though the Labour Party leadership 
backed military action and employed much of the same patriotic 
rhetoric. Robert Gray argued that the Falklands episode showed the continued 
strength of the historical relationship between the political Right and 
concepts of the nation (R. Gray, 1982 a& b). Hobsbawm and Gray noted though 
that the Left need not necessarily be disqualified from adapting the 
concept of the nation for its own purposes (Hobsbawm, 1983). Both also drew a 
contrast between Thatcherite populism on the Falklands issue and the 
detrimental domestic effects of Thatcherism on social cohesion and communal 
relations. BarrLett's "Iron Brittaniall argued that the episode was a 
reassertion, of "Churchillism", reviving themes of national unity, militarism, 
imperialism and parliamentary sovereignty (Barnett, 1982). 
The Falklands War is best seen as a short-term expression of 
Thatcherite nationalism rather than part of a coherent nationalist strategy. 
This nationalist rhetoric matched the public mood, but its domestic effects 
were short-lived. The tensions within Thatcherite, doctrine undermined the 
language of nationhood which was used: its divisive elements could not be 
disguised by jingoism after the conflict ended. The Falklands conflict 
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neither ensured the predominance of the Conservative Right nor inaugurated 
a coherent nationalist strategy as the Left had feared. Instead it illustratd 
the continued relevance of the Conservative Party's historical links with 
nationalist rhetoric and the way it could be mobilized by a determined, 
populist government. In the short term, Thatcherism had restored the pre- 
eminent position of the conservative concept of the nation, gaining issue 
hegemony, government competence and electoral benefits. It did not mark the 
beginning of a nationalist strategy though and problems remained for the 
government and for the conservative nation, particularly over the Union. 
I 
Conservatism's "one nation" strategy had historically sought to 
minimise the effects of both class and territorial divisions within British 
society. In Scotland, this was expressed through a Unionist ideology which 
allowed peripheral elites a high level of autonomy in a number of policy 
areas. Scotland, Vales and Northern Ireland also benefited from over- 
representation at Westminster and through proportionately higher levels of 
public-spending by the centre. The Conservative Party's "one nation" strategy 
was closely linked with Unionist ideology, but its fortunes have been in 
steady decline in Scotland since 1955 when the party gained over 50% of 
the vote. This decline reached crisis proportions in the Thatcher years with 
the Conservative share of the vote falling to 24% in 1987, the loss of 11 
seats leaving the party with Just 10 MPs, 6 of whom had been returned with 
less than 40% of the vote. The Conservative vote had declined well below the 
party's support in England and, more significantly, in 1983 was 17% worse 
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than would be expected taking into account class and social differentials 
between England and Scotland (Kendrick 6 McCrone, 1989, p. 599). 
The "one nation" Unionist strategy crumbled in the 1960s in the face of 
growing Scottish national ism, prompt ing Heath's 1968 "Perth Declaration" 
which committed the party to Scottish Devolution despite a lack of long- 
term party support for this in Scotland (Mitchell, 1990; Smith, 19 77). Heath 
set up the party's Constitutional Committee in 1968, headed by Sir Alec 
Douglas Home, the (Scottish) former party leader. The Home Report *Scotland's 
Government" (1970) proposed a directly elected Scottish Convention which 
would take over the functions of the Scottish committees at Westminster. 
However, Heath's government did not implement these proposals or those of 
the Kilbrandon Report of 1973 as the issue began to crumble. 
Divisions within the Scottish Conservatives intensified in the party's 
period in opposition (1974-9) as policy continued its shift between pro- 
devolution and anti-devolution strategies. The Scottish Conservative Party 
was split on the devolution issue. Malcom Rifkind's call for a "new Unionism" 
based on a weak Scottish Assembly took advantage of Thatcher's lack of 
interest in the issue in the early years of her leadership, but was to be the 
last significant pro-devolution statement for over a decade (Xitchell, 1990, 
p. 71). By 1976 the anti-devolutionists were in the ascendancy and the party 
campaigned for a "No" vote in the 1979 referendum, the result of which 
temporarily weakened the nationalist cause. 9 
In the Conservative's 1979 election victory, the party in Scotland 
increased its vote and number of parliamentary seats, though this would 
ýI 
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later appear to- be'a blip in its continued long-term electoral decline. The 
party's national strategy had been weakened by policy shifts and party 
splits on the fundamental issue of the Union. Its claim to be a national 
party suffered from inherent tensions because the conservative focus an 
tradition and national identity had to marry Scottish distinctiveness with 
a-Unionist or "one nation" strategy-The Conservatives' links with consensual 
politics and its roots in Scotland were in decline by the time of 
Thatcher's leadership. Traditional Unionist ties among the Protestant working 
class had declined, the- Scottish Conservative Party lost some of its 
autonomy to a centralizing party machinery, and the identification of the 
Scottish Tories with Scottish interests and identity waned in the face of a 
nationalist revival and economic decline (Miller et al, 1981; Kendrick & 
XcCrone, 1989). The policies of the Thatcher governments exacerbated existing 
problems for the Conservatives in Scotland, and again worked against the 
creation of a national strategy or coherent concept of nationhood. 
The decline in support for the Conservatives in Scotland in the 1983 
and 1987 general elections returned the devolution issue to the political 
agenda. Opponents argued that because of the party's poor showing, the 
Conservatives did not have a mandate to govern in Scotland. The government 
countered by arguing that constitutionally its mandate was one over the 
whole UK, t and that the Labour was not the largest English party in 1974. 
However the decline was a serious and embarrassing one, limiting choice in 
Scottish Office appointments. English Conservative MPs had to be drafted in 
to make up the numbers at Scottish debates in the chamber, and the Scottish 
Affairs Select Committee, was wound up in 1988 because of the lack of 
Conservative XPs able to serve on it. 
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The validity of Conservative rule in Scotland was also weakened by 
Thatcherism's free market strategy which clashed with the high level of 
public administration and state activity in Scotland. In 1988, when the 
Conservative vote had fallen behind the SIP vote in the local government 
elections for the first time, Nairn noted that the Scottish middle classes 
had a corporate identity based on a tradition of public administration, 
rather than an entrepreneurial identity as Thatcherism demanded (Nairn, 
1988, b, p. 31) -Despite Thatcher's claim that the Scottish political heritage of 
Smith and Hume was Thatcherite before Thatcherism, her economic strategy 
proved unpopular in Scotland, especially as it hastened the decline of the 
shipbuilding, steel, coal and fishing industries. The recession of the early 
1980s hit Scotland hard and reductions in the number of Assisted Areas and 
the restructuring of regional aid all undermined support for the party, with 
Labour being seen by many as the best protector of Scottish interests and 
distinctiveness. In 1987 Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson claimed 
that Scotland had a culture of dependency rather than enterprise which 
hindered economic prosperity. 
Although Thatcherite policies have been applied in Scotland as well as 
other parts of the UK, here they have come up against f irm opposition and an 
unresponsive tradition of public service employment and state activity. 
Rifkind sought to uphold the relative autonomy of the Scottish Office and 
make Thatcherism more appropriate to the Scottish case, but the loss of a 
Conservative moral mandate weakened his role and image as Secretary of 
State for Scotland. The imposition of the Community Charge in 1988 caused 
further Conservative unpopularity and brought claims that the government 
was acting contrary to the Act Of Union's clause that all parts of the UK 
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should be subject to the same systems and rates of taxation. The poll tax 
also illustrated the rise of the Thatcherites within the Scottish 
Conservative Party-Michael Forsyth's pamphlet "The Case For A Poll Tax" was 
produced after the 1985 Perth Conference had brought a grassroots revolt an 
the Scottish rates revaluation. The rise of Forsyth and other Thatcherites 
caused friction in the Scottish Conservative Party and the Scottish Of f ice 
as he presided over unpopular reforms in education. Rif kind sought to dilute 
the more unpopular aspects of Thatcherism to suit Scottish conditions, 
while Forsyth was determined to impose Thatcherite solutions to Scottish 
problems. 10 The dispute between the two camps came to a head in 1990 when 
Forsyth was removed as chairman of the Scottish party, but the damage to an 
already weakened and demoralized party had already been done. 
The 1987 general election left the Conservatives with only 11 seats in 
Scot land, result ing in new demands for Scottish devolution and claims that 
the Conservatives had no moral mandate to govern Scotland. Over the next few 
years, some in the Scottish Conservative Party again began to advocate 
devolution to revive party fortunes, with some Tories setting up a 
Conservative Constitutional Forum which proposed an Assembly with tax- 
raising powers (Mitchell, 1990, ch. 7). Those in favour argued that an Assembly 
with such powers could be introduced provided Scottish MPs were no longer 
able to vote on non-Scottish matters at Yestminster, preventing the West 
Lothian Question from re-emerging., I The 1988 Scottish Conference voted 
overwhelmingly against legislative devolution. 
After 1987, the Conservatives were left isolated with an unpopular and 
outdated Unionist policy as -Labour campaigned for a Scottish Assembly with 
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legislative and tax-raising powers (Geekie & Levy, 1989). Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats were involved in setting up the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention under the 1989 Claim of Right which upheld the popular 
sovereignty of the Scottish people rather than the sovereignty of a 
Unionist parliament at Westminster (Kellas, 1989). The Constitutional 
Convention was boycotted by both the Conservatives and the SNP, who 
complained about low levels of nationalist representation and believed the 
Convention undermined calls for independence. The Convention and Claim of 
Right succeeded in raising public awareness on constitutional issues and 
Scottish distinctivenes, though it was still low on the electorate's list of 
priorities. The Thatcher government rejected calls for a powerful Scottish 
Assembly, outlined in Labour's Government of Scotland Bill (1988), as likely 
to undermine the Union and weaken the Scottish economy. 
Scotland's constitutional, position was a key issue throughout the 1992 
general election campaign as opinion polls showed high levels of support 
for devolution and independence. The Conservatives were the only party to 
support the exising arrangements as Major and Lang stressed the dangers to 
Scotland and the rest of the UK of breaking up the Union (Major, 1992). 
Scottish Secretary Ian Lang claimed that Labour's devolution plans would 
harm the Scottish economy and warned that an independent Scotland could 
not expect automatic membership of the EC. The leadership did though 
recognise Scottish concerns and promise a review of the governmental 
system after the election, but within a Unionist framework. At the general 
election the Conservatives did better than predicted, taking eleven seats, 
gaining one seat on 1987 and retaking the Kincardine and Deeside seat lost 
in a 1991 by-election. The party's share of the vote though was only 25.7%. 
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Scotland has posed considerable problems for British Conservatives in 
recent years. In statecraft terns, the success of Thatcherism in establishing 
government competence, issue hegemony and electoral support has been uneven 
across the UK, with the Conservatives failing to meet any of these criteria 
in Scotland. As far as the party's national strategy is concerned, Thatcherism 
reasserted traditional Unionism, but at a tine when popular support for 
existing constitutional arrangements was falling away. The decline of the 
Scottish Conservatives reached crisis point as the Thatcher government lost 
its "moral mandate" in Scotland and implemented unpopular policies their-Of 
more long-term concern to Conservatives though is the popular belief that 
the party no longer represents Scottish interests or is concerned with 
maintaining Scottish cultural distinctiveness and an appropriate level of 
administrative autonomy. 
"It seems that every element which has generated the Scottish political 
dimension has made Scotland as an ideological category incompatible 
with generalized Conservative English/British national rhetoric.. Any 
attempt Thatcher makes to bolster her position by the use of British 
(perceived as English) national rhetoric is likely to fall an deaf ears 
in Scotland and work to reinforce her perceived anti-Scottishness. " 
(Kendrick & McCrone, 1989, p. 602). 
The Scottish situation then illustrates the problems for the modern 
Conservative Party in using the language of nationhood. The weakening of 
integrative forces and the reassertion of national identities in the Celtic 
periphery has undermined the conservative nation and the Conservative 
Party's national strategy. Thatcherism has maintained elements of Unionism, 
but not the "one nation" consensual approach which had previously been its 
strategic partner. This separation has weakened the theoretical conservative 
nation as well as the Conservative Party's national strategy. 
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In Scotland, the Thatcher governments maintained a strong Unionist 
position at a time when its place within the theoretical conservative 
nation was being challenged and when such a position was increasingly 
unpopular. In Wales, nationalist demands are less politically and electorally 
formidable and the Thatcher governments tended to be more pragmatic. 12 
Again constitutional reforms have been ruled out, but concessions were made 
to nationalist pressure with the establishment of the Welsh language 
television station, Sianel Pedwar Cymru (M), the guaranteed place of the 
Welsh language in the national curriculum (as it applies in the 
Principality) and the relative autonomy enjoyed by Peter Walker during his 
spell at the Welsh Office. The 1992 election manifesto promised to introduce 
a Welsh Language Act giving the Welsh language the same legal status as 
English. 
In Northern Ireland, Thatcherism was also more pragmatic in its 
attachment to Unionism, notably over the 1985 signing of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement. The close ties between Ulster Unionists and the Conservative 
Party had declined from the time of the Sunningdale agreement. In 1974, 
Ulster Unionists resigned the Conservative Vhip at Westminster, but only in 
1986 was Unionist representation on the party's Executive Committee and 
Central Council of the National Union formally withdrawn. The autharised 
establishment of National Union of Conservative Associations in Northern 
Ireland in 1990 brought the final severance of official links between the 
Ulster Unionists and the Conservative Party. 
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The approach of the Thatcher governments to the ongoing problems in 
Northern Ireland followed the essentially pragmatic course steered by 
British governments since direct rule was imposed on the Province in 1972. 
Article Five of the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement stated that: 
"the present status of Northern Ireland is that it is part of the 
United Kingdom. If in the future the majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland should indicate a wish to become part of a united Ireland, the 
British Government would support that wish. " (quoted in Vilson, 1989, 
P. 180). 
This position was reinforced by subsequent governments. However, the 
constitutional position of Northern Ireland is anomalous in that its place 
within the United Kingdom is officially recognised as being conditional on 
the expressed wishes of a majority of its people (Rose, 198 2). Rose argues 
that Vestminster denies the integrity of Northern Ireland by treating it as 
a separate case, with its borders open to alteration if the majority so wish. 
The Conservative Party introduced direct rule from Vestminster over the 
Province, but is aware of the long-term problems of this position, as the 
party's 1991 Campaign Guide makes clear. 
"Direct rule works reasonably well in that it has provided 
fair, responsible and efficient government for Northern Ireland, and 
considerable progress has been made under it.. But the fundamental 
weakness of direct rule is that it does not allow locally elected 
politicians to decide policies-The Government's central political 
objective in Ulster is to transfer powers currently exercised by 
Xinisters to locally elected representatives by re-establishing a 
devolved administration for the Province as a whole. " (The Campaign 
Guide, 1991, pp. 570/1). 
Atkins -early plans for devolution were abandoned while his successor at 
the Northern Ireland Of f icejames Prior, also saw his plans f or "rolling 
devolution" run aground in the face of an SUP boycott. Thatcher meanwhile 
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recognized the role of the Republic of Ireland in achieving any solution to 
the Province's problems, without commiting herself to bilateral agreements. 
The 1982 White Paper stated that any solution had to be acceptable to both 
sides of the community, but the Unionist majority opposed the most 
significant development of the Thatcher era, the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 
The AngloýIrish Agreement arose after the Thatcher had rejected the 
three constitutional arrangements put forward by the Irish "New Ireland 
Forum": a unitary Irish state; a federation; or joint British-Irish authority. 
Vhen asked about the proposals, Thatcher replied "out, out, out" to the three 
strategies while Prior argued that Dublin had to recognize Unionist 
feelings, Northern Ireland's status as part of the UK and the need for 
devolved administration (Kenny, 1986). The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement 
angered Unionists who were little comforted by government claims that the 
Republic had formally recognized the constitutional position of Northern 
Ireland and accepted that the Province would remain British for, as long as 
a majority of its people wished. However this was only a de facto acceptance 
of Northern Ireland's position by Dublin (articles 2&3 of the Republic's 
constitution continued to claim sovereignty over Ulster) and the 
constitutional position remained unclear. 
The government hoped the Anglo-Irish Agreement would increase the 
confidence of the minority Nationalist community in the constitutional 
arrangements, but it raised the wrath of the majority Loyalist community who 
resented the influence of a foreign government in the affairs of a part of 
the UK. Inter- Governmental Conferences were to take place at regular 
intervals between British and Irish ministers, giving the Irish Foreign 
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Minister a dual role, as a representative of the Republic and of Northern 
Ireland's Nationalist community. The British Government were particularly 
concerned to see increased co-operation between the two states in the 
fight against terrorism. Indeed this appears to have been one of the main 
reasons behind Thatcher's support for the Agreement. In practice though any 
co-operation was partially undermined by political and legal problems over 
extradition procedures. 
In the House of Commons, Thatcher claimed that the Unionist position had 
been strengthened by the Agreement because Dublin accepted the need for 
consent in addressing the issue and de facto recognized British rule in the 
Province. She also noted that the Inter-Governmental Conference lacked any 
executive authority. However, the Unionists fundamentally opposed it, setting 
back any short-term hopes of devolved power-sharing. Unionist sympathizers 
within the Conservative Party were also highly sceptical and the Housing 
Minister Ian Gow, a Thatcher confidant, resigned from the Government in 
protest. Gow argued that the Agreement gave "a wholly disproportionate 
consideration to the views of the minority. " (Hansard, vol. 87, col. 760). 
The parliamentary debate also revealed some Conservative support for a 
fuller integration of Northern Ireland into the UK. Julian Amery argued that 
Northern Ireland citizens were effectively "second-class citizens" not 
enjoying the democratic rights of other UK citizens. Pressures for full 
integration also gained momentum in the Province after the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement. The 1986 Campaign for Equal Citizenship urged mainland parties to 
put up candidates in Northern Ireland, with some of its backers going on to 
establish an unofficial Conservative Association in North Down in 1988. The 
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party leadership was not prepared to recognise Conservative Associations 
and candidates there but a grassroots rebellion saw the 1988 Party 
Conference vote to recognise them by an overwhelming majority. By 1991 11 
affiliated associations had been formed, but performances in the European 
elections were poor. Earlier 6 unofficial Conservatives had formed the 
largest party on North Down Council after local election victories in 
1989. The Northern Ireland Conservative Associations argued for the 
reintegration of the Province into the party system, enabling people there to 
vote for the party of government rather than on sectarian lines. In 1992 the 
Northern Ireland Conservatives fielded eleven candidates, polling over 44,000 
votes (5.7%) despite a noticeable lack of organizational support from 
Central Office. In North Down Dr Laurence Kennedy scored 32% of the vote 
but criticized the Prime Minister and Northern Ireland Secretary for their 
lack of public support for his campaign. 
Thatcherism broke with the Conservative Party's "one nation" national 
strategy but did not develop its own nationalist strategy. Instead. 
Thatcherism has revived the Conservative domination of the language of 
nationhood, but at a tine when the nation-state and national identity were 
being challenged by forces both inside and outside the state. An analysis of 
Thatcherism's politics of nationhood encounters similar methodological 
problems to those found in general studies of Thatcherisn. I have argued 
that a study of Thatcherism should work from several different levels and 
that for the politics of nationhood this means looking at Thatcher's own 
instinctive nationalism, at the tensions between neo-liberal and traditional 
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authoritarian accounts of individual and nation, and at how the Thatcher 
governments have reacted within policy spheres relevant to nationhood. This 
tripartite approach avoids an undue stress on one particular area, 
recognizing the shortcomings of each approach. Thatcherism is not internally 
cons istent, unif arm or static. 
The most useful studies of Thatcherism provide accounts relevant to 
this thesis: Gamble notes the tensions within Thatcherite doctrinejessop and 
others examine the divisive effects of Thatcherism on society; while Bulpitt 
shows that doctrine must often play second fiddle to considerations of 
statecraft. But an examination of the politics of nationhood warns against 
crediting Thatcherism with too much coherence or consistency in either 
doctrine or policy. The policies and doctrines espoused by Thatcherism have 
also changed over time, particularly on European and race issues. 
Thatcher herself, is an instinctive rather than intellectual nationalist: 
ber idea of the nation is born from gut values and loyalties, and is not 
trartc,, lated into a theoretically coherent approach to politics. This 
instirictive nationalism has been significant in a number of areas. On Europe, 
Thatcher's personal animosity to European integration, which she interpreted 
OLs 4 threat to national identity and self-government, was outlined in her 
1988 Bruges Speech. Her stance on Europe caused divisions within the 
Conz%rvative 
Party, tensions within the EC and ultimately contributed to her 
40"I(FIll. Thatcher's instinctive nationalism was apparent during the 
falkl4nds 
conflict, while its Southern English petty bourgeois values have 
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been perceived as anti-Scottish and as detrimental to harmonious race 
relations. 
Doctrinal lyThatcherism departed from the theoretical cornerstones of 
the conservative nation. Thatcherism fused the economic individualism of 
nea-liberal thought with a stress on -morality and authority found in 
traditional Tory thought. This mix of political and cultural accounts of the 
national community was a radical departure from previous conservative 
accounts of the nation. These political and cultural accounts of nationhood 
have in the past tended to veer off at tangents from mainstream accounts 
of the conservative nation (see Chapter One). Its fusion of different ideas 
an the meaning and significance of nationhood created inconsistencies and 
tensions within Thatcherism. The emphasis on individualism, limited 
citizenship and the centrality of market relations rests uneasily with 
values of autharity, order and the protection of a traditional culture-The 
economic account of citizenship, where individuals are seen as consumers or 
economic units, is partnered by an account of man as a social animal whose 
identity is shaped by his communal role in the family and the nation. State 
involvement in the economic sphere is to be reduced, but the power of the 
state has to be increased to remove alternative centres of power and to 
protect the British way of life. Individual freedom may then be enhanced In 
the market place, but is restricted when it threatens traditional morality or 
communal identity. Thatcherism may have been instinctively nationalist in 
defending political self- government, but had an economically internationalist 
outlook. 
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Thatcherism was also prevented from espousing a clearer concept of 
nationhood by the demands of statecraft and the limitations imposed by 
political lifeJust as the economic doctrine of monetarism had to change in 
the face of the realities of government, so the politics of nationhood are 
shaped and constrained by the need for issue management eg in race 
relations. In such areas the Thatcher governments acted pragmatically rather 
than with ideological purpose, illustrating again the gap between 
conservative thought and the actions of Conservative governments. The need 
for pragmatism and flexibility on European issues eventually resulted in 
the rejection of Thatcherite accounts of sovereignty. In the sphere of the 
politics of race, the strengthening of laws on immigration and citizenship 
reflected the values of the Conservative Right, but there was a more 
pragmatic approach to the integration of ethnic minorities into British 
society. In both cases, conservatism struggled to adapt its concept of the 
nation to the new realities of the decline of sovereignty and the 
development of an ethnical ly- pluralist society. This theoretical confusion 
was reflected in government policies which were more akin to pragmatic 
damage limitation or issue management exercises than well-structured 
governing codes. 
The problems of statecraft and doctrinal inconsistency show that the 
politics of nationhood is no longer easy or natural territory for 
Conservatives -Accounts of immigration laws or the Falklands conflict as 
ushering in a coherent nationalist strategy proved erroneous, exaggerating 
the doctrinal consistency of Thatcherism, and the possibility of the 
Conservative Party producing a workable national strategy across the wide 
range of policy spheres which a politics of nationhood would need to 
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envelop. Thatcherism was a departure from "one nation" strategies and, while 
some of its concerns with national identity drew on Powellite themes, also 
differs from the nationalist strategy proposed by Powell. 
The environment in which the Thatcher governments operated was one 
unsuitable to the old "one nation" or nationalist strategies, but also one in 
which Thatcherism struggled to develop a new national strategy. It did enjoy 
some success in restoring Conservative dominance over the language of 
nationhood, enabling Thatcherism to present itself as a nationalist-populist 
response to economic decline. But this national ist-populist image and 
rhetoric developed at a tine when the relevance of the nation was being 
quest ioned. Thatcherism tried to breathe new life into the traditional 
OBritish way of life" but this proved inappropriate to a changing world. The 
bases of national identity put forward by Thatcherism were also divisive, 
marginalizing society's disadvantaged and minority groups. The policies of 
the Thatcher governments tended to divide rather than unite the country, 
again breaking with "one nation" conservatism. This I'de- integrative" social 
and economic outcome was exacerbated by the unpopularity of Thatcherism in 
parts of the UK: Thatcherism was territorially uneven in its popularity, 
while its espousal of Unionism was also uneven. In Scot land, Thatcherisn's 
refusal to alter constitutional arrangements deepened the crisis of the 
Scottish Conservative Party, while in Northern Ireland the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement undermined traditional Conservative Unionism. 
The overall record of Thatcherism on the politics of nation and 
nationhood is then a mixed one. In terms of the theoretical foundations of 
the conservative nation, Thatcherism's mix of the political and cultural 
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accounts was not of a kind usually adopted by British Conservatives, but one 
drawing on themes often found outside of mainstream Conservative thought. 
In particular the focus on individualism weakened the communitarian element 
in conservative thought. Thatcherite doctrine and strategies did not find 
effective answers to new problems of questions about national identity and 
the structure of the nation-state. Instead Thatcherism revived some of the 
old language of nationhood without becoming an intellectually coherent 
nationalist strategy. The language of nationhood is no longer a potent 
weapon in the Conservative armoury: traditional views of the nation have 
been challenged by changes in British society (immIgration, decline of 
Unionism) and beyond (end of empire and EC membersb ip). Thatcher ism shows 
the problems modern Conservatives face in pursuing a consistent politics of 
nationhood or national strategy. The difficulties for the Conservative Party 
also illustrate the need for the theoretical conservative nation to take 
account of new developments and abandon old myths. Thatcherism recognized 
the failings of both "one nation" and Powellite courses of action, but for 
conservatives offered little that positively addressed issues of identity, 
citizenship, community and self-government. 
1. Norton's analysis of the voting records and stated positions of 
Conservative MPs showed that only 72 (19%) were Thatcherites (defined 
as being economic nec-liberals or on the Tory Right). The majority of 
MPs (217 or 58%) were uparty faithful" (Norton, 1990). 
2. Compare Thatcher's Methodist influences with the Catholic/Christian 
Democratic tone of Chris Patten in "The Power To Change", Narxism 
Today, February 1991. See also Vill Hutton: "A Rosier Shade of Grey". 
. Ka. rxism 
Today, April 1991. 
3. Note the increased role of policy "think-tanks" in the Thatcher era. 
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4. On Thatcherite economics see David Smith: *Xr-s Tbatcbez-'s Economics", 
Heinemann Educational, Oxford, 1988. Smith notes the early demise of 
pure monetarism and the shift to a more pragmatic economic strategy. 
5. Interview, Voman's Own, 31st October 1987. This quote is often taken 
out of context: the full interview reveals that Thatcher's main point was 
that people evaded their responsibilities by blaming their problems on 
society. 
6. Regional voting in the general elections of the Thatcher era was as 
f ollows: 
South Midlands North yales Scotland 
1979 51.4% 47.6% 40.7% 32.5% 31.3% 
1983 50.6% 46.8% 38.4% 31.0% 28.4% 
1987 51.8% 47.8% 36.6% 29.5% 24.0% 
Figures are taken from the David Butler & Dennis Kavanagh series on 
British General Elections (Macnillan, Landon) in which East Anglia is 
counted as part of the Midlands. 
On the limited influence of "moral Right" pressure groups on government 
policy in the Thatcher years see Martin Durham: "The Thatcher 
Government and 'the Moral Right"', in Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 42, 
U0.1,1989. 
8. In the June 1989 elections to the European Parliament, the Conservatives 
lost 13 seats and polled only 33.6% of the UK vote. 
9. On Scottish politics 
System* 4th edition, 
Scottisý nationalism 
Scotland", Routledge & 
Decline of the SNP, 197 
1982. 
see James G. Kellas: ffThe Scottish Political 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. On 
see Jack Brand: "The National Xovement In 
Kegan Paul, London, 1978 and Mark V. Kauppi: "The 
'7-1981" in Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 5, no. 3# 
10. See Neal Ascherson: "The Forsyth Saga" in The Independent on SundaY, 16 
September 1990. 
11. The West Lothian Question, first raised by Tam Dalyell, asks whether 
constituencies sending representatives to a Scottish Assembly could 
still elect MPs to sit at Vestminster. In the 1992 general election 
campaign Robin Cook again raised the question of whether members of 
the Scottish Assembly could sit as MPs at Westminster or serve in a 
British Government. 
12. The electoral impact of Plaid Cymru has been limited by Welsh 
nationalism's linguistic (and potentially exclusivist) basis. See Denis 
Balson, Peter Madgwick & Denis Van Mechelen: "The Political Consequences 
of Welsh Identity", in Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 7, no. 1,1984. Also 
Dafydd Elis Thomas: "The Constitution of Wales" in Bernard Crick: 
nNational Identities: Tbe Constitution of the United Kingdom", Blackwell 
Publishers, Oxford, 1991. 
-192- 
British Conservative responses to the pressures f or greater European 
economic, monetary and political integration from the other EC states have 
revived arguments about national identity and the structure of the nation- 
state. The debate in the Conservative Party reflects the way in which 
national identity is having to be reinterpreted in the light of recent 
developments in domestic and international politics. In this chapter, I 
examine the responses of the Thatcher and Xajor governments to changes in 
the European Community. Chapter Seven then focuses on the discourse these 
developments have provoked within the Conservative Party. The concept of 
sovereignty is central to the Conservative debate on European policy, but is 
defined in different ways by the key players in the debate, namely the Euro- 
enthusiasts and the Euro-sceptics. An assessment of the meaning and 
relevance of the concept of the sovereign nation state in the modern world 
is therefore important to an understanding of Thatcherite policy and the 
debate within the Conservative Party. 
National identity and independence have of ten been underlying themes in 
British foreign policy. Imperialism and "splendid isolation" fostered myths 
of national uniqueness which are also reflected in the traditional view that 
Britain is significantly different to its European neighbours both 
politically and culturally. The decline of Britain as an imperial and 
economic power brought only a gradual realization of the necessity of a new 
direction in British foreign policy. William Wallace claims that British 
foreign policy has been paralysed for several decades by a dispute between 
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Atlanticists and EurDpeans, the former looking to links with the United 
States as a means of strengthening the Anglo-Saxon alliance while the 
latter group believes that the EC is the mechanism through which Britain 
can secure her World role (W. Val lace, 199 D. Br it ish foreign policy is an 
important branch of the politics of nationhood. Trends towards inter- 
dependence and globalization have illustrated the declining efficacy of 
national sovereignty. Nation-states have lost much of their autonomy in the 
spheres of economic action and security (Held, 1989; Beetham, 1982). The scope 
for independent national action has been reduced and this, taken with 
Britain's relative decline, has meant that isolation is not a feasible policy 
aption, encouraging states to enter supra-national organizations such as the 
EC. This in turn has had a significant effect an domestic political discourse 
where the debate has often returned to ideas of sovereignty and national 
identity. As moves towards European integration gathered pace in the 1980s, 
the debate in the Conservative Party became more acute, illustrating the 
important links between foreign policy and domestic discourse. 
The Conservative response to developments in Europe is systematic of 
the problems Britain has encountered in seeking to establish a new position 
for itself on the world stage. This uncertainty about foreign policy options 
is part of the wider question of national identity and independence which 
Powellism had addressed earlier -Sovereignty has been a central concept in 
Conservative discourse on Europe, but its meaning is disputed. There are two 
main camps involved in the EC debate within the Conservative Party: those 
who relate sovereignty to national autonomy and independence (the Euro- 
sceptics) and those who accept that national sovereignty defined as 
independence is a sham, with effective influence only coming through a 
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partnership of nations (the Euro-enthusiasts). In the next chapter I will 
examine attitudes to the EC by these two camps, but first I will assess the 
role ideas of sovereignty have played in shaping the policies of the 
Thatcher governments. The different interpretations of national sovereignty 
are clearly articulated in the contrasting attitudes of Margaret Thatcher 
and Sir Geoffrey Howe. 
Mrs Thatcher's vision, as outlined in her Bruges Speech of September 
1988, is of a Europe of *willing and active co-operation between 
independent sovereign states"An this scenario nation-states will retain 
ultimate control over economic, monetary and fiscal matters. The nation-state 
will continue to be the centre of decision-making, with the EC limited by 
the principle of subsidiarity to action only in areas where it is more 
effective than the sovereign state, like trade and agriculture. For Thatcher: 
"the ability to run monetary, economic and f iscal policy lies at the 
heart of what constitutes a sovereign state-The rights and powers of 
national governments and parliaments in these matters must be 
preserved. " (Hansard, vol 154, col 1121; 15th June 1989). 
The meaning of sovereignty as given by Thatcher is based around the 
traditional British idea of the ultimate authority of the Queen-in- 
Parliament over all other powers internal or external to the nation-state. 
Economic and monetary union (EMU) would undermine British sovereignty by 
weakening the power of parliament, transferring its authority to a European 
Central Bank and other EC institutions. Sovereignty is defined as self- 
government and requires a high level of national independence. EMU would 
have an adverse effect on national sovereignty for it entails the transfer 
of ultimate responsibility for fiscal and monetary policy away from 
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national institutions to European ones. Thatcher also links the concept of 
sovereignty as national independence with the protection of national 
identity. Any integration which goes beyond her favoured vision of a 
Community of independent and diverse nation-states, will inevitably weaken 
traditional national identities. Thatcher believes that supporters of 
European Union want to replace the nation as the dominant focus of 
national loyalty and identity, constructing in its place an artificial, supra- 
national identity. - A federal Europe would not have the gradually evolved 
sense of shared values and common allegiance which give meaning to the 
national community. As she noted at Bruges: 
"To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of ýa 
European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would Jeopardize 
the objectives we seek to achieve. Europe will be stronger precisely 
because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each 
with its own customs, trad it ions and identity. It would be folly to try to 
fit them into some sort of identikit European personality-Certainly we 
want to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of common 
purpose, but it must be in a way which preserves the different 
traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one's 
own country. " (Thatcher, 19 8 8, p. 4). 
Thatcher's account, based an the ultimate authority of national 
parliaments to make care economic and political decisions and on the 
continued relevance of national identity, implies that sovereignty is an 
absolute rather than a relative concept. Economic and monetary union has 
become the point of no return for the Thatcherite account, for beyond this 
national independence and identity will be irrevocably damaged. Thatcher has 
noted that joining the EC inevitably involved the transfer of some powers 
to Brussels, such as in the areas of trade and agriculture, but the kernel of 
sovereignty (parliamentary supremacy and national identity) must survive 
any erosion of the outer shell. Some areas of national competence can be 
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given up, provided ultimate control remains at the national level, but EMU 
is a step too far. A more detailed account of Thatcher's opposition to the 
trend towards economic and political integration is given in Chapter Seven. 
At this stage though it is useful to compare the Thatcherite account of 
sovereignty with that of her one-time Chancellor and Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Geoffrey Howe. 
In an article published in the week of his resignation from Mrs 
Thatcher's cabinetSir Geoffrey Howe gave a different account of 
sovereignty. rejecting Thatcher's absolutist definition (Howe, 199 0). These 
differences on the issue were further illustrated in Howe's resignation 
speech, when he referred to them as a matter of policy rather than emphasis, 
and in revelations about his role in pushing an unwilling Thatcher towards 
ERX membership. Howe believed the optimum explanation of sovereignty is to 
see it as: 
"not some pre-def ined absolute, but af lexible, adaptable, organic notion 
that evolves and adjusts with circumstances ... (Sovereignty is) a nation's 
practical capacity to maximize its influence in the world. " (Howe, 1990, p. 676 
& 678). 
Howe notes that Britain historically enjoyed an almost unique position 
of the absolute central authority of the sovereign Parliament. Because of 
this, sovereignty has culturally come to be associated with separateness 
from continental Europe, though in the pragmatic tradition of the British 
constitution it ought to be recognized that sovereignty is divisible. "It is 
not virginity, which you either have or you don't". Howe sees effective 
sovereignty as expressed in the capacity of a state to have power and 
influence at international level. This is to be achieved through a "minglinS 
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of authority" rather than an isolationist stance. The EC allows member 
states to forgo some decision-making powers to achieve greater influence 
and a "maximization of sovereign power. " Howe draws an analogy between the 
EC and a multi-coloured rope: 
*As I see it, the Community represents the coming together of twelve 
different coloured skeins of silk, each of which retains its unique 
quality, but all of which gain in strength by being engaged with each 
other. The phrase 'ever closer union' in the Treaty of Rome implies a 
separateness as well as unification: as the twelve national strands 
intertwine, they remain distinct enough to be seen seperately from one 
another. " (Howe, 199 O. p. 685). 
Sovereignty f or Howe is also directly related to the wishes of the 
political community, so that the 1975 referendum on EC membership was an 
expression of "self-determination. " But sovereignty must also be rooted in a 
practical capacity of maintaining physical control and security as in the 
questions of citizenship and nationality from the Falklands and Gibraltar 
to Hong Kong. Here again the concept of British sovereignty is not an 
absolute but must be related to practical questions of power and authority. 
Unlike the Thatcherites or Euro-sceptics who regard anything beyond the 
internal market as a threat to Britain's absolute sovereignty, Howe (like 
Heath and Heseltine, whose views will be assessed in the following chapter) 
sees sovereignty as a capacity to influence and wield power which can only 
be achieved through the transfer of some state powers to supra-national 
institutions-' 
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The growth of the EC, should be seen in the context of the real decline 
in the scope of nation-states for effective autonomous action (Held, 1989). 
Economic affairs are conducted in a global rather than national environment 
given the internationalization of communications, product ion, f inance and 
trade. The size and strength of multinational organizations has added to the 
global scale of economic action, although the extent to which they actively 
limit the state's scope for action is questionable (Turner, 1972). Vallace 
notes that the tradition of economic openness and free trade have made the 
British state particularly vulnerable to the loss of economic autonomy 
(W. Vallace, 1986). However, the Thatcher governments believed that the City of 
London would be in a strong position to benefit from the integration of 
financial markets, and have encouraged foreign firms to invest in Britain. In 
a nuclear age of heightened military technology, the capacity of the state to 
defend its territory and citizens through isolated or independent action 
has also declined. The trend is towards an integration of defence forces and 
military command structures in organizations like NATO. The' limitations on 
state autonomy have been illustrated in this area by the presence of 
American bases and weapons on British soil beyond the direct control of the 
government. 
International organizations are frequently cited in absolutist accounts 
as limiting the sovereignty of nation-states, obliging member states to act 
according to their treaty commitments. But in such organizations ultimate 
power and decision-making rests in the hands of national governments, with, 
bodies such as the United Nations being weak unless resolutions have the 
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explicit backing of the most powerful states. The making of treaties by 
states is indeed a case of sovereignty in action, the states displaying their 
international legal personality. The EC is a special type of international 
organization as it acts as an international actor in its own right in 
certain spheres, especially in trade and foreign affairs. However the scope 
for EC action in such circumstances ultimately depends an the agreement of 
its component member states. The EC is not a federation or autonomous actor; 
instead it is best seen as a union of states or a confederation, with the 
member states pooling their resources while retaining ultimate control over 
their own affairs in most circumstances (Brewin, 1987; Taylor, 1991, b). The 
institutional form and overall direction of the EC is determined by its 
member states, though the EC enjoys some autonomy through its legal system. 
The Treaty of Rome is not an EC constitution, but an international treaty, 
ratified by the national parliaments of the member states. The right to 
withdraw from or redraft the Treaty of Rome is the legal prerogative of 
national parliaments, though in reality such decisions are taken by national 
governments. The extension of majority vating, the EC's democratic deficit, the 
extension of Community competence and greater European integration in 
economic, monetary and political spheres all affect state sovereignty-and are 
important factors shaping British policy. 
The ef fect which the EC is said to have on sovereignty depends on the 
definition of sovereignty involved. If any loss, of decision-making authority 
by national governments is taken to be a loss of state sovereignty then 
clearly the role of the EC in structuring trade relations and agricultural 
production has impinged on the sovereignty of its member states. Sovereignty 
though is better defined as ultimate control over key economic and 
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political decisions by internal state structures, coupled with effective 
international influence. This definition permits the pooling of certain 
decision-making capacities with other comparable states to increase 
collective influence, while retaining a high level of national input and 
democratic control. 
The neo-functionalist account of European integration envisages a 
substantial transfer of sovereignty from the nation-state to the EC thereby 
countering the decline in the capacity for action of the state. An 
alternative inter- governmentalist account though recognizes the "obstinacy" 
of the nation-state, arguing that integration would be "negative" rather than 
upositivell Ue concerned with removing barriers rather than transferring 
state authority to EC institutions) with states protecting their vital 
interests in the sphere of uhigh politics" (Vebb, 1983). Despite the federal 
vision of the Community's founding fathers, the nation-state -has not been 
transcended and British politicians in particular have resisted moves aimed 
at reducing the authority of the state. The neo-functionalist prediction that 
the nation-state would plunge into irreversible decline as its capacity to 
provide the resources and utilities demanded by its citizens was revealed 
has not proved accurate (Lodge, 1 978). Functionalists argued that national 
governments, increasingly unable to maximize socio-economic welfare, were 
being sustained by the misplaced loyalites of their citizens. The claim was 
that loyalty would be almost automatically transferred to supranational 
authorities which could provide the utilities desired by citizens. However, the 
functionalists seriously underestimated the staying power of the nation- 
state and the continued strength of national identity. Loyalty and allegiance 
to the traditional national community are not dependent on economic or 
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social welfare, but run deeper in the culture and consciousness of the 
community. At the same time, public identification with the EC has not been 
forthcoming in Britain. Indeed public opinion has often taken a negative view 
of a bureaucratic, unaccountable EC, which during the late 1970s and early 
1980s was frequently portrayed a having a structural bias against British 
national interests. 2 
The EC has been unable to forge a positive cultural or political 
identity to compete with that of the traditional national community 
(Smith, 1992). It is an artificial creation attracting little public 
participation or enthusiasm despite encroaching further into the everday 
lives of Europeans. It seems ill-equipped to compete with powerful, long-held 
ethnic or national allegiances. So although the nation-state may suffer a 
loss pf authority as European integration proceeds there is little evidence 
as yet to suggest that European Union will undermine the primacy of 
national identity and loyalty. In fact there is some evidence that the 
identity of same nation-states has been regenerated through their 
membership of the EC. States such as Belgium, or the Netherlands have 
achieved a level of influence beyond their independent means while Spain 
and Portugal emerged from dictatorship to reclaim their place in European 
affairs through the EC. Domestically, Thatcher's image as a defender of 
British interests was first generated in the budget disputes in the 
Community. The "independence in Europe" strategy of the Scottish National 
Party also suggests that not only is the EC compatible with strong national 
identities, but it nay be an arena in which it can be successfully nurtured. 
In general states have been unwilling to cede effective authority an issues 
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of vital national interest, and this unwillingness may yet undermine the 
trend towards positive integration codified at Xaastricht. 
The Heath government claimed that membership of the European Community 
would offer a greater role in international affairs plus economic 
improvement in return for EC control of some areas. The White Paper on UK 
membership and the Heath government stated that this would not mean a loss 
of national sovereignty. 0 One major area of controversy concerning the 
effect the EC has had on national sovereignty is that of the primacy of EC 
law over national law and the status of the 1972 European Communities Act 
and the 1986 Single European Act in the unwritten British constitution. 
Once Britain had signed up to the Treaty of Rome, European Community 
law became the law of the UK, having primacy in cases of conflict. The 
European Court has ruled that entry to the EC creates a new legal system 
with EC regulations being binding and directly applicable. According to 
Community law, national legislation cannot conflict with or override EC law 
and the courts of member states cannot issue authoritative interpretations 
of EC law (Collins, 1984; Lasok & Bridge, 1987). The 1978 Simmentbal case in 
the European Court held that EC law took priority over both prior and 
subsequent national legislation. Lord Denning's judgements in two noteable 
cases concerning the relationship between EC and British law reflect the 
tensions between the claims of primacy for either Community law or 
Parliamentary sovereignty (Denning, 1 987). The basis of UK sovereignty is the 
supremacy of the Crown in Parliament and Denning argued, in the Xacartbys v 
SmItb (1981) case that: 
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"if the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act 
- with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision of it, 
or intentionally of acting inconsitently with it, and says so in express 
terms - then I should have thought that it would be the duty of our 
courts to follow the statute of our Parliament. " (quoted in Collins, 
1984, p. 28). 
However this is in extremis. Where possible, English courts should see 
Community law as part of English law and interpret cases in this light. 
Again in the Xacartbys v Smitb (1981) case Denning noted that: 
"Community law is' now 'part of our law--, and, whenever there is any 
inconsistency, Community law has priority. It is not supplanting English 
law. It is part of our law which overrides any part which is 
inconsistent with it. " (quoted in Akehurst, 1989, p. 355). 
Denning's Judgement in the 1979 Sbields vE Coombes (Holdings) Ltd sex 
discrimination case also reflected the priority of EC law in cases of 
inconsitency between national and Community law. The Treaty of Rome did not 
become British law until the British Parliament had codified it in statute. 
The Merchant Shipping Act (1988) was found to be contrary to Community 
law by the European Court of Justice in 1991, although the Act had already 
been in part altered'by Parliament in 1989 when problems were first raised. 
The Factcrtame Ltd. and otbers v Secretary of State for Tr-anspor-t (1989) 
hearing in the House of Lords saw Spanish fisherman challenge the legality 
of the Merchant Shipping Act (1988) under Community law (Akehurst, 1989). EG 
directives had established a common fisheries policy allocating quotas to 
the member states, and Spanish fisherman had registered their ship as 
British allowing them to participate in catching the UK's quota. However, the 
1988 Act changed the rules so that ships owned by British' companies 
controlled by foreign nationals could no longer be registered as British-In 
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the House of Lords case, Lord Bridge temporarily suspended the 1988 Act 
until the European Court of Justice had reached a decision on its 
compatibility with Community law. This was the first time a law passed by 
both Houses of Parliament had been suspended by a British Court and was 
interpreted as a sign of the limitations imposed an parliamentary 
sovereignty by the EC. In June 1991 the European Court of Justice found 
against the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act (1988) that UK- 
registered ships had to be 75% British-owned and have 75% of its crew 
resident in the UK. It did though accept that it was lawful for the British 
government to insist that UK-registered ships should have bona fide links 
with the country. Political reaction among Euro-sceptics, at a time of raised 
interest in the EC and British sovereignty, was hostile, though the rulings 
only confirmed earlier beliefs in the supremacy of EC law in all but the 
most extreme cases. 
The orthodox reading of British constitutional law states , that 
parliament cannot bind its successars, but the extent to which the European 
Communities Act is binding is a matter of controversy. Ultimately it would 
appear that parliament has the power to repeal the Act if Britain is to 
leave the Community, but any amendments made which conflict with EC law or 
treaty obligations would create a conflict of constitutional sytems. Section 
2 (4) of the 1972 Act is , of particular importance, implicitly preventing 
future parliaments from passing legislation which conflicts with Community 
law. The complexity of this clause is expressed by Lasok and Bridge: 
"The European Act - does not seek to - guarantee ' the supremacy of 
Community law by forbidding Parliament to enact conf licting 
legislation. Instead the guarantee is provided by denying effectiveness 
to such legislation within the legal systems of the United Kingdom to 
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the extent that it conflicts with Community law. " (Lasok & Bridge, 1987, 
p. 373). 
The European Community is then a separate legal entity with its own 
autonomous legal order binding on member states and which takes priority 
over national law in cases of conflict. EC law claims to take priority even 
over the fundamental constitutional law of member states, though many 
British legal experts claim that legally and politically British law would 
take priority in the case of a deliberate and intended clash of interests, 
upholding the British parliament as the supreme sovereign authority. 
The following section of this chapter focuses on the Conservative 
governments European policy since 1979, showing in particular how moves 
towards deeper European integration affected accounts of sovereignty in 
Conservative political discourse. Since the Single European Act of 1986, the 
momentum towards economic, monetary and political union has gathered pace, 
going further and faster than the British government had hoped. In ý terms of 
sovereignty, moves towards a single currency and a European Central Bank 
were resisted by Thatcher on the grounds that they were incompatible with 
national sovereignty. Proposals for political union have raised questions 
about subsidiarity and community competence, while the reform of EC 
institutions has been interpreted in terms of a democratic deficit. The 
theme of national sovereignty is also important in debates on proposals 
for common defence plus foreign policies. Many of these proposals go beyond 
the Thatcherite , vision the single market, but the SEA itself raises 
problematic issues like immigration policy and tax harmonization, while 
common social policies and EMU are regarded by Euro-enthusiasts as 
inevitable after the signing of the SEA. 
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Conservative policy towards the European Commmunity since 1979 has not 
followed- one clear course, varying between the ideological and the pragmatic, 
the integrationalist and the isolationist. This is in part explained by the 
nature of EC decision-making which, because of the need to find a common 
ground between competing national interests, is necessarily built on 
compromise, bargaining and coal ition- making. The attitude and policies of 
post-1979 Conservative governments towards developments in the European 
Community suffered from the lack of clarity of its medium and long-term 
aims, and the tension between its ideological and pragmatic responses to 
issues and problems in the European agenda. 
In supporting the single market initiative, the government saw the 
Community's purpose and scope as essentially economic rather than 
political, the goal being to bring about a free trade area within the EC, 
rather than seeking a higher degree of political union. Proposals for moves 
towards a single European -market owed much to the neo-liberal vision of 
British Conservatives: the proposals to free financial services and the 
movement of capital were decidedly Thatcherite in character. The subsequent 
moves towards deeper European integration forced the government onto the 
defensive, as it sought to slow down and limit future developments in the 
EC. The important connection between foreign policy and domestic politics is 
seen in the political discourse on sovereignty used by the Thatcher 
governments, and its primary concern to protect British interests. Even where 
developments in the EC, have been ideologically in accord with Thatcherism, 
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the British government has often sought to uphold national (especially 
economic) interests. 
This has tended to produce a mixture of pragmatic bargaining, based 
ultimately on the protection of perceived national interests, and ideological 
responses to European integration. The rhetoric of sovereignty employed by 
Thatcher over the budget disputes and EMU linked the government's stance to 
domestic political discourse, but caused tension between the UK and fellow 
EC member states. There is also a significant tension in the ideological 
discourse of the Thatcher governments. They have sought the "Thatcherization 
of Europe" in terms of the application of neo-liberal and free market 
solutions to EC problems (the 1992 project, tighter budgetary discipline). 
But Thatcherite ideology also emphasizes its vision of a Europe of 
independent nation-states, each retaining a high level of autonomy and 
diverse national characteristics. This juxta-position of neoý-liberal and 
nationalist strands within the Thatcherite approach to Europe has caused 
tension in several policy areas, notably over tax harmonization, the single 
currency and immigration. The government has also had to act pragmatically 
in seeking compromise between the aims of other EG members and British 
national interests. Britain's relations with her EC partners has also been 
complicated by the revival of the "special relationship" between Britain and 
the United States under the auspices of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan, adding renewed vigour to the debate between Atlanticists and Euro- 
enthusiasts. 
The policies and attitudes of the Conservative governments towards 
developments in the EC can usefully be divided into four main phases: 
-208- 
Q) 1979-1984., dominated by the determination of the Thatcher governments 
to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the budgetary dispute. After several 
failed attempts at solving the budgetary issue, a compromise was reached at 
the June 1984 Fontainebleau Conference, which Thatcher presented as a 
victory for Britain. During this period Britain was often isolated, suffering 
from her late entry into the Community, trying to modify EC budgetary 
mechanisms and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to suit British 
interests. 
(11) 1984-1988: in which the Single European Act with its proposals for the 
establishment of a single market by the start of 1993 was the dominant 
theme. In this period, Britain moved towards a more central and constructive 
role in the formulation of proposals for the future development of the EC, 
including the British Presidency. This phase also saw the clearest link 
between the British governments vision of the future direction of the EC 
and actual developments in the Community, with the creation of the internal 
market as an extension of Thatcherism's domestic economic liberalism. 
(111) 1988-1990: in which the Thatcher government became increasingly 
isolated within the Community because of the Prime Minister's opposition to 
proposals for deeper European integration. The seeds of the moves towards 
EMU and Political Union were contained within the SEA and were discussed 
at the June 1988 Hanover Summit and in the 1989 Delors Report. Thatcher's 
political rhetoric in this period focused on sovereignty and national 
identity, especially in her September 1988 Bruges Speech. Splits within the 
Cabinet developed around the time of the June 1989 Madrid Summit which 
laid down the conditions for British membership of the ERX. Thatcher's 
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position became more isolated and ideological ly-based, contribut ing to her 
eventual downfall in November 1990, by which time Britain had joined the ERN 
and consented to Inter- Governmental Conferences (IGC, s) on EMU and 
Political Union. 
(iv) 1990-1992: in which John Major's premiership promised a more 
pragamtic approach to EC, developments. This involved a more pronounced 
desire for compromise, coupled with determined opposition to the impostion 
of a- single currency, the social charter and talk of a federal destiny. 
Conservative Party divisions intensified as the twin ICGs on EMU and 
Political Union got underway. At the crucial Maastricht Summit in December 
1991, Major negotiated an opt-in clause on the single currency and a 
protocol on the Social Chapter, but signed a treaty recognizing EMU and 
political union as an ultimate goal. 
On assuming office, the priorities of the Thatcher government with 
regard to the EC were to reduce the net contribution of Britain to the 
Community, get a significant budget rebate and restructure the CAP to bring 
it more into accord with British interests. The hard-line position taken by 
Thatcher alienated her EC colleagues, with Britain unwilling to compromise 
over her demands for a long-term structured solution rather than a single 
lump-sun rebate. At her first European Council in Strasbourg in June 1979, 
Thatcher clashed with the French and Germans who offered only a small one- 
off. payment, then she caused unease in Dublin by stating her intention to 
"get our money back". 
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The budget dispute was to last until af inal agreement at Fontainebleau 
in 1984, during which times several attempts at compromise failed and 
Britain became more isolated in a stagnant and near-bankrupt Community. In 
1980 the Conservative Government linked demands f or a rebate and 
restructured budgetary system with CAP price-f ixing, blocking 1980 attempts 
at price-f ixing. On this particular problem, the Foreign Secretary Lord 
Carrington negotiated a three-year deal by which the UK would get back 
two-thirds of the net contribution for 1980/81. Other member states were 
unenthusiastic about British proposals for reform of the CAP, the differences 
coming to the fore in May 1982 when Britain's attempts to invoke the 
"Luxembourg compromise" were defeated. The "Luxembourg Compromise" was a 
mechanism for allowing one member to effectively veto an act which it 
deemed to be against its vital national interests, but on this occasion other 
members refused to accept the validity of this British claim and overturned 
it. 
In 1983 Thatcher linked the settlement of the budget dispute with the 
EC's own proposals for an increase in the 1% level of the VAT contribution 
of each member state in order to improve the tenuous financial position of 
the Community brought about by the spiralling costs of the CAP. The 1983 
Stuttgart Declaration proved to be something of a turning-point as France 
in particular came to see the British budget problem as an urgent issue and 
one which could be related to future EC developments in order to achieve 
compromise and keep pressure on Britain. Here the EC members sought to look 
to possible future developments, issuing a "Solemn Declaration" on a relaunch 
of a more dynamic and integrated European Community. After French and then 
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German compromise proposals were put forward, it became clear that the end 
agreement would link the UK budget dispute with VAT contributions. 
The June 1984 Fontainebleau meeting thus laid out - the terms of the 
budget agreement, producing af ormula whereby Britain was to receive an 
annual rebate amounting to 66% of the gap between its total VAT 
contribution and the level of EC spending in the UK. 4 This agreement was 
close to the initial British demands of 1980 that contributions should be 
linked to EC expenditure in Britain, and it also produced an automatic 
formula rather than a series of negotiations over future rebates. At the same 
time the VAT contribution rate was raised to 1.4% with Britain exempt under 
the terms of the Fontainebleau declaration. However concessions had been 
made by the British over the size of the cash rebate and would be made 
again later in the year with the granting of a one billion ecu 
supplementary budget. (Butler, 1986; Allen, 1988; George, 1990. ) 
Domestically, Thatcher presented the budgetary settlement as a British 
victory, despite these significant concessions. Using the the rhetoric of 
national interest, she portrayed Britain as standing firm to win its case 
against the structural bias of the EC. Thatcher's aggressive stance was a 
cause of concern to her Community partners and was criticized at home by 
the Opposition parties* and pro-European Conservatives, but her lone and 
protracted struggle against the EC enhanced her the image as a resolute 
leader fighting Britain's corner in a -Community for which public opinion 
had little sympathy. But British problems with the structural arrangements 
of the EC were nothing new. The country's late entry meant that the Common 
Agricultural Policy and budgetary arrangements had been framed so as to 
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meet the interests of f ounder members whose agricultural systems were less 
efficient than Britain's. The recession and Britain's relative decline meant 
that her contributions to the EC no longer reflected her economic standing 
in the Community. The budgetary dispute was in some respects merely a 
continuation of the "renegotiation" campaign of the 1970s when Vilson also 
claimed his 1975 budgetary agreement as a victory f or Britain although it 
left many problems unaddressed. (George, 1990). 
Thatcherism's emphasis on a free market strategy and the desirability 
of limiting the excesses of inefficient bureaucratic arrangements is evident 
in the British stance an the budgetary dispute. The Conservative government 
insisted on financial discipline in the Community to match its domestic 
policy of limiting public expenditure. Thatcher pointed to the inefficency of 
the Common Agricultural Policy, with its high subsidies and food mountains, 
and the unaccountability of EC bureaucracy. Thus as the EC lurched closer to 
financial crisis Thatcher sought tighter budgetary regulations and a reform 
of the CAP. The CAP absorbs about two-thirds of the EC budget but is 
notoriously inefficient, creating surpluses and causing land abandonment. Its 
main beneficiaries are small farms, meaning that less efficient French 
farming does better out of the CAP than British farmers. The CAP later 
became a maJor cause of tensions in the Uruguay Round of GATT talks on 
free trade and tariffs. The more liberal EC states such as the British and 
Dutch find themselves in a difficult position, supporting free trade but 
locked into a system of agricultural subs idiesSested interests make reform 
of the CAP extremely difficult, but dairy quotas introduced in 1984 and 
production stabilizers in 1988 added some restraining and stabilizing 
nechanisms. 15 British concern for structural reform in this first phase 
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though did not include any wholesale alteration of the EC's decision-making 
procedures, with Thatcher keen to prevent further centralization or the 
perceived loss of national sovereignty to European institutions. 
The EC as a whole appeared to have lost its way in the early 1980s, but 
the Fontainebleau agreement was in many ways a watershed, allowing Britain 
to play a more constructive role in the Community and strengthening the 
determination of other member states to set a more dynamic agenda for the 
future. The 1983 Stuttgart "Solemn Declarationu an European Union planned a 
"relaunch" of the EC, taking in the settlement of the British budgetary 
dispute, but also referring to developments on European Union and 
institutional reform. The British government was worried by such proposals 
and by the European Parliament's February 1984 Draft Treaty on European 
Union GUT). Having reached agreement on her budgetary contributions, Britain 
began to play a leading role in encouraging progress towards the internal 
market and an greater co-operation in foreign policy, revealing her vision in 
the 'Europe-The Future" paper presented at Fontainebleau. At the same time, 
Britain was hoping to prevent other member states from forcing the pace on 
institutional reform and European integration. 
The Fontainebleau European Council in June 1984 was a turning-point in 
the affairs of the EC, settling the British budgetary dispute and moving the 
Community towards a more dynamic future. The Council continued to build on 
the impetus provided by the Stuttgart Declaration and the European 
Parliament's Draft Treaty on European Union, setting up the Ad Hoc Committee 
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for Institutional Affairs which became known as the Dooge Committee. The 
Dooge Report sought the creation of a homogeneous economic area to be 
achieved through the creation of an internal market, the promotion of 
economic convergence and the strengthening of the ENS (Lodge, 1986). Britain 
was by now playing a more central role in EC negotiations, being a prime 
mover on the creation of the internal market, but opposing institutional 
developments which went beyond this. On the Dooge Committee, Malcom Rifkind, 
the British representative adopted a positive approach to the internal 
market and to the extension of co-operation an foreign policy, but opposed 
plans for the extension of majority voting, insisting on unanimous agreement 
where vital national interests were at stake. 
Two European Council meetings in 1985, at Milan in June and Luxembourg 
in Decenber, brought real progress an the proposals for an internal market. 
At the Milan Council, Britain maintained its enthusiasm for economic 
liberalization and foreign policy co-operation, as revealed in Howe's Stresa 
proposals. Cecchini's report an the internal market outlined the benefits of 
the single market to the EC, while the British Commissioner Lord Cockfield 
produced a Vhite Paper establishing a timetable for the process and listing 
over 300 legislative matters needed for the single market to come into 
effect. Though generally supportive of these proposals, at Milan the British 
delegation was outmanoeuvred when the Council agreed to the establishment 
of an IGC to discuss treaty amendments. The IGC proposals were subsequently 
discussed at the Luxembourg Council later in the year, and after difficult 
negotiations and some important concessions by all parties, agreement was 
reached on the Single European Act (SEA). - Britain expressed reservations 
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in several key areas, including social af fairs, monetary union, institutional 
reform and majority voting. The government compromised on several areas, 
accepting a revision of the Treaty of Rome, plus mention of the EMS and 
European Union as a long term aim in the SEA. The SEA also replaced the need 
for unanimity in decision-making with qualified majority voting, though 
concessions to the UK were made in providing for unanimity in certain 
cases of major national interest. Although the powers of the European 
Parliament were increased, the changes were minor and the SEA did not bring 
the major shift to co-decision which had been urged in the Draft Treaty on 
European Union. 
This second period in the relations between the Thatcher governments 
and the EC, with the Single European Act as its centrepiece, was one of mixed 
success for the British position. Britain moved to a more constructive role 
in charting the development of the Community, but the nature of decision- 
making among member states means that any one state is unlikely to be able 
to achieve all its ideological or strategic objectives. Helen Wallace notes 
the importance of negotiations and coal ition- forming in Community on EC 
affairs, effectively meaning that all negotiating positions must be open to 
compromise (H-Vallace, 1985). The budgetary dispute era had been one of 
British isolation and inflexibility, while in this second period the 
government actively sought support for economic liberalization and foreign 
policy co-operation. At the Milan and Luxembourg Councils, the British also 
formed useful alliances with other members to limit the scope -of 
integration and institutional change. However, as with the budgetary 
settlement, compromise and defeats in some areas were inevitable. Of longer 
term significance was the move away from unaninimty, which was welcomed on 
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the completion of the internal market, but also meant that the power and 
influence of a government would be considerably reduced if it was in a 
minority, adversely affecting democratic accountability. 
Xuch of the 1992 internal market project ties in with the aims and 
vision of the Thatcher governments. The creation of an internal market was 
one of the express aims of the Treaty of Rome but developments beyond this 
have been opposed by the Conservative government eager to prevent 
centralization and a loss of British decision-making capability. The 1992 
single market programme aims to create a free, internal market in which 
physical barriers (eg customs controls), technical barriers (eg conflicting 
business laws) and fiscal barriers (eg differing rates of excise duty) are 
removed (Cecchini, 1988; Owen & Dynes, 1989). 7 By the start of 1993 the 
liberalization of capital, financial transactions and the movement of goods 
and services should have been achieved if the measures outlined by Lord 
Cockfield have been adhered to. This economic liberalization is consistent 
with Thatcherism's domestic strategy of increasing competition and giving 
the market a greater role in determining the success of businesses. The 
internal market project has also attracted the support of core elite groups 
in the City and in British industry. The financial "Big Bang" in the City of 
London had liberalized financial arrangments and the government was keen 
to ensure that London would retain its place as Europe's major financial 
market. As recession eased in this period, with British industry emerging 
more streamlined and competitive, the aims of the SEA seemed to favour 
British economic interests. 
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The approach of the Thatcher government towards the single market 
mixed the strategic- ideological pillars of neo-liberalism and national 
sovereignty with British economic interests (primarily those of the City) 
and pragmatic compromise over the more detailed proposals of the SEA. The 
British Presidency in 1986 saw general British enthusiaism for the freeing 
of the internal market, but the need to compromise with other member states 
who placed more emphasis on the role of trade unions than did the British 
neo-liberal account of employment and job creation. Some neo-liberal, free 
market areas within the 1992 project, such as initial plans for tax 
harmonization and the removal of border controls, were opposed illustrating 
how the pragmatic defence of national interests could override proposals 
which were ideologically consistent with free-market economics. In the case 
of proposed tax harmonization in the single market, the British government 
refused to compromise over its zero VAT rating of certain goods such as 
food and children's clothes. Agreement was eventually reached whereby two 
different VAT bands would be retained and market harmonization would be 
aimed only at a minimum standard on goods rather than stricter controls. 8 
British opposition to the removal of border controls remains, based on fears 
of terrorism, loss of immigration control and the spread of rabies. 
The Conservative view depicts the Treaty of Rome as a "charter for 
economic liberty" with the aims of the 1992 project to be limited 
accardingly. Britain has been near the fore in implementing the changes 
indicated by Cockfield's White Paper, and the government has been critical of 
those member states looking to further integration before implementing the 
changes needed for the completion of the internal market. Measures which 
extend Community competence, especially in the social sphere but also on 
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technological co-ordination, EC structural funds and environmental 
directives, are criticized for bringing centralization and interference by 
unaccountable and inefficient bureaucracy into areas best left to the 
market. National interests as well as ideological objections come into play 
an issues of tax harmonization and the free movement of people, with the 
government keen to maintain control at national level in these areas. 
Inherent in the SEA and the internal market project though is a deeper 
economic and political integration encompassing a European Central Bank, a 
single currency and Community- imposed immigration rules. 
The British government has tended to oppose institutional change within 
the EC as part of its general opposition to European integration, preferring 
a gradual, evolutionary of EC institutions, and one consistent with a view of 
the nation-state as the optimal area of decision-making (Judge, 1986). 
Britain thus opposed the Dooge Committee plans for extended majority voting 
and co-decision between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of 
Ministers. The Thatcher governments have opposed attempts at increasing the 
scope and powers of the EP, arguing that they are incompatible with 
Britain's traditional parliamentary sovereignty. 
One area in which the British government has consistently played a 
leading role is in moves towards Political Co-operation whereby the foreign 
policies of the various member states are more closely linked. This reveals 
the greater European dimension in British foreign policy, though Britain has 
been a stauch supporter of the NATO Alliance and maintains a strong 
relationship with the United States. Political Co-operation has involved a 
closer co-ordination of the foreign policies of the EC member states, rather 
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than a common foreign policy. '9 On certain issues the Community has been 
able to take a united policy position (eg the Venice Declaration on the 
Xiddle East in 1980) but differences in national perspectives on foreign 
affairs frequently come to the fore (eg over the Falklands War or the 
American bombing of Libya). Foreign Secretaries Carrington and Hurd were 
eager to promote a more integrated foreign policy approach by the EC 
(Hurd, 1981) but were less supportive of proposals for an, integrated EC 
defence policy. The UK has also pressed for a liberal trade policy fearing 
the alternative scenario of ,a protectionist Community. Following the 
reforms in Eastern Europe, Britain has urged an enlargement of the Community 
(including EFTA states) to form a wider, looser union of European states. 
Phase Three-"Ever ClOser Union", 1988-1990. 
The "negative integration" or removal of internal barriers supported by 
the Thatcher governments and set out in the 1992 single market programme 
was rapidly superseded by moves towards "positive integration" involving 
economic, monetary and political -, union, which the Thatcher governments 
opposed. The Hanover Summit of June 1988 and the Delors Report of April 
1989 brought the issues of economic and monetary union, with their 
associated proposals for a single currency and a Central European Bank, to 
the forefront of the EC agenda, provoking much opposition from the British 
government and Mrs Thatcher in part icular. During this, perod, the Thatcherite 
Euro-sceptics in the Conservative Party became increasingly vocal in their 
opposition to proposals for further economic, monetary and political union. 
Thatcher set the tone of British hostility to integration and federalism in 
her Bruges Speech of September 1988. As moves towards EMU gathered pace, 
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the tension in the government and the party deepened. At the June 1989 
Madrid Sunmit, Howe and Lawson succeeded in manoeuvring Thatcher into 
laying down specific conditions for British entry into the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). BritairL joined the 
ERM in October 1990, by which time Thatcher was becoming more strident in 
her opposition to EMU, becoming progressively more isolated in the Community 
and in the Conservative Party, creating the conditions for her downfall. The 
period is then one of increasingly desperate British attempts to frustrate 
the progress towards EMU desired by her EC, partners, and of rising domestic 
interest in policy towards the Community. 
At the 1988 Hanover Summit, the French and German governments sought to 
build on the SEA, which had proclaimed the objective of "progressive 
realization of economic and monetary union", by putting forward proposals 
for a single currency and central bank. The June 1989 Madrid Summit saw a 
number of conditions laid down by Thatcher, under pressure from Lawson and 
Howe, for determining the timing of British entry to the ERM. These 
conditions were (i) a significant reduction in the rate of British 
inflation, (ii) further capital liberalization in the EC; (iii) real progress 
towards the single market, freedom of financial services and strengthened 
competition policy. In fact these conditions were largely ignored in the 
eventual timing of British entry as inflation was high, though the 
government claimed that the underlying inflationary trend was downwards. 
Britain f inally Joined the ERM in October 1990 having placed British 
currrency reserves in the European Monetary System in 1979.111 In Autumn 
1985 Chancellor Nigel Lawson had proposed entry into the ERM at a level of 
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DM 3.75, but was vetoed by Thatcher who favoured a floating currency. 
However in February 1987 Lawson began a policy of shadowing the 
Deutschmark at a central rate of DM 2.93 with a 2.25% margin, effectively 
following the conditions which would have been laid down if Britain had 
joined the ERN at that stage. This shadowing policy was criticized by Sir 
Alan Valters, Mrs Thatcher's economic adviser. In March 1988 Thatcher forced 
Lawson to abandon the shadowing of the DM, adding to the disagreements 
about European policy in the Cabinet and the Conservative Party. The 
expected economic boom on ERM entry didn't materialize and fears of 
devaluation persisted as the value of the pound hovered in the lower 
margins of the ERN bands. The devaluation issue gathered momentum within 
the Conservative Party in the recession of the early 1990s as Tory Euro- 
sceptics argued that ERX constraints were preventing the interest rate cuts 
needed for swifter economic recovery. " 
The report of the Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary 
Union, known as the Delors Report, set out four components of economic union: 
a single market; competition policy; common policies for structural and 
regional developmemt; plus macro-economic budgetary policy co-ordination .12 
The first three of these fell within the scope of the SEA's 1992 programme 
and were consistent with the British government's preferred free market 
strategy. The Report's more - controversial proposals, and those most 
vehemently opposed by the Thatcher government, recommended that central, 
budgetary authority be given to a European body and that a European System 
of Central Banks be established to design monetary policy and manage 
exchange rate (Thygesen, 1989). The report proposes three stages towards 
monetary union, only the first of which was accepted by the British. This 
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f irst stage involves merely voluntary co-ordination of monetary policy and 
was adopted by the 1989 Madrid Summit. Under Stage Two of the Delors 
proposals, "soft" monetary union would be -brought about by the linking of 
national central banks, giving limited powers to a European Bank. Stage 
Three would then bring hard monetary union with a dominant European 
Central Bank and locked exchange rates. A single currency is seen as a 
desirable but not inevitable extension of the process of monetary union. 
The Thatcher government rejected the Delars proposals f or economic and 
monetary union, was unenthusiastic about the ERM, and f irnly opposed a 
single currency and central bank. As a Conservative Party policy document of 
the time states: 
OThe overriding concern of the Government is that stages two and three 
of the Delors' Committee Report would entail a fundamental transfer of 
sovereignty away from Parliament at Vestminster.. The Delors proposals 
for a common European currency, a single central bank and a common 
monetary policy would remove national governments' control over their 
economic policies. This would have far reaching implications for 
Britain's sovereignty and the role of Parliament. " (CPC Politics Today, 
April 1990, p. 146). 
- The government instead stresses the importance of markets and 
competition, the key objective of price stability and the need to retain 
national control over economic policy making. In the House Of Commons debate 
on economic and monetary union in November 1989, Chancellor John Major 
attacked the centralizing tendencies of the Delors proposals which made no 
allowances for political accountability and eroded the sovereign decision- 
making powers of the British government and Parliament. Major was looking 
for a market approach in- his government paper "An Evolutionary Approach to 
Economic and Monetary Union". 13 
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Under the Major proposals EC monetary policies would harmonize at 
their optimum level and currencies would effectively become interchangeable. 
National currencies would remain and economic decision-making would stay 
at national level, with the market determining any pragmatic moves towards 
monetary union. Major's proposals were for the development of the whard ecu 
as a twelfth EC currency which if successful in the exchange markets could 
in tine evolve into a single currency. As Major said in the Commons' debate 
an entry into the ERM in October 1990: 
"There has been no shift, no weakening in our opposition to the 
imposition of a single currency and a single monetary authority.. Ve 
shall continue to advocate our plans for the development of the hard 
ecu. We believe that our proposals are practical, evolutionary and based 
on markets and choice. They leave open the possibility of the hard ecu 
evolving towards a parallel currency and then a single currency, but 
only if that were the wish of governments and peoples. w (Hansard, issue 
1534, columns 195-291). 
Major's "hard ecull plan did not meet with any great enthusiasm from 
other EC leaders or from the Governor of the German Bundesbank. Xuch of 
this can be put down to Britain's isolation on the issues of economic and 
monetary union, with the other states forging on ahead regardless of British 
intransigence. The clear opposition of Mrs Thatcher to even an evolutionary 
development, of a single currency also weakened the credibility of the Major 
Plan. However in his first EC meetings as Prime Minister, Xajor persisted 
with his *hard ecu" plan, calling for a European Monetary Fund to ensure 
price stability., but it was dismissed by the EC in the build up to the 
Maastricht summit. 
The f inal weeks of Mrs Thatcher's premiership were marked by growing 
disputes within the Conservative Party and among her ministers - about 
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developments in the EC, with her personal position being f irmer and more 
vocal in ý its opposition to a single currency and Central Bank. At the Rome 
Summit in lovember 1990 Thatcher was again left isolated as the eleven 
other heads of government agreed on moves towards economic and monetary 
union. The communique noted agreement by all but Britain on the creation of 
a central monetary authority with independent powers and full 
responsibility for monetary policy. A single currency was to be the ultimate 
aim. The second phase of economic and monetary union was to begin with the 
creation of the single - market, bringing progress towards monetary 
convergence with a third stage and single currency predicted by the turn of 
the century. Thatcher's response in the, Commons was adamant about the need 
to preserve British sovereignty over economic and monetary policy, 
culminating in her unscripted "No. lo. lo. " to Delors' plans for powerful, 
centralized EC institutions. 
Phase Four-Major's Road to Maastricht . 1990-1992. 
'John Xajor faced a difficult task on becoming Prime Xinister just weeks 
before the December 1990 Rome Inter-Governmental Conference when decisions 
on the "menu" for discussions on EXU and political union were due to be 
taken. At the time of Thatcher's fall from power, Britain was isolated on the 
issues facing the twin IGCs. Thatcher had made explicit her belief that the 
EC had gone as far as it should down the road towards European Union. Her 
"no, no, no" to the single currency. European Central Bank and deeper political 
union undermined Britain's role in the Community. According to the Thatcher 
line, the point at which Britain would go no further had been reached, 
implying that in future she would resort to using the British veto rather 
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than seek compromise or constructive dialogue. The signals reaching the 
other EC member states were that the period of pragmatism had ended to be 
replaced by an ideological strategy in which national sovereignty would be 
defended against future Community developments. 
Major's task was to restore Britain's position as a constructive member 
of the Community, while not abandoning the legal reservations or concerns 
that his government also had. His strategy was one more readily in keeping 
with the Community style: his government offered its own proposals, was 
prepared to negotiate and seek compromise where possible, but had a list of 
measures on which the UK felt it was impossible to compromise. Most of 1991 
was taken up with difficult and protacted negotiations plus coalition- 
making aimed at giving the UK the maximum possible influence. A pragamtic 
willingness to compromise over aspects of EXU, defence and foreign policy, 
plus political union restored respect for British anxieties and made trade- 
offs to ensure that Britain got its way on the key issues more likely. Added 
to Major's European anxieties was the need to avoid deepening the split in 
the Conservative Party between the Euro-enthusiasts and the increasingly 
vocal Euro-sceptics, with Thatcher added to the ranks of the latter as a 
thorn in the government's side. 
This strategic mix of pragmatic compromise and ideological 
determination f irst surfaced at the Rome IGC in December 1990 when fellow 
EC members noted a change in the British tone, but little alteration in her 
ultimate policy platform: a shift in style rather than substance. Major 
entered the Rome IGC knowing that there was a consensus among the other 
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member states an the desirability of rapid moves towards EMU and a 
political union with a decidedly federal character. Britain though was able 
to join her partners in signing the Rome communique which agreed to 
formally open the twin IGGs on EMU and political union, while reaffirming 
the Community's commitments to social policies in the internal market. 
Major did so because of he won concessions in several areas, meaning that 
Britain's preferred options on monetary union (based on his "hard ecu" 
plan) and political union (envisaging more intergovernmental co-operation 
outside the scope of the Treaty of Rome) were added to the IGCs' discussion 
agendas, allowing the government to buy more time to further its negotiating 
and coalition-building strategy. Major's more positive attitude towards the 
EC pleased the other EC governments and established an atmosphere of 
constructive compromise rather than obstructive stonewalling. 
Having established an atmosphere of constructive dialogue, the Major 
government spent 1991 trying to reach a deal which would satisfy both the 
more federally- inclined governments and the different groupings at odds on 
European issues in the Conservative Party. The government offered a formal 
version of its "hard ecu" plan in its Draft Treaty in January 1991, including 
plans for a European Monetary Fund administering the ERX and hard ecu, as 
well as participating in devaluation decisions with the overall aim of 
ensuring price stability. 14 Although Thatcher had identified EMU as ýL step 
too far for British sovereignty and national interests, the Major government 
soon signalled their willingness to sign a deal, providing it incorporated an 
oPt-out clause allowing the UK, to decide at a later date both whether and 
when to join a single currency. Major and Lamont also insisted on a high 
level of economic convergence between EC states as a prerequisite for moves 
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beyond the transitional second phase into the third phase of EMU which 
included the creation of the single currency and single monetary policy 
under the auspices of a European Central Bank. 
The opt-out clause for the UK was f irst mooted as a means of ensuring 
a deal on EMU acceptable to the Major government in the "Delors Compromise" 
in June 19911amont and Major indicated that the UK would not veto a treaty 
on EMU containing such an opt-out clause, allowing other states to go ahead 
with a single currency. Thatcher's comments on EMU in her last weeks in 
office, after her isolation at the October 1990 Rome Summit, had implied that 
she would use the veto to prevent other members moving towards EMU, and 
prominent Euro-sceptics like Nicholas Ridley argued that this was still the 
best option available to the government. Major had not completely abandoned 
the Thatcher stance, vigourously opposing "the imposition of a single 
currency" and moves which adversely affected the national interest and 
undermined the commitment to free market principles. The preferred option 
was the evolution of the "hard ecull as a common rather than single 
currency, but the original "hard ecu" plan was soon modified so that the 
hard ecu would be part of a transitional phase on the road to a single 
currency. At the Luxembourg Summit in June 1991, Britain emphasized the need 
for economic convergence rather than fixed timetables for EMU. Major 
maintained the legal reserve on the EMU treaty, but the expectations were of 
compromise. Though rejecting the Dutch Draft TreatiesLamont indicated that 
EMU would happen and looked for covergence and the agreement of eight EC 
states before the third stage could begin. 16 
-228- 
In the run-up to the Maastricht Summit, then, the British government had 
indicated its willingness to sign an EMU treaty which offered Britain an 
opt-out clause, despite some vocal opposition among the more hard-line Euro- 
sceptics in his party. In the Commons debate on the government's negotiating 
position in November 1991, Major outlined his strategy, noting that Thatcher 
had committed the country to "the progressive realization of Economic and 
Monetary Union" by signing the SEA. He stressed the government's commitment 
to Stages One and Two, but argued that Stage Three would require a high 
level of economic convergence. On the single currency and opt-out compromise 
he stated that Britain would not commit herself now. 
"A single currency could be the means of safeguarding anti-inflationary 
policies for the whole of the European Community. That would be a great 
prize. But the House knows there is a price to pay for that prize. The 
price is that it would take from national governments the control of 
monetary policy. That, would be a very significant political and economic 
step for Britain to take. Ve cannot take that step now. But nor should we 
exclude it. " (Hansard, vol. lgg, no. 13, col. 274). 
At Maastricht Major duly secured an opt-out clause, but one specifically 
aimed at the UK. Under the terms of the clause, the UK is not compelled to 
sign up for the single currency without a separate decision by her 
government and Parliament. ' 6 Britain agreed to the text on the second stage 
and conceded ground by signing a separate protocol declaring the 
"irreversible character of the movement to the Third Stage", and agreeing to 
"respect the will of the Community to enter swiflty into the Third Stage of 
EMU". During the Second Stage, Britain will act as if she were going to enter 
the final stage by being bound to protocol commitments an excessive deficit 
and the hardening and irrevocable fixing of the ecu. Major would not though 
say whether he believed Britain would eventually join a single currency and 
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single monetary policy. On EMU then Major left Maastricht having secured his 
priarity, an opt-out clause for the UK, but had moved well beyond the 
Thatcherite stance by signing a treaty and legally recognizing the 
inevitability of the EMU process. 
The road to agreement on a political union treaty at Maastricht proved 
more difficult, with arguments continuing into the final minutes of the 
Maastricht summmit. The Major government retained , the hostility of its 
predecessor to greatly increased powers f or the European Parliament, to the 
extension of EC competence and qualified majority voting (especially in 
social affairs and on immigration), and to Franco-German plans to 
incorporate a common defence and foreign policy within the institutional 
structure of the EC. Again through negotiations, concess ions were made and 
compromises reached, with the UK accepting an extension of EP powers and of 
EC competence in its Maastricht strategy. In his presentation of the 
government's negotiating postion to the House of Commons in November 1991, 
Major objected to "wholesale changes in the nature of the Community which 
would lead it to an unacceptable dominance over our national life" (Hansard, 
vol. 199, no. 13, col. 274). But his position an national sovereignty was less 
strident than Thatcher Is, recognizing that an extension of EC powers was 
inevitable, but should be shaped to meet British interests as far as 
possible. 
The government rejected the radical Dutch Draft Treaty which called f or 
a unitary EC structure on domestic and f oreign af fairs, and succeeded in 
removing the references to a "federal vocation" from the Maastricht Treaty. 
Major's preferred structure was one based on "separate pillars" of inter- 
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governmental co-operation on foreign policy and domestic affairs, outside 
of the Treaty of Rome and thus not subject to Commission proposals or the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. At Naastricht, Major was able 
to avoid the formal incorporation of law and order, foreign policy and 
defence policy in the EC under the Treaty of Rome, policy on these areas 
instead being shaped by a legally binding, inter-governmental framework. 17 
On f areign policy Britain secured a national veto on key elements of a 
joint foreign policy and maintained the freedom of national action. However, 
as in other areas Britain was forced to accept the extension of qualified 
majority voting, though leaving the Council of Ministers to unanimously 
decide in which areas of foreign policy this would apply. On defence, the 
Anglo-Italian coalition secured the dominant role for NATO in the face of 
Franco-German proposals for a EC defence corps. The Vestern European Union 
(WEU) also remains prominent, with Greece and Denmark invited to join it. 
However, the UK was forced to accept the strengthening of a "European 
defence identity" and the eventual integration of the VEU into the EC's 
institutional structure. 'IB 
The EC's area of competence was extended by the Maasticht agreement, 
with the scope of qualified majority votingý-also increased. Environmental 
policy though remained outside the Treaty of Rome, and the Major government 
subsequently ignored EC opposition to several construction projects in the 
UK. Britain also agreed to increased powers for the EP, another area of 
compromise, with the Strasbourg Parliament able to veto Council of Ministers, 
decisions in certain areas. Co-decision was not adopted, but Britain had 
agreed to the extension of EP legislative powers for the first time. 
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Britain's proposals for the EP to play a greater role in scrutinising the 
Commission and auditing EC, spending were incorporated into the treaty. The 
government also conceded on the establishment of a Cohesion Fund for 
regional aid. On immigration, which Major had wanted left to inter- 
governmental decisions, Britain again achieved nixed results, with asylum 
policies being gradually harmonized after 1996, but with increased rights 
for family members to join immigrants already settled in the EC. 
The greatest split on political union came over the issue of the 
extension of EC competence into social policy in the single market, 
including EC decisions on working conditions, health and safety, pensions 
and unemployment, plus trade union rights and collective bargaining. The 
Delors Social Charter and the Maastricht social chapter were firmly 
rejected by the Major government for the same reasons as Thatcher had 
outlined. Major regarded the social chapter as interference in market forces 
and as damaging to British industry. Though Heath urged British acceptance 
of the social charter, the vast majority of Conservatives were opposed to 
the extension of EC competence in this area. Ultimately, Major refused to sign 
a political union treaty including the social chapter, forcing the other 
eleven EC states to sign a protocol on social affairs outside the Treaty of 
Rome. "" The Opposition claimed Britain was isolated in a lower tier by this 
and the EMU opt-out. Major though claimed that British industry would 
beAefit from internal investment because of lower costs, and that Britain 
had already agreed to 19 of the 33 social programme areas already accepted 
by the Council of Ministers. 
-232- 
In the 1992 general election, the issue of European Union was kept of f 
the agenda by Conservative and Labour strategists eager to disguise 
internal disputes on the issue which existed in both parties. In the May 
debate on the Maastricht Treaty, Major argued that he had secured a deal 
which marked "the point at which, for the first time, Britain has begun to 
reverse the centralizing trend"Xis government increasingly stressed the 
principle of subsidiarity (though its meaning remains disputed), arguing that 
the Maastricht agreement ensured that decisions would be taken at national 
level where appropriate. Although 22 Tory MPs voted against the Bill's 
Second Reading, Labour's decision to abstain on the vote ensured a 
comfortable government majority. However, the Treaty ran into fresh trouble 
with the *No" result of the Danish referendum in June, giving Tory Euro- 
Sceptics fresh ammunition and causing the government to postpone plans for 
ratification of the Bill just before the British Presidency began. 20 
European integration is taking place against a background of a decline 
in the autonomy of the state, but a revival of national identity. The 
Thatcherite view of sovereignty argues that economic, monetary and political 
union will bring about an irreversible transfer of decision-making 
authority from the nation-state to a supranantional body. The alternative 
account presented by Howe defines sovereignty as the capacity for influence 
a nation-state has in an interdependent world. Integration is thus seen as a 
means of increasing Britain's scope for effective influence through closer 
links between EC member states. Both accounts have something useful to 
contribute to the integration debate, but also contain significant flaws. 
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State sovereignty cannot be depicted as an absolute in the contemporary 
world. The capacity of the state to follow an autonomous or independent course 
of action has been eroded by a trend towards globalization in political and 
economic affairs-But the state is still the key actor in international 
relations: the EC's scope for autonomous action is strictly limited for it is a 
union of states not a federation. It is unhelpful to see sovereignty as absolute 
and indivisible. The EC's member states have extended their scope of influence 
and ability to act, while maintaining their independence in many areas. Those who 
believe that state sovereignty must mean state autonomy ignore the need for 
and benefits of supranational organ izations. An isolated state could preserve 
its sovereignty, but impotence would be the price to pay. 
The Maastricht Treaty however opens up the prospect of a European Union 
in which important areas of state authority will be lost. The ability of nation- 
states to take decisions an monetary and fiscal affairs will be limited as a 
single currency and European Central Bank effectively usher in a Europe wide 
monetary policy. A permanent convergence of the economies of the EC member 
. states, on which the success of 
EMU may well depend, seems highly unlikely and 
there is significant opposition to EMU and political union in several EC 
member states. On political union, the extension of Community competence and of 
qualified maJority voting threatens to further erode the authority of elected 
state governments and legislatures Sation-states may be obliged to accept 
decisions they opposed in the Council of Ministers. The political community may 
find itself no longer able to decide upon who should be regarded as a member 
of the community if immigration matters are formally decided at EC level. 
Qualified majority voting raises the question of the democratic deficit: how can 
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an elected government be held responsible for decisions made in the Council of 
Ministers if it was outvoted 
,,, 
Bogdanor and Voodcock suggest that extending democratic accountability to 
all, EC institutions is the most pressing task in the years ahead (Bogdanor & 
Voodcock, 1991). Stronger links between the national and European parliaments 
and greater scrutiny of EC directives would be a major element in the 
democratization of the EC. But the smaller and weaker EC member states will 
have , limited potential for the redress of grievances even if democratic 
accountability is extended. Popular allegiance to and participation in the EC 
are lacking at present, but would be important in the longer term. As the 
r, ommunity moves towards Union rather than intergovernmental co-operation the 
capacity of each individual member state to act independently will decline. A 
common foreign, defence and immigration policy are on the horizon, but each must 
take account of the different outlooks and traditions of the member states. If 
European Union is to be harmonious, nat ion- states must not be constrained from 
sometimes following different, but complementary, paths towards closer union 
where vital national interests or political traditions dictate this. Here the 
, principle 
of subsidiarity is taken to mean that the nation-state will still 
play a signif icant role in decision-making in those cases where a supra- 
-national role is inappropriate. 
The EC has limited the British government's scope for action, particularly 
in the legal sphere where Community law has become part of UK law and takes 
priority in all but the most extreme cases-Britain has in general benefitted 
-1 frolft giving up some of, its decision-making authority to the EC, although her 
late entry has meant that dif f icult struggles have been needed to alter EC 
-235- 
institutions to meet British interests -European integration will erode the 
scope for government action still further, but the threat European union poses 
to national, identity has been exaggerated. As' yet, there has been little to 
suggest that the EC is incompatible with strong national identities. The 
Community itself has been unable to develop an attractive cultural or political 
identity of its own, while a revival of ethnic nationalisms suggests that 
national identities are resilient. However, British national identity and 
sovereignty are linked, especially in conservative thought, because Britain is a 
parliamentary nation. European Union challenges the British tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty, one ill at ease with continental accounts of popular 
sovereignty and federalism. The traditions and membership of the national 
community may also be undermined by EC foreign or immigration policies. The 
process of European integration is beginning to raise the questions of 
national independence and self-government for perhaps the first time in modern 
British history. 
An examination of government policy towards the EC shows the limitations 
of the account of Thatcherism. as a nationalist doctrine or strategy. In the 
final weeks of the Thatcher premiership there was certainly a drift in this 
direction, best ilustrated in Thatcher's own unscripted remarks about EMU. 
However, the overall record of the Thatcher governments suggest that reports of 
a nationalist strategy are exaggerated. Thatcherism has not been isolationist or 
protectionist, as one would expect from a nationalist strategy. Instead the 
Thatcher governments were pressing for changes in the EC to meet their vision 
of an economically liberal EC where key decisions were left at a national 
level. Problems mounted when the trend towards integration rapidly moved away 
from the negative integration (the removal of internal barriers) which 
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Thatcherism felt comfortable with, towards positive integration (political, 
economic and monetary union). Support for negative integration was the dominant 
theme of Thatcherite policy (seen in policy on reform of the budgetary process 
and CAP, the single market and Political Co-operation), but there was also a 
great deal of government pragmatism made necessary by the EC negotiating 
processes and its rapidly changing agenda. The Thatcher governments had most 
influence over EC policy-making when there was general agreement on the 
direction of the Community, notably on the desirability of the internal market. 
But Thatcherite influence was weakened by its distrust of the EC negotiating 
process, its hardline stance aimed at changing EC institutions to meet British 
objectives, and key differences between Britain and her partners over their 
visions of European integration. 
Policy towards the EC in the -Thatcher years was not primarily dictated 
by nationalist doctrine. Thatcherism was not a coherent nationalist strategy, 
although it successfully exploited nationalist themes when British interests 
were at stake or when the EC moved in the direction of EMU which was 
Thatcher's b6te noiz-e. By signing the SEA, with its clauses promising moves 
towards EMU, Thatcher assented to a further erosion of the sovereignty she 
vigorously defended in her final weeks in office. Pragmatic considerations, the 
need for negotiation and coalition-making, plus pressure from Cabinet colleagues 
and the Foreign Office, all prevented Thatcher from following the nationalist 
style suggested in October 1990 and after. Public opinion on the Community and 
Thatcher's policy fluctuated from widespread support for her "Britain first" 
attitude in the budgetary dispute, to heavy electoral losses in the 1989 
European elections when the Conservatives ran a Euro-sceptic campaign. Public 
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uncertainty continued in the early 1990s during the debates on economic, 
monetary and political union. 
The tension between Thatcherism's neo-liberal economics and its 
nationalist rhetoric was another key factor preventing the emergence of a 
coherent nationalist doctrine. In defending the primacy of the nation-state and 
defending national interests against any extension of Community competence, 
Thatcherism expresses itself in a Gaullist tone. Both are ideological supporters 
of the nation-state and opponents of EC federalism. But Thatcherism's neo- 
liberal economics and support for the internal market suggest that the 
economic role of the nation-state will decline. Support for the internal market 
is based on Thatcherism's preferrence for market rather than state action, but 
the nation-state itself is the main barrier to a truly free European market or 
a level-playing field (Sharpe, 198 9, p. 234; Willets, 1992, pp. 170-3). Instead of 
f ollowing neo-liberal theory to its ultimate conclusions about the 
incompatibility of the nation-state with the free narket, Thatcherism upheld the 
role of the nation-state by opposing tax harmonization, a single currency and 
the social charter. But Thatcherism also followed market-led policies which were 
not always compatible with the national interest eg not acting to protect the 
UK's coal or manufacturing industries, and encouraging foreign investement in 
British industries. The 1992 programme saw the Department of Trade and 
Industry encouraging British industry to become more competitive, but there has 
not been the sort of strategic partnership between government and industry 
envisaged by technocratic Euro-enthusiasts like Michael Heseltine. 
The Maastricht treaty testifies to the shift away from the ideological 
opposition to positive integration of Thatcher's final weeks in power, but the 
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Major government retains significant doubts about European Union. It is by no 
means certain that the Maastricht agreement will hold for doubts about its 
benefits are surfacing in Germany and France, while the process of integration 
will itself raise problems of convergence, structural aid and the possibility of 
a two-tier Europe developing with the single currency. 
In the next chapter I will examine the domestic factors affecting 
Thatcherite policy on the EC by looking at tensions between Euro-sceptics and 
Euro-enthusiasts in the Conservative Party. 
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CHAPTER SEVEI., THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AID TIER EUROPEAN CONNUIFITY. 
The Conservatives have never enjoyed unanimous internal support f or 
official party policy on Britain's relations with the EC. The parliamentary 
party has contained a hard-core of Euro-sceptics, prepared to vote against 
the official party position both in government and opposition, since the 
decision to seek membership of the Community was first made. A significant 
number of Tory MPs ignored the Heath government's three-line whip to vote 
against the 1972 European Communities Act, and then campaigned for a No 
vote in the 1975 referendum I Enoch Powell left the Conservative Party 
because of its pro-Community platform, but many Euro-sceptics remained on 
the backbenches, respected for their principled stance, but having little 
practical influence on party policy. The friction within the parliamentary 
party eased as EC issues dropped down the political agenda, but re-emerged 
in the late 1980s when the gathering pace of European integration fuelled 
intra-party tensions. The party was publicly perceived as divided over EC 
policy by 1990 as the dispute unseated senior Cabinet ministers and 
ultimately contributed to Mrs Thatcher's downfallJohn Major's task was to 
f ind a policy which would appease both sides of the Tory Party and be 
acceptable to Britain's Community partners. 
Different attitudes towards the EC within the Conservative Party are, 
broadly speaking, grouped around two camps: the Euro-sceptics and the Euro- 
enthusimsts. However, differences of opinion exist within these rival camps. 
These are not well-organized factions of ideologically-allied folowing a 
specific strategy, but are loose groupings of like-minded MPs, sharing a 
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general positive or negative opinion on European integration. Membership of 
the two camps is difficult to accurately quantify because many MPs tend to 
follow a pragmatic course, supporting loosely-defined official policy rather 
than voting against the government. The scale of the internal dispute was 
heightened in the final phase of Thatcher's premiership. The resignations and 
stated positions of Lawson, Ridley, Howe and Thatcher revealed deep divisions 
in the Cabinet, while the polarization of the parliamentary party gathered 
pace as backbench Tories publicly affiliated themselves to the rival camps. 
The Euro-sceptic and Euro-enthusiast camps are not ideological factions 
in a strict sense, each camp acting instead as a loose coalition of attitudes 
and containing significant internal differences of opinion about the 
desirability of European integration and the optimal strategy for the 
government to pursue. In an article written as intra-party tension on the 
issue was in the ascendancy, Andrew Gamble identified two main camps, the 
"federalists" and the "nationalists", with both of these containing further 
sub-groupings (Gamble, 19 9 0). These titles though exaggerate the ideological 
basis of the rival camps: few Euro-enthusiasts are fully-fledged federalists, 
while only the most Powellite of Euro-sceptics offer anything approaching a 
coherently nationalist platform. The article further divides these two camps 
into another three sub-groupings per camp. The Euro-sceptic, "nationalist" 
wing thus contains: 
(I) Isolationists, who favour withdrawal from the EC as the only means of 
restoring British sovereignty; 
(ii) Atlanticistst who focus on defence and security and regard NATO and 
the United States as the principle pillars of British foreign policy, 
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(iii) market liberals, who oppose further integration because it erodes 
economic sovereignty. 
The Euro-enthusiast, "federalist" wing also has three sub-groupings- 
(D unionists, who favour rapid moves towards a united Europe; 
(ii) realists, who are essentially pragmatic, seeking to maximize Britain's 
influence within'the EC but having significant reservations about the speed 
and scope of the integration process; 
(iii) market liberals, who regard further integration as a natural and 
desirable result of the SEA. 
This breakdown reveals the pitfalls involved, in faction-spotting: key 
individuals like Heseltine or Major cannot easily be pigeonholed into these 
categories, and the dividing line between them is often blurred. Realist 
cannot be classified as federalists either. Later in this chapter I will look 
at the position of the more significant Euro-sceptics (Thatcher, Ridley, 
Tebbit et al) and Euro--enthusiasts (Heath, Heseltine etc), noting the 
differences in opinion on major issues between and within the two camps. 
Though the ideological positions of some key players may be significant, 
pragmatism seems to be an overriding feature in the stance of the majority 
of Conservative MPs. Philip Norton's survey of the ideological 'position of 
every Conservative MP in 1990 indicated the pitfalls which those who 
categorize party factions must be wary of (Nortan, 1990). Norton identified 
seven categories in the party, but the 'ideological groupings (the 
Thatcherites, either neo-liberal or Tory Right; and to a lesser extent the 
Critics, either "wet" or "damp") make up only a small proportion of the 
parliamentary party. By far the largest grouping was the loyal "party 
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faithful" (217 MPs or 58% of the party) who support the party and the 
leader through loyalty rather than ideological accord. It was the declining 
confidence of these crucial members which ultimately determined the timing 
of Thatcher's departure. Norton's conclusion is then that the parliamentary 
Conservative Party is neither significantly ideological nor Thatcherite. The 
relevance of Yorton's findings for attemps at fact ion-spotting an European 
policy are clear. Few Conservative MPs can be confidently pigeonholed on 
this issue, while an analysis of the Commons debates on the Single European 
Act in 1986 reveals that few Conservatives understood its longer term 
significance. A large number of Conservative MPs then have no expert 
understanding of the complexities of the EC, but picked up rhetorical themes 
when the EC, took centre stage in party anxieties. Many MPs take a pragmatic, 
sceptical or realist approach to policy-making. 
The debates within the Cabinet and Party on economic and monetary 
union from the time of the Bruges Speech onwards undoubdtedly concentrated 
Conservative minds on the dangers of the loss of British sovereignty and 
the re-imposition of socialism and bureaucracy. The debate within the party 
produced a limited amount of factionalism, with the formation of the Euro- 
sceptic Bruges Group, but the dominant view among backbenchers was that of 
the pragmatist-The increasingly strident and isolationist position of Mrs 
Thatcher and the pro-European sympathies of some traditional Conservative 
support (the City, the CBI, the Daily Mail and The Economist among others) 
played on the minds of the party faithful. The choice of John Major as 
Thatcher's successor perhaps revealed the general sympathy for a more 
pragmatic and less confrontational approach. But even this pragmatism is 
underpinned by a "realist" recognition of the desirability of Britain 
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playing a key role in EC negotiations, while refusing to transfer too much 
power from Vestminster to Brussles or Strasbourg. Major's pragmatism on 
Europe (both sides of the party saw him as "one of us" on Europe) thus won 
the day over Heseltine's more visible support for a pro-European policy. The 
intra-party debate in the build-up to the Maastricht summit seemed 
primarily concerned with reaching a compromise behind which the majority 
of the party could unite, once again reducing the extreme Euro-sceptics to a 
vocal but ineffective rump. The agreement Major brought back from Maastricht 
only achieved this goal in the short-term, for after the general election, 
backbench opposition to the Treaty intensified. 
The Bruges Group (and its Westminster of f-shoot "The Parliamentary 
Friends of Bruges"), supports the vision of Europe presented in Thatcher's 
Bruges Speech and is a major vehicle of opposition to further European 
integration. It includes academics, businessmen. and politicians from both the 
Conservative and Labour parties, but its primary significance has been in 
providing a rallying cry for Tory Euro-sceptics. Michael White's surveys of 
Conservative attitudes on Europe for "The Guardian" in 1990 showed that 
the Bruges Group claimed the support of 132 Conservative MPs, while Teddy 
Taylor's Conservative European Reform Group claimed 73 supporters 2A 
hard-core of anti- communautaire Conservatives have voted against pro- 
European government legislation in the Commons. Among these more consistent 
Euro-sceptics are the backbenchers 'Jonathan Aitken, John Biffen, Nicholas 
Budgen, Terry Dicks, Teddy Taylor and Nicholas Winterton. The "No Turning 
Back Group" of Conservative MPs has also collectively expressed its 
opposition to economic and monetary union. The most prominent Euro-sceptic 
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contributors to the EC debate have been Margaret Thatcher, Nicholas Ridley 
and Norman Tebbit. 
Euro-enthusiasts are less overtly organized, though the European 
Movement chaired by Hugh Dykes has rallied pro-European Conservatives. In 
July 1990 Vhite estimated their were up to 40 Euro-sympathisers in the 
parliamentary party including Sir Anthony Meyer, David Knox and Robert 
Hicks. Groups such as the Tory Reform Group and the Conservative MEPs, who 
have no formal role in the decision-making apparatus of the party, are 
sympathetic. The major Euro-enthusiast contributors to the European debate 
have been Edward Beath, Michael Heseltine and Sir Geoffrey Howe. Two former 
Conservatives Lord Cockfield and Sir Leon Brittan have taken up pro- 
European themes as UK Commissioners. Cockfield was the instigator of much 
of the 1992 programme, but his vision of the future development of the 
Community went further than that of Mrs Thatcher, for which he paid the 
political price when he was not re-appointed. His successor Sir Leon Brittan 
has also reacted more favourably to EG proposals for EMU than the Euro- 
sceptics would have hoped. 
Mrs Thatcher has been the standard-bearer for the Conservative Euro- 
sceptics with her vehement opposition to any centralization or integration 
which would diminish British sovereigrity. But the most ardent Euro-sceptics 
are also critical of her for signing the SEA, which set the wheels of 
European integration firmly in mation, and for finally agreeing to British 
membership of the ERM. The key themes in Thatcher's position an Britain's 
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relations with the EC and the future development of the Community can be 
found in her 1988 Bruges Speech and her parliamentary speeches, particularly 
those made after leaving office. The Bruges speech contained the crux of the 
Conservative opposition to European integration: f ears of a loss of 
sovereignty or national diversity; opposition to proposed increases in the 
decision-making powers of EC institutions; fears of protectionism , and 
commitment to a free-trade EC; commitment to NATO and the "special 
relationship" with the United States; and an opposition to socialism and the 
collectivist political traditions of other EC members. 
Thatcher's account of sovereignty has been outlined in the previous 
chapter, but it is worth repeating that hers is an absolutist account, viewing 
anything beyond the single market project as an unacceptable erosion of 
national sovereignty. European integration threatens not only the sovereign 
decsion-making authority of the nation-state, but - the very essence of its 
national identity. European Union aims to transcend time-honoured national 
identities, replacing them with an artificial supra-national identity. 
Thatcher rejects the federal and functionalist visions of European union. 
Her vision is of co-operation between sovereign nation-states. Thatcher is 
eager to stress the differences in political tradition and outlook between 
Britain and continental Europe. The collectivist traditions of continental 
Europe are alien to British values of liberty, free trade and parliamentary 
democracy. In the debate on the British negotiating position for the 
Xaastricht summitThatcher told the House that one of the primary concerns 
of the government should be the protection of national identity. 
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"It has been rightly said that it is the character of a people which 
determines the institutions which govern them, and not the institutions 
which give people their character. Yes, it is about being British and what 
we feel for our country, our Parliament, our traditions and our liberties. 
Because of our history that feeling is perhaps stronger here than 
anywhere else in Europe, and it must determine the way in which our 
government approaches such fundamental matters. " (Hansard, vol. 199, 
no. 13, col. 292). 
Thatcher's vision is of a Europe in which independent states 'work 
together but maintain their distinct national identities. It is not to be a 
federal or politically united Europe, but one of co-operative yet ultimately 
independent nation-states, upholding their nationhood and acting to protect 
their national interests where necessary. The Delors inspired vision of a 
political union is-, criticized as bureaucratic and inefficient, reimposing a 
centralist socialism on a British people who had rejected it in national 
elections. Thus for Thatcher, 
"Ve have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in 
Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European 
super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels. u (Thatcher, 1988, 
p. 4). 
Thatcher wants to see practical reform of the Community's institutional 
structure, notably the CAP and the Community budget, and opposes extensions 
of Community competence or the transfer of decision-making authority 
fromnational to EC level. Federalist schemes for EMU and political union 
would seriously undermine the sovereignty of Parliament and the British 
people it represents. The extension of majority-voting would mean that 
decisions could be imposed an Britain despite the expressed opposition of 
the government and Westminster. Although she claims that the SEA merely 
repeated existing commitments to economic and monetary co-operation, by 
signing the SEA Thatcher contributed to the build-up of pressure for 
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further integration and agreed to a decisive step away from unanimity. It 
was the SEA, signed by Thatcher and pushed through Parliament on guillotined 
motions, which gave fresh momentum to proposals for European integration 
and moved EC decision-making towards qualif ied majority voting. 
Subsequently Thatcher dubbed this path "a federal Europe achieved by 
stealth", involving "the greatest abdication of national and parliamentary 
sovereignty in our history" (Hansard, vol. 193, no. 130, cal. 1032). 
In her Bruges speech, Thatcher outlined her vision of a Europe of free 
trade and competition, with the 1992 internal market the realization of the 
Treaty of Rome's character as a "charter for economic liberty". She opposed a 
protectionist Europe and the stream of EC directives which sought to create 
a level playing field yet only brought centralization and inefficiency. While 
other EC member states were pushing for deeper integration, Thatcher was 
castigating them for laxity in introducing the legislation required for the 
realization of the internal market. By the 1988 Hanover Summit she was 
rounding on proposals for economic and monetary union, claimins that a 
single currency and central bank could only exist in a united Europe with a 
common monetary policy. Economic and monetary union would prevent nations 
from having their own economic policies and was therefore' a threat to 
British sovereignty, economic success and democratic accountability. 
For many years, Thatcher opposed British membership of the ERM, her 
preference being for floating exchange rates and government control over 
interest rates. Divisions within the Cabinet saw Lawson shadowing the DM, 
before Thatcher intervened to prevent her Chancellor "bucking the market". 
At the 1989 Madrid summit Howe and Lawson manoeuvred her into setting 
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conditions for British entry, and in October 1990 Thatcher and Major finally 
took the decision to join the ERM. Thatcher claimed to have agreed to this 
on advice that Britain would gain from greater co-operation while not being 
unduly restricted economically. However, significant doubts remain about the 
extent to which Thatcher actively supported ERN entry with her vocal 
support for the ERN notably absent since her resignation. 
Thatcher has been far more vigorous In her opposition to plans for EMU 
and its associated single currency and European Central Bank. In the face of 
these proposals, Thatcher has depicted the Pound Sterling as one of the most 
visible and essential symbols of national sovereignty. She backed the "hard 
ecu" plan of her Chancellor John Major as a means of slowing down the 
momentum towards EMU, preventing the imposition of a single currency and 
removing the need for a Central Bank. The "hard ecull would evolve as a 
common currency, not an imposed single currency, and could be used by 
governments to the extent they desired. Vhile trying to present the "hard 
ecull plan as a serious British contribution to the EMU debate though, 
Thatcher managed 'to undermine it by expressing a personal belief that it 
*would not be widely used" as states would prefer to use their own national 
currencies. From the backbenches and in speeches abroad, Thatcher repeated 
her opposition to EMU when out of office. In the Commons in June 1991 
Thatcher offered five points of advice for British negotiators: (I) 
opposition to EMU as it involves an abdication of British sovereignty; (ii) 
the need for greater co-operation between nation-states rather than further 
integration; (III) the belief that federalism means centralization; (iv) the 
danger of "vague commitments" becoming "damaging proposals" eg on social 
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policy; and (iv) the need to maintain a strong relationship with the US and 
encourage reform in Eastern Europe. 
These last two points illustrated Thatcher's disdain for the negotiating 
processes of the EC and the Atlanticist emphasis in her 'foreign policy. The 
problems she faced in reducing Britain's budgetary contibutions and her 
experiences of other EC states uniting to set agendas or push through 
motions against Britain's wishes, have, convinced her' that British interests 
can only be safeguarded by determined opposition not by concessions. She 
thus advised John Major to go to Maastricht not with her "handbagu, but with 
his "cricket bat" to beat off demands for federalism. 
"The history of our dealings with the European Community seem to 
consist of our conceding powers, of reassurances being given about their 
limits, of those limts being breached, and of the European Community then 
coming back with a new set of demands for more power f or the 
Commission. That is the conveyor belt to federalism. u (Hansard, val. 199, 
no. 13, col. 294). 
Finally, Thatcher, has emphasized the commitment of the UK to NATO and 
to the United States, supporting the strengthening of the Western European 
Union, but not at the expense of NATO. Thatcher's personal commitment to the 
special relationship with the US was especially strong, seeing Britain as 
the major European ally of the United States, a position strengthened during 
the war with Iraq at a time when Germany seemed to be emerging as the new 
continental power. In her speeches in Chicago and New York in June 1991 
Thatcher looked to an Atlantic Economic Community, founded on Anglo-Saxon 
principles of free trade and liberal democracy. 3 This would involve 
states from Korth America, Western Europe and the emerging democracies of 
Eastern Europe in an community of liberal free trade, and was clearly 
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of fered as an alternative to the vision of a closed, federal Europe which she 
regards as the likely outcome of moves towards EXU. 
Thatcher is not an isolationist: she believes that Britain must be a 
member of the Community, but one based on intergovernmental co-operation 
and primarily concerned with the creation of the single market. For her, EMU 
is an unacceptable erosion of national sovereignty. A single currency and the 
single monetary policy it implies are undesirable and unworkable steps on 
the road to a federal Europe. As John Major, sought a deal at Maastricht, 
Thatcher called for a referendum on the single currency to allow people to 
have a choice on the irrevocable removal of the pound sterling as the 
national unit of currency. Thatcher reasoned that if, as seemed likely, all the 
major political parties supported moves towards - EMU, the British people 
would be denied a real choice on the issue at a general elect ion. However, 
her call for a referendum sits uneasily with her belief in the primacy of 
parliamentary sovereignty which she has often invoked against plans for 
European integration. Thatcher abstained from voting on the agreement Major 
obtained at Maastricht. It seems unlikely that as Prime Minister she would 
have agreed to, any clause implying British acceptance of the single 
currency as an EC objective. She has also consistently opposed the extension 
of Community competence, increased powers for the EP and the extension of 
qualified majority voting, particularly on foreign policy matters. 
In the previous chapter, I noted that the Thatcher governments did not 
follow a coherent nationalist strategy. The EC's negotiating process and the 
relatively high level of support for European Union among other member 
states meant that Thatcherism could only stall not prevent integration. 
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Government policy was necessarily a strategic blend of compromise measures 
plus ideological beliefs and perceptions of the national interest which 
would not be sacrificed. Tensions between the neo-liberal and *Gaullist" 
elements in Thatcherism revealed themselves in negotiations on the internal 
market to illustrate the claims made in Chapter Five that Thatcherism, 
whether defined as doctrine or government policy (statecraft) is not and 
could not be coherently nationalist. In this section I have assessed the 
values and beliefs of Margaret Thatcher herself, the other method of 
analysing Thatcherism which I outlined in Chapter Five. Although she 
frequently uses nationalist rhetoric, Thatcher's personal thought is not 
coherently nationalist in the sense that Powell's was. Her understanding of 
sovereignty is not as clear as Powellls: she talks of the sovereignty of 
parliament, but advocates a referendum to by-pass Westminster, while her 
premiership continued the shift of power away from the legislature to the 
executive. Vhen Thatcher did adopt a hardline position on sovereignty in the 
face of EMU, it proved damaging to Britain's influence in the EC. 
Much of the significance of Thatcher's use of the language of 
nationhood and sovereignty an EC issues lies in its ef fects an the domestic 
political agenda and on the debate in the Conservative Party. Her Bruges 
speech was a shot across the bows of her EC partners and slowed down the 
pace of European integration. Domestically it fuelled the European debate and 
mobilized Conservative Euro-sceptics. The two major protagonists of the EC 
debate of twenty years earlier, Heath and Powell agreed that the Bruges 
Speech was a turning point in British foreign policy. Heath saw it as a 
dangerous move towards -isolation'and impotence, Powell as a decisive move 
against the Foreign Office and one which recognized that British interests 
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were incompatible with EC membership. The speech and Thatcher's vehement 
opposition to EMU and political union in her final weeks in office 
contributed to the polarization of the Conservative Party. But it should also 
be noted that the Bruges Speech was not such a sharp break f rom the 
position of previous British governments as has often been implied (George, 
1990). Few British politicians would have unreservedly supported the Delars 
plans for EMU or happily presided over a decline in the capacity for 
government decision-making. 
Mrs Thatcher's opposition to EMU and political union has acted as a 
guiding light for many Euro-sceptics within the Conservative Party. Her 
Bruges speech rallied support for her vision of Europe under the banner of 
the Bruges Group, of which she later became President. Many of the themes U 
espoused in Thatcher's attitude towards the EC, are echoed in the discourse 
of prominent Euro-sceptics such as Nicholas Ridley and Norman Tebbit. But 
there are also significant differences of opinion and strategy within the 
Euro-sceptic camp as a whole, and I shall now outline some of these. 
The most prominent of Xrs Thatcher's allies' on Europe, both in the 
Cabinet and then on the backbenches, has been Nicholas Ridley. He was f orced 
to resign from her Cabinet in July 1990 having made derogatory comments 
about the role of the Germans and French in the EC in an interview f or "The 
Spectator'l. r, Ridley shares Xrs Thatcher's belief that the cards are often 
unfairly stacked against Britain in the EC. He portrays the EC as dominated 
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by a "Franco-German axis" concerned only to promote their own national 
interests, often at the expense of Britain (Ridley, 199 1, p. 2 09). It 'was this 
which Ridley referred to as "a German racket designed to take over the 
whole of Europell, backed by French "poodles" in his "Spectator" interview. His 
fear was that the strength of the German economy and the Deutschmark would 
mean that other EC states would be economically subservient to the Germans. 
Ridley follows Thatcher in arguing that concessions and compromise are the 
wrong way to secure British objectives in the Community, c lain ing that ERM 
membership and the "hard ecu" plan were only agreed to on misplaced 
Foreign Office advice about the concessions other EC members would make in 
return. 
The thrust of Ridley's Euro- scepticism is economic, a belief that ERM 
membership is economically undesirable and that EMU is unwarkable. r- His 
preference is again for a Europe of free trade between co-operating nation- 
states. He is highly critical of Delors' desire for a centralized, socialist 
Europe, and rounds an Lawson and Howe for trying to force Thatcher into 
joining the ERM without Cabinet support for such a move. EMU is both 
unworkable and undesirable. It would severely erode national sovereignty in 
critical economic areas, leaving national governments without the economic 
weapons of control of interest rates and exchange rates. All the major 
economic decisions would be made in the EC, with uncompetitive states 
relying on structural fund hand-outs from the Commission (Ridley, 1991, 
pp. 147-152). The Third Stage of EMU is depicted as part of Delors' scheme 
for a federal Europe, but is economically unworkable because of its 
requirement for permanent economic convergence between all EC member 
states. Differences between states in terms of productivity, inflation rates 
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and currency values cannot be permanently ironed out: any unusual event such 
as the Gulf Var will throw economies temporarily off course (Ridley, 199D. 
British membership of the ERM is also criticized, the ERN being likened 
to a "halfway house". inplying political union but having significant 
economic drawbacks. Ridley claims that historically the British economy has 
been most successful when the value of the Pound Sterling has been allowed 
to fluctuate, the exchanSe rate floating in the market place. He blames ERN 
membership, at an artificially high rate as well, for the recession and high 
interest rates of the early 1990s. Ridley was the subject of internal party 
criticism when he echoed Powell by arguing that people should vote for the 
anti-federal candidate in their constituency, reSard less of which party he 
7 represents. 
Norman Tebbit's opposition to European integration is delivered in more 
authentically nationalist tones than Ridley's primarily economic criticism. 
Tebbit uses the language of nationhood as a rhetorical weapon, pointing to 
an inherent conflict between British and continental accounts of nationhood. 
The EC is trying to change the traditional nature of the constitution and 
our national identity, but it is a "foreign force", alien to to the British way 
of life. Tebbit points to the revival of ethnic politics in Eastern Europe as 
to show that nationhood is crucial and supra-national states doomed to 
failure. He argues that the EC would fail as a federal union because of the 
diverse ethnic and linguistic groups in Europe. 
"The importance of language is not just that it reflects past and 
guides future cultural patterns. A democratic state must have a sense of 
national identity and of national public opinion to sustain it. Vithout a 
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common language it is almost impossible for either to exist. " 
(Tebbit, 1991, p. 66). 
The prospect of EMU and political union raises the issue of national 
sovereignty, or the right to national self-government as Tebbit prefers to 
call it (Tebbit, 1992). The trend in the EC has been towards the erosion of 
self-government notably with the extension of qualified majority voting and 
the impending threat of a single currency and monetary policy. 8 The 
creation of a single currency would be the final act in this erosion of 
sovereignty: from that moment the British Chancellor of the Exchequer would 
lose his effectiveness, his position being comparable to that of "the 
treasurer of a permanently rate-capped local authority" (Tebbit, 1991, p. 69). 
Parliament had no mandate to permanently give-up the right to self- 
government, so a move towards a single currency could only be decided by a 
referendum. But it is not made clear why this referendum should permanently 
bind future generations. In the build-up to the Maastricht summit, Tebbit 
argued that Britain should use its veto to prevent any of the EC member 
states from moving towards EMU or political union. He subsequently voted 
against the government on the agreement Major brought back calling it "a 
series of bridgeheads into our constitution", and claiming that the opt-out 
clause "clearly implies that Her Majesty's Government have no objections in 
principle to the creation of a single currency" (Hansard, vol. 201, no. 33, 
col. 323). Tebbit's vision is again that of a Europe of co-operating nation- 
states. 
Nigel -Lawson's position in the Euro-sceptic camp is less clear cut than 
that of either Thatcher or Ridley, af ter all it was he who strongly backed 
British membership of the ERK. HoweverLawson opposes the Stage Three 
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proposals f or a single currency and an independent European Central 
Bank, believing that these are incompatible with his key values: democratic 
accountability, national sovereignty over economic affairs, and "essential" 
national identity (Hansard, vol. 199, no. 13, col. 469). He fears that EMU will 
provoke a backlash of extreme right-wing nationalism in some European 
states as they lose control over economic policy. '9 Lawson wants ýa free- 
trade Europe of co-operating nation-states, encouraging competition without 
imposing tax harmonization or excessive regulation. He supports the EMS as a 
means of tightening EC currency movements and welcomed the "hard ecull plan 
as a means of having a common rather than single currency, but opposes EMU. 
"The European Monetary System is an agreement between individual 
sovereign states whose economic policies remain different and distinct.. 
Economic and monetary union by contrast is incompatible with 
independent sovereign states with control over their own fiscal and 
monetary policies. " (Lawson, 1989, p. 15). 
Teddy Taylor has been a consistent opponent of official Conservative 
Party policy on the EC, especially as Chairman of the Conservative European 
Reform Group. Vriting for the Monday Club in 1982, he argued that Britain 
should seek "special status" as an associate member of a two-tier Europe. 
The task of Conservatives is to protect the nationhood under threat from 
the Community. 
"If the Conservatives were to commit themselves to the desire to 
associate with Europe, but not to be enmeshed within it, we believe we 
would not only adopt an arrangement which conforms to the basic view 
of Britons, but would adopt a posture more in keeping with Conservative 
principles and offer-the nation the opportunity to free ourselves from 
a binding and inevitably increasing link which will destroy the whole 
basis of nationhood and destine our islands to inevitable economic 
decline. " (Storey & Taylor, 1982, p. 16). 
-258- 
Taylor voted against the SEA in June 1986, predicting that it would lead 
to the loss of national sovereignty in the crucial realm of monetary policy 
and give - greater power to EC institutions at the expense of Vestminster. In 
1990 he voted against the government on British membership of the ERM, 
voicing his fears on ENU and the artificial pegging of exchange rates. In 
1991 Taylor returned to the idea of a two-tier Europe with Britain in the 
second tier (possibly with the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe), 
benefitting from the internal market without having to proceed any further 
towards a federal Europe. 11 
The No Turning Back Group (NTBG) of neo-liberal Conservative MPs 
dubbed EMU "the nightmare scenario" in their pamphlet *Europe: Onwards From 
Bruges" in 1990. EMU would bring enforced harmonization, regulation and 
bureaucratic imposition regardless of national traditions and differences. 
Their alternative vision, "the dream scenario", is of Europe as a single 
market with a level playing field. 
wjn this possible future, the frontiers come down in 1992, but no attempt 
is made to take away national sovereignty or to impose alien systems 
and standards of regulation.. Instead the nations of Europe have to take 
account of each other in determining their actions. Vith enterprise and 
talent free to settle wherever they will within the single market, 
nations must contrive to encourage them within their borders and to 
discourage then from leaving. " (NTBG, 1990, pp. 5-6). 
The Euro-sceptics do not constitute an organized faction within the 
Conservative Party for important ideological and strategic differences exist 
within the camp. " Opposition to European Union may be expressed through 
economic concerns (but by no means all Euro-sceptics oppose the ERX), fears 
of a loss of political sovereignty, distrust of EC bureaucracy and "backdoor 
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socialism" or a belief that the EC is structurally biased against British 
interests. Despite this lack of factional unity or organization, the Euro- 
sceptics have caused anxious moments for the Government Vhips, as some Tory 
XPs voted against the SEA, ERM entry and Major's stance at the Maastricht 
Summit, but without seriously threatening the government's majority. 12In the 
1992 election campaign the Euro-sceptics were temporarily silenced to give 
the impression of party unity, but with the Danish referendum's rejection of 
the Maastricht Treaty, their stance was re-invigorated. Only 22 Tories voted 
against the Second Reading of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, but 
after the Danish "No" 100 Conservative XPs signed a motion calling on the 
government to seek a fresh start in the EC. 13 Calls for a British 
referendum also gained support. 
The main spokespersons for the Euro-enthusiasts in the parliamentary 
Conservative Party are former Prime Minister Edward Heath and Michael 
Heseltine. As mentioned above the European Movement has some support but is 
not an organized faction. with Heath and Heseltine promoting their views as 
individuals -Heath has long played a significant role in Britain's relations 
with Europe, acting as a negotiator for British entry to the EC in the 
1960s, before overseeing this goal during his premiership. Heath was then, and 
is now, an enthusiast for greater European union. At the Paris Summit in 1972 
Heath and other EC heads of government agreed on a programme of European 
Union which, if implemented, would have brought about an internal market, a 
central bank and a common currency by 1980 (George, 199 O, pp. 56- 6 0). However, 
world recession and the stagnation of the EC in the 1970s prevented these 
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aims being realized. Now Heath believes moves towards European Union must be 
more pragmatic and built on consensus, but is essential nonetheless 
(Heath, 1988). 
OThe notion of independent national sovereignty is a chinera, and that 
only by binding our institutions closer together can we achieve that 
shared sovereignty which, in fact, gives us greater influence over the 
forces which control our destiny-There is nothing to fear from closer 
union. " (Heath. 1989) 
For Heath the EC must develop as a "form of unif ied government suited 
to its own needs". This is to include moves towards closer political and 
economic integration, a significant departure from the Thatcherite insistence 
on seeing the EC as merely an economic community. In 1988, Heath called for 
full British participation in the European Monetary System so that Britian 
would play its part in determining future developments. In the longer term 
he regards a central bank and single currency as essential to closer union, 
while a common foreign and defence policy are also key parts of his vision. 
Heath's views on European union go further than most of those on the 
pro-European side of the debate. It is Heath rather than Thatcher who 
provides the most significant departure from the norm in British relations 
with the EC. Vhereas other British Prime Ministers have been mildly 
enthusiastic about the EC without being fully communautalre or sharing the 
continental European ideal, Heath is clearly at ease with European 
federal ists. Many in the Conservative Party pragmatically recognize that the 
tide is flowing towards greater European integration, but are keen to ensure 
that it is tempered to meet British interests. Few are as enthusiastic about 
a common economic policy or single currency as Heath, for whom European 
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union is an ideological goal. His dismissal of the Thatcherite emphasis an 
the importance of sovereignty is though one shared by the Euro-enthusiasts 
who believe that the continuing relevance of national sovereignty is 
overstated. The views of Sir Geoffrey Howe on the efficacy of national 
sovereignty have been discussed in Chapter Six. In debates on EC matters in 
the Commons, pro-European backbenchers including Edwina Currie and Alan 
Haselhurst, have been critical of Thatcherite rhetoric on sovereignty. Sir 
Peter Horden believes the attachment to national sovereignty has been 
costly in economic terms. 
"There is nothing to be said for sovereignty if it means economic 
isolation and a gentle slide against all other currencies.. (Sovereignty 
has meant) the inalienable right to depreciate our currency and to pay 
ourselves more than we earn. " (Hansard, vol. 1534, col. 224). 
Having resigned from the Cabinet during the Vestland affair in 1986 
when he had proposed a European takeover of the helicopter company, Michael 
Heseltine became the most important and visible Euro, -enthusiast in the 
party. Heseltine regards economic co-operation in the EC as essential for 
British interests and as a key part of his Conservative project. His is a 
technocratic conservatism, looking to an active partnership between 
government and industry to ensure British success in the European market. 
But his enthusiasm for full, rapid economic and monetary union is muted, and 
he frequently stresses the need for institutional reform to increase 
democratic accountability. Heseltine's vision of Europe is most clearly laid 
out in his 1989 book "The Challenge of Europe: Can Britain Win? ". As with 
other pro- Europeans, Heselt ine argues that the notion of effective national 
sovereignty is flawed, and claims that the trend is towards a "creeping 
federalism". The Single European Act was "as comprehensive a redefinition of 
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national sovereignty as we have ever known" (Heseltine, 1989, p. 23), but one 
essential for British interests. 
"No one would wish to deny our nationhood but it is the case that, f rom 
the moment Britain threw in her lot with that of her European partners, 
no logical alternative has existed to the transfer of some power to the 
European institutions. " (Heseltine, 1989, p. 27). 
Heseltine proposes a series of institutional reforms to make this 
Ofiedgling federalism" more palatable. These reforms would include a more 
accountable European Parliament, with national parliaments having direct 
influence in a newly-created upper house or senate within the EP. National 
parliaments, rather than just national governments, would play the leading 
role in ensuring effective accountability and national influence. Reform of 
the budget, regional and agricultural policies are also a priority for 
Reseltine-He also backed British entry into the ERM. Heseltine's policies are 
a pragmatic and technocratic mix, emphasizing competition and free-trade, 
while recognizing the desirability of increased public spending to ensure 
development in high-technology areas. 
*The case f or Europe must rest on the argument that we will achieve 
more f or our people within a more competitive European market than 
they can hope f or within a collection of purely national markets. " 
(Heseltine 1989, p. 77). 
Heseltine is enthusiastic about the 1992 project and the Cockf ield and 
Cecchini reports, viewing the internal market as the key to national and 
ýuropean prosperity. He supports closer association of monetary policies and 
%upports an evolutionary and voluntary move towards a single currency, but 
fears the unaccountability of a European Central Bank. In the Jean Monnet 
Lecture in July 1990, Heseltine accepted that economic and monetary union 
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was inevitable and called for the Bank of England to become independent as 
part of the gradual transition to an accountable European Central Bank. At 
the 1990 Party Conference he supported a gradual economic convergence and 
warned that Thatcher's eagerness to open up the EC to Eastern Europe would 
produce a flood of refugees with grave effects. 14 
*European institutions should grow and their growth should not be 
forced; sovereignty, even in penny packets, should be transferred to a 
higher authority only where there is an overwhelming case for 
it; initial commmitments should be voluntary, and to ensure confidence, 
should be retractable also. " (Heseltine, 1989, p. 90). 
Heseltine locates his support f or a closer union of European states in 
a Conservative tradition dating back to Churchill's vision of an extended 
sovereignty of real influence and economic progress. He also backs the 
Burkean concept of a chain of loyalties and attachments ranging from family 
to nation state and common humanity. lew associations such as a closer 
European Union need not then destroy old attachments. National diversity and 
patriotism can survive in an integrated Europe, but the idea of indivisible 
national sovereignty is no longer relevant. National independence is not a 
viable option for the UK; the only way forward is through an active role in 
the EC, influencing developments rather than being excluded and isolated. 
Heseltine signalled his challenge for the Conservative Party leadership in a 
letter to his constituency chairman in November 1990 in which he warned of 
the damage being done to Britain's role in the Community by Thatcher's 
uncompromising stance on European integration. " Though the European issue 
did not feature prominently in the leadership election, most Euro-sceptics 
would have been wary of the direction of government policy under a 
Heseltine premiership. 
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Former Conservative minister, Lord Cockf ield has been a consistent 
supporter of greater European integration-He is a neo-liberal in economic 
terms, but believes that the 1992 programme should go beyond the internal 
market and move towards economic and monetary union (Cockf ield, 1990). The 
Single European Act is depicted as the f irst formal legal step towards 
political union and as introducing social and monetary dimensions to the 
process of European integration. Cockf ield Is views were anathema to Thatcher 
who replaced him as Commissioner with Sir Leon Brittan when she refused to 
renominate Cockf ield. Brittan though has proved himself to be no Euro- 
sceptic, seeking compromise between the UK and Europe to ease the British 
road to economic and monetary union. ", Brittan has sought to gain 
government acceptance of a single currency as the ultimate goal so that the 
UK would not become isolated, but could progress towards EMU at its own 
pace. Generally, most Conservative MEPs are more enthusiastic about European 
Union than their counterparts at Westminster, but have little practical 
influence over policy-making in the party. 
As discussed In the f irst part of this Chapter, Sir Geoffrey Howe is 
also a supporter of a more active British role in the EC. His article on the 
concept of sovereignty shows that he too regards sovereignty as a myth in 
the modern world. For Howe, Britain should be concerned with directing change 
in Europe rather than seeking to maintain British economic independence at 
the expense of economic decline (Howe, 1984 & 1990). Howe had supported early 
entry into the ERX while Foreign Secretary, manouevring Thatcher into 
agreeing the Madrid Conditions in 1989. As the divisions in the Cabinet and 
party became more visible, Howe was increasingly critical of Thatcher's 
vehement opposition to moves towards economic and monetary union. After the 
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Rome Summit of October 1990, Thatcher's tone became more strident, prompting 
Howe's resignation from the Cabinet and a strong attack on Thatcher's 
policy towards the EC and the style of her premiership in his Common's 
resignation speech. 17 Howe had called for Britain to be "in the drivers' 
cab" of the European train, but Thatcher's response was that those who 
supported EMU deserved to be "taken for a ride". 
From the backbenches, Howe continued to press for a more positive 
British approach to developments in the Community, expanding the country's 
influence by pooling sovereignty. He offered , support for the Major 
government's negotiations an an apt-out clause in the EMU treaty, but went 
beyond the government position by emphasizing the positive advantages of a 
single currency. Britain would be exposed if it remained outside a single 
currency because of high transaction costs, volatile exchange rates and 
reduced inward investment '(Hansard, vol. lgg, no. 13, col. 310). Howe also backed 
the "combined strength" produced by moves towards joint decision by EC 
member states on foreign policy. 
British policy towards the EC has long been a source of tension within 
the Conservative Party: Heath's government only secured Commons, support for 
British entry with the support of Liberal and some Labour MPs after 
rebellions by anti-Common Market Tory MPs (Norton, 1978). The re-emergence of 
intra-party tensions in the late 1980s did not reach these levels partly 
because of the size of the government majority and a lack of organized 
factionalisn, but were still worrying for the Government Whips and party 
-266- 
managers. In a normally loyal and non-ideological parliamentary party. the 
European issue mobilized a large number of MPs who procedeed to back one 
or other of the rival camps. Much of the potency of the issue can be put 
down to Thatcher's own politicization, of policy on the EC after her Bruges 
speech. The splits which developed within the Cabinet were mirrored in the 
parliamentary party, gathering momentum as positive integration in the EC 
came to dominate the political agenda-A significant impact of the split was 
its role in the resignation of Mrs Thatcher. Thatcher had become 
increasingly strident and isolated in her attitude towards EMU, prompting 
the resignation of Howe and Heseltine's challenge. Though the issue rarely 
surfaced in the leadership campaign proper, it was the European issue which 
more than any other provoked the circumstances which culminated in 
Thatcher's downfall. 
The agreement secured by John Major at Maastricht did not immediately 
produce the large split in the Tory ranks predicted by some commentators, 
though the situation changed after the Danish referendum. The road to the 
summit had been paved with internal dissension and some successes for the 
government in easing the worries of Euro-sceptics and winning their 
parliamentary support. Ultimately only a handful of Euro-sceptics voted 
against the government on its negotiating position and the agreement it 
signed at Xaastricht. Of the most prominent Euro-sceptics, several left the 
Commons in the 1992 elections (eg Thatcher, Ridley and Tebbit) while others 
like John Biffen were long-term opponents rather than recent recruits to 
the cause. 18 The emergence of the Bruges Group and the problems ahead for 
Britain as European integration gathers pace will probably ensure that 
divisions on Europe remain a thorn in the side of the government, despite 
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Major's more pragmatic and consensual approach. The Right of the party still 
has the potential to launch a nationalist campaign against European Union. 
The issue of national self-government is likely to be its trump card in the 
years ahead, but without the presence of Thatcher and others in the 
parliamentary party it will lack a figurehead. Thatcher and Tebbit came 
closest to offering a nationalist strategy from 1987, but lacked a coherent 
platform and suffered from so obviously running against the tide of 
developments. Thatcher did not have the intellectual stature of Powell: her 
accounts of sovereignty were inconsistent and any nationalist platform 
suffered from tensions between her Gaullist approach to the EC and her neo- 
liberal economics. 
In 1971/2 39 Tories voted against the principle of entry to the EEC. On 
the Second Reading of the European Communities Bill, 15 Tories voted 
against the Government while 5 abstained, while on the Third Reading 
the figures were 16 against and 4 abstentions. Only cross-voting by 
Labour and Liberal MPs ensured the Bill's passage. See Philip Norton: 
*Conservative Dissidents. -Dissent witbin the Parliamentary Conservative 
party, 1970-74"t Temple Smith, London, 1978. 
2. The Guardian, 17th July 1990 & 31st October 1990. 
3. See the reports in The Guardian, 19th & 20th June 199I. Thatcher's 
Chicago Speech was reportedly rewritten to remove the more 
controversial points, but still provoked a vicious attack from Heath. 
4. See Edward Heath: "Forty Years of Political Labour Must Not Be Swept 
Brusquely Away", in The Independent, 22nd September 1989 and Enoch 
Powell: "Opportunities and Dangers? ", in Patrick Robertson (ed)- 
loResbaping Europe in the Twenty-First Century", Macmillan, London, 1992. 
5. uSaying the Unsayable about the Germans", in The Spectator, 14th July 
1990. 
6. See also Nicholas Ridley: "The Home Truth of Euro-Moneyu, in The 
Guardiant 28th February 1991. 
7. The independent on Sunday, 10th November 1991. 
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8. See also Norman Tebbit: "Hijack on the Euro-Express", in The Guardian, 
12th November 1991. 
Lawson argued that a single currency would create nationalist 
backlashes in Europe, but stressed his support for the ERX in The 
London Evening Standard, 4th Novenber 1991. 
10. The Guardian, 14th May 1991. 
Other examples of Conservative Euro-scepticism can be found in Michael 
Spicer: "Beware of a Federal Fiasco", in The Guardian, 20th June 1991 
and Richard Shepherd: "What a Tangled Web we Weave", in The Guardian, 
16th June 1992. See also the collection of Bruges Group essays in 
Patrick Robertson (ed): Vesbaping Eurvpe in the Twenty-First Century", 
Macmillan, London, 1992. 
12. Euro-sceptic Tony Favell resigned his position as John Major's 
Parliamentary Private Secretary following Britain's entry into the ERM. 
13.7 Tories voted against the Government and 12 abstained in a vote on 
the Maastricht Summit in December 1991. Those who voted against were: 
John Biffenjohn Browne, Xicholas Budgen, Tony Favell, Richard Shepherd, 
Norman Tebbit & Bill Valker. Abstainers were: Margaret Thatcher, Gerald 
Howarth, Bill Cash, James Cran, Christopher Gilljohn Carlislejoby 
Jessel, Tim Janman & Teresa Gorman. In the post-election Parliament, 22 
Tory Mps voted against the Second Reading of the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill. They were: Rupert Allasonjohn Biffen, Sir Richard 
Body, Nicholas Budgenjohn Butcher, John Carlisle, Michael Cartiss, Bill 
Cash, James Cran, Christopher Gill, Teresa Gorman, Harry Greenway, Andrew 
Hunter. Toby Jessel, Tony Marlow, David Porter, Richard Shepherd, Sir 
Trevor Skeet, Michael Spicer, Sir Teddy Taylor, Ann Winterton & Nicholas 
Vinterton. For the list of 100 Conservative MPs who signed the anti- 
Maastricht motion see The Guardian, 5th June 1991. 
14. The Guardian, 10th October 1990. 
15. The letter is reprinted in The Guardian, 5th November 1990. 
16. See Leon Brittan: "EMU: Not a Problem, a Solution" in The Independent, 
14th March 1991 and report in The Guardian, 28th November 1991. Also 
of interest is Peter Price MEP: "No Nation is an Island in Tomorrow's 
Vorld", in The Independent, 17th January 1990. 
17. Howe's resignation letter is reprinted in The Guardian, 2nd November 
1990. 
18. But 25 Conservative candidates signed a letter warning against economic 
and political union in The Daily Telegrapb, 29th November 1991. 
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Both the Conservative Party and conservative thought in general have 
found difficulty in adapting to the development of a multi-cultural society 
in Britain -Although it is not explicitly racist, the conservative nation 
defines itself in terms of tradition and organicism which preclude the easy 
integration of ethnic minority groups, with their own cultural and political 
identities, into British society. Conservative values of tradition, authority 
and patriotic allegiance to state and nation implicitly work against a 
society of diverse ethnic identities. Minority cultures are seen as Nalien" 
groups outside of the traditional values of British society and the British 
way of life. The emergence of Powellism and New Right cultural conservatism 
ended the inertia into which the conservative nation had fallen, proposing a 
protection of national identity against the perceived threat of large-scale 
immigration-It was though a fundamentally flawed account of nationhood and 
one ill-equipped to address the problems of a plural society. 
The changing context of conservative thinking on the nation was echoed 
in the dilemmas the plural society posed f or the Conservative Party. The 
Conservative leadership rejected Powell's nationalist strategy in which 
immigration control and repatriation would be the key concerns of a 
government seeking to revive national identity. Under Thatcher's leadership, 
the party still faced difficult choices on the direction of its policies on 
race and immigration. On the one hand it was commited to "firm but fair" 
immigration controls and a new British Nationality Act, recognizing the 
electoral attractions of a populist stance in this area.. On the other, having 
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rejected repatriation and assimilation, the party had to manage the plural 
society and ensure harmonious relations between the various communities 
(Layton-Henry, 1978). It is on these dual areas of Thatcherite policy that 
this chapter focuses. 
The Thatcher era was an important one for the politics of race, 
reflecting the breakdown of bi-partisan consensus on the desirability of 
keeping race issues off the political agenda. Under Thatcher's leadership, the 
Conservative Party took a populist line an race issues, using popular fears 
of mass immigration to their political advantage and forcing the Labour 
Party onto the defensive. This populism thus both exploited existing fears 
about levels of immigration- and the integration of ethnic minorities into 
British society and shaped the political agenda through its populist 
rhetoric (Studlar, 1980). In this respect, Thatcherism has built an the sea 
change which Powellism brought to the politics of race. 
Prior to 1968, the dominant approach to race politics was the liberal 
formula for integration, with support from the major parties for curbs on 
immigration -Equally, the major political parties were keen to keep race 
issues off the political agenda, delegating responsibility for race relations 
and integration to local authorities and quangos (Bulpitt, 1986, b). In 1966 
Roy Jenkins talked of mutual tolerance, equality of opportunity and cultural 
diversity as the guiding principles for the plural society, allowing ethnic 
minority communities to retain their cultural identities (Saggar, 1991). 
Powell broke the silence of the elite or centre on race relations by 
proposing repatriation and questioning the possibility and desirability of 
integration. This focus an a politics of nationhood to protect the British 
-271- 
way of life is also found in the writings of cultural conservatives who 
portray ethnic minorities as "a problem" for British society. Thatcherite 
rhetoric has rejected the liberal solution and politicised race issues, 
seeking to gain from a populist rhetoric and a firm stance on immigration. 
Thatcherism, as I have pointed out in earlier chapters, is not a coherent 
political doctrine, but has two distinct outlooks, the strong state emphasis 
on culture and nationhood plus the neo-liberal emphasis on market solutions 
and individualism. The language of the former has been important in 
establishing a populist approach which politicizes race issues and excludes 
some ethnic communities from full membership of the national connunity. The 
neo-liberal approach rejects this emphasis on culture and nationhood, but by 
focusing on individuals rather than groups, and an market solutions, has 
prevented state action aimed at addressing the problems facing the ethnic 
minorities in areas like housing, employment, education and racial 
discrimination (Mitchell &, Russell, 1989). 
The expulsion of Powell from the Shadow Cabinet after his controversial 
and provocative "rivers of blood" speech showed that the mainstream of the 
party had no taste for repatriation or apocalyptic visions of the failure of 
integratian. The Tory Right and Powellite followers continued to play the 
anumbers game" warning that the rapid expansion of the ethnic communities 
in the inner cities would create unsurmountable problems for future 
generations-The racist Right in the guise of the National Front had gained 
strength at local elections in the mid-1970s, and had achieved a significant 
level of infiltration into the Monday Club in 1971/2. However until 1978 the 
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Conservative Party leadership publicly stuck to the liberal, integrationist 
consensus with its objectives of limiting primary immigration and improving 
race relations through equality of opportunity and tolerance of multi- 
culturalism. Heath's government passed the 1971 Immigration Act which 
introduced the category of "patriality" to determine which citizens had the 
right of abode in the UK, but accepted Ugandan Asians expelled by Idi Amin 
in 1972. Despite criticism from the Tory Right and claims that a reduction 
in racial discrimination could not be achieved through legislation, the 
Conservative leadership did not officially oppose the 1976 Race Relations 
Act. 
The Conservative Party leadership regarded strict immigration laws as 
the best means by which to improve domestic race relations and achieve 
social cohesion. Under Thatcher's leadership the concentration on 
immigration, always the dominant theme in the dual approach, became even 
more obvious as leading Tories adopted a populist approach, expecting to 
reap electoral rewards. In 1978 both Vhitelaw and Thatcher emphasized the 
issue of immigration, pushing race issues into the electoral arena of party 
political debate. Whitelaw, the Shadow Home Secretary, out lined Conservative 
proposals for stricter immigration rules and a new Nationality Act in a 
series of speeches in 1977/8. The most widely reported comments on race 
issues were those made by Thatcher in a Granada Television "World In 
Actionu programme on 30th January 1978. In this broadcast Thatcher spoke of 
the legitimate fears the indigenous population had about "swamping" by 
alien cultures of ethnic minorities and immigrants. This echoed Powellism's 
belief that the prejudices of the majority population were legitimate and 
should be taken into account when determining membership of the nation. 
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"People are really rather afraid that this country might be swamped by 
people with a different culture, and you know, the British character has 
done so much for democracy, for law and done so much throughout the 
world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped, people are 
going to react and be rather hostile to them coming in. So, if you want 
good race relations, you have got to allay people's fears about 
immigration. " (quoted in Bevan, 1986, p. 85). 
Thatcher demonstrated her grasp of populist rhetoric, recognizing the 
concerns of ordinary people and backing their concerns about *alien" ways 
of life. It is immigrants who are seen as the root of the problem, rather 
than racism in society. This populist anti- immigration tone was also seen in 
the Conservative-supporting tabloid press in the Thatcher years, where 
blacks were often portrayed as criminals or unwelcome outsiders in British 
society. In her Granada TV interview, Thatcher readily admitted that the 
Conservative Party was aiming to win back votes lost to the National Front 
by adopting a tough stance on immigration. Immigration issues remained 
electorally significant in the run-up to the general election as opinion 
polls indicated popular support for the Conservative proposals (Layton- 
Henry, 1978). After winning the 1979 general election, the Thatcher government 
set out to tighten immigration laws, introduce a new Nationality Bill, and 
manage the status quo in race relations rather than introduce state-led 
initiatives. 
one of the key rights a state has is determining who is entitled to its 
citizenship. Citizenship itself is a legal concept concerned with the 
distribution of rights and duties, but is also linked to nationality because 
citizenship is a prerequisite of membership of the political community (the 
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nation-state). ' The meaning of these terms is often confused in political 
discourse, but Powellites on the Tory Right have stressed that the legal 
rights entailed by citizenship do not equate with membership of the nation. 
Xembership of the latter is based on subJective feelings of loyalty and 
allegiance, plus shared cultural values. The distinction between citizenship 
and nationality mirrors that between political and cultural accounts of the 
nation, the former focusing an political rights in a territorial, sovereign 
state, while the latter looks at ethnic and cultural links between 
compatriots. In British law the concepts of citizenship and nationality have 
been further confused by anomalies in immigration and nationality laws. The 
first Thatcher administration sought to rectify this through the British 
Nationality Act (1981). 
By the late 2970s widespread agreement existed on the need f or a 
significant refor-x of Britain's citizenship and nationality law. The 1948 
British Fationality Act created a Citizenship of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies, and reccff; nized the citizenships of independent Commonwealth 
countries holders r)f which would nevertheless continue to be regarded as 
British subjects. rne Act, drawn up in a liberal era when politicians still 
felt bound by imperial commitments to Empire and Commonwealth, crucially 
failed to include -restrictions on immigration. This raised the prospect of 
large scale immigration because under the 1948 Act all Commonwealth 
citizens were recc; Snized as British subjects with right of abode in the UK 
(Bevan, 1986; Dumnott & Ilicol, 1990). The 1948 Act also failed to adequately 
define or distingaiish between "subjects* and "citizens". Also there were no 
statutory rights : and duties associated with citizenship. Allegiance, while 
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still an important concept in relation to citizenship through lius soli" or 
naticnality based on birth in the territories ruled by the British monarch, 
was complicated by the potential for dual status and continued British 
responsibility for residents of the colonies. 
The restrictions on immigration under the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act, the 1968 Act of the same name, and the 1971 Immigration Act divorced 
citizenship of the UK and Colonies from the right of abode in the UK by 
denying legal access to many UK citizens without close connection to the UK 
through birth or residence. The 1971 Act introduced a short-term solution 
to the perceived dangers of large-scale immigration by creating a category 
of "Patrials" for those UK and Colonies citizens who had right of abode in 
Britain. OPatriality" thus referred to the status of those free from 
immigration control, and hence able to exercise their right of abode in the 
UK. Non-patrials still had the title of UK and Colonies citizen, but under 
the 1971 Act were denied a fundamental citizenship right, that of right of 
access to and abode in the territory of which they were legally a citizen. 
The "patriality" category was intended only as a stopgap: the Home Office 
and the major political parties recognized the need for a new Nationality 
Act which would reunite British citizenship with rights of access to and 
abode in the UK, and ensure that only those with close connections to the UK 
through family ties would have right of abode. This would thus link the 
legal concept of citizenship with the subjective idea of nationality, or 
membership of the national community. 
in opposition, the Conservative Party advocated a fundamental overhaul 
of nationality law to overcome the distinction that the 1971 Immigration 
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Act had instigated between the legal status of citizenship and nationality 
as a belonging to the nation as a cultural community. A pamphlet on 
citizenship and nationality from the Society of Conservative Lawyers, which 
included future Home Secretary Leon Brittan, recommended a new citizenship 
based on the "homeland principle" in which only those with close family 
connections to the UK would have a right of abode here (Committee of the 
Society of Conservative Lawyers, 1976). These proposals were supported by 
other Conservative pamphleteers like Richard Plender and Edward Gardner 
who wanted citizenship and nationality law to provide a formal basis of 
national identity for the British who had thus far been denied the benefits 
of a clear legal identity (Plender, 1978; Gardner, 1980). Separate citizenships 
for each of the dependent territories were also recommended, but were 
rejected in the framing of the 1981 Act. 
0 
The 1981 British Nationality Act (BNA) drew on recommendations made in 
the 1980 Vhite Paper and the Labour Government's Green Paper, a point 
emphasized by Conservative Home Secretary William Vhitelaw in the face of 
Labour opposition to the Bill in the Commons. The Thatcher government wanted 
to end the system under which anyone barn within the UK was automatically 
a British citizen, able to transfer this citizenship to his offspring, 
believing that it was open to abuse. They argued that people with no 
interest in settling in this country could have their children born here 
solely in order for them to enjoy the rights of British citizenship. It was 
argued that it was undesirable for children born in the UK to temporary 
residents (eg students) to have the right to re-enter the country in their 
adult lives without having any close association with Britain. 
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The 1981 British Nationality Act created three 'main categories of 
citizenship from the old category of UK and Colonies citizenship: British 
Citizen, British Dependent Territories Citizen and British Overseas Citizen. 
This was the first time in which British citizenship was legally defined. On 
the commencement of the Act in 1983, all those legally resident and settled 
in the UK would become British citizens. The BIWA modified the centuries old 
Pius solill basis of citizenship under which citizenship had been determined 
by place of birth, drawing on the feudal notion of allegiance to the 
sovereign on whose territory one was born (Dummett & Nicol, 1990; Macdonald. 
& Blake, 1 982). Under the 1981 Act, British citizenship was to be transferred 
primarily through descent (the continental "ius sanguinis" principle) and 
was related to "close association" with the UK. The need for close 
association through parents or grandparents born in the UK meant that very 
few residents of the New Commonwealth would have the right of abode in 
Britain. Under the terms of the BYA, a child born in the UK can only become a 
British citizen if either of his/her parents is a British citizen or is 
settled here. Citizenship by descent is not transmissible as of right 
beyond the first generation for children born abroad, again restricting 
citizenship to those with a "close connection" to the UK. British 
citizenship can also be acquired through registration or naturalization, 
though this rests on a decision of the Home Secretary, with the claimant 
having no right of appeal. An amendment to the Bill did allow for any child 
born in the UK who did not acquire British citizenship at birth to acquire 
citizenship after ten years continuous residence, regardless of the status of 
his/her parents. This was a move back towards the "ius soli" principle of 
citizenship through birth in the UK. 
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The limitations on the transmission of British citizenship went beyond 
those envisaged in the Labour Green Paper. The right of a foreign woman 
married to a British citizen to register as British was removed: they must 
now apply for natural ization. But the government argued that sex equality 
had been introduced in the BNA by allowing for the transmission of British 
citizenship through the nother. British citizenship overall was to be related 
to settlement and close connection with the UK. The automatic right to 
citizenship through birth in the UK was removed and citizenship could be 
transmitted automatically only to those having close family connections 
with Britain. Those seeking British citizenship through naturalization or 
registration first had to be resident in the UK for three years if they 
were the spouse of a UK citizen, with the Home Secretary having increased 
discretionary powers in determining the success of applications. The 
preliminary requirements for naturalization were residence, good character, a 
good knowldege of the English or Welsh languages and an intention to settle 
here permanent ly. Aga, in the intention was to limit British citizenship to 
those with close links with Britain. 
Only the category of British Citizen entailed the right of abode in the 
United Kingdom. This category effectively codified that of "patrial" 
introduced in the 1971 Immigration Act, ensuring that British Citizenship 
meant freedom from immigration control. The status of British Overseas 
Citizen followed immigration rules as it brought with it no right of access 
or abode. But this British Overseas Citizenship was almost entirely 
meaningless as it gave no substantial rights to its holders, except for the 
status of British nationals for the purpose of international law, and would 
fade out over time as it cannot be transmitted to descendants. It did not 
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entail citizenship of any actually existing state or right of access and 
abode in the UK: the category meant nothing in terms of national or legal 
identity. The BOC category did though phase out the status of "British 
subJect". 
Xany Conservative XPs were concerned about having a single category of 
British Dependent Territories Citizen rather than separate citizenships; for 
individual colonies. Conservative backbenchers took up the causes of various 
dependent territories, arguing that the proposed category weakened British 
links with the colonies and adversely affected the citizenship rights of 
colonial residents. The category raised a similar problem to the former "UK 
and Colonies" citizenship by failing to relate citizenship to any concrete 
territorial entity, thus not providing for a proper nationality, al leg iance or 
identity. The Government initially opposed making special citizenship or 
immigration provisions for Hong Kong, Gibraltar or the Falklands, but were 
forced to moderate the initial proposals. Gibraltarians had to be given 
special access to British citizenship so as to fall in line with Gibraltar's 
membership of the EC (as part of the UK's European possessions). The 
Falkland Islanders were given special status after the conflict with 
Argentina under the 1983 British Nationality (Amendment) Act. In 1990 
special provisions were. made to allow selected residents of Hong Kong to 
enter the UK before the Chinese administrative takeover in 1997 (p. 286). 
The aim of the BNA according to Vhitelaw was to provide a "more 
meaningful citizenship for those who have close links with the United 
Kingdom" (Hansard, val 997, col 935). This meant re-uniting citizenship and the 
right of abode in the UK. The right of abode was the only direct right of 
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British citizenship outlined in the Act. Calls for a comprehensive statement 
of rights from MPs of all parties were rejected as too complicated and 
covered by other areas of national legislation. This followed the general 
rejection by Conservatives of a codification of citizens' rights, for example 
in a Bill of Rights, as alien to the British constitution. The Act also failed 
to define "British nationals" and significant anomalies remained. 
Critics of the BNA in the Opposition parties, the Commission for Racial 
Equality and the Runnymede Trust saw the Act as a key element of the 
Conservative's drive to strengthen immigration controls. The government was 
accused of racial discrimination for basing citizenship an "close 
connection". particularly when special treatment was afforded to the 
residents of Gibraltar and later, the Falkland Islands. The 'Act raised concern 
among the country's ethnic minority communities, who feared their status and 
rights were weakened by the alterations to "ius solill and the need to 
register or naturalize, the fees for which rose subtantially. Critics of the 
BIA argued that the Act weakened the citizenship rights of immigrants, and 
contravened the spirit if not the letter of the European Convention of 
Human Rights eg the right to family life (A. C. Evans, 1983). The BIA did not 
enjoy an easy passage through Parlianent. It was strongly opposed by the 
Labour leadership, despite their acceptance of the need for reform, and the 
similarities between the BYA and the Labour Green Paper. A large number of 
amendments to the Bill were forced by Conservative backbenchers, committee 
stages and by the House of Lords, but its essence was not radically altered. 
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The BNA had, f or the f irst time, provided a legal status of British 
citizenship and removed the traditional principle of "Jus solill from its 
primary 'place in British nationality laws, linking British citizenship with 
Oclose association" and freedom from immigration controls. But it did not 
provide a clear statement on the membership of the national community. David 
Dixon greatly exaggerates the scope and clarity of the BNA by arguing that 
the Act provided the "formalized expression of a reconstructed national 
identity" based on imperial sentiments of racial superiority (Dixon, 1983, 
p. 175). In revising nationality laws, the first Thatcher government did not 
produce a conceptual clarification of citizenship or redefine national 
identity as Powellism urged. In terms of nationhood and national identity 
the Act added little flesh to the bones of the legal status of British 
Gitizenship-The Act did not outline the rights and obligations of British 
citizens, except for right of abode, even in the light of Britain's membership 
of the European Community. 
Many in the Conservative Party and beyond had hoped that the new 
nationality law would lay the foundations for a clearer definition of 
national identity, but the 1981 Act did not do this (see Chapter Four for a 
discussion of Powell's views). Both right-wing Conservatives and the 
Runnymede Trust criticized the BNA for failing to outline the rights and 
duties associated with citizenship, or its relationship to allegiance 
(Runnymede Trust, 1980). The BNA defined those people who were legal citizens 
of the British state, it did not address national identity in the way in 
which many on the Right envisaged it. A nationality or citizenship law such 
as the BIA cannot define a nation. The language of ethnic ity, cu lture, shared 
history and traditions are alien to it. The Act can say who is or is not 
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British in legal terms, and many argue that it does so in ways which 
discriminate against non-Europeans -Under the Act, birth in British territory 
does not automatically bring with it British citizenship. The legal status of 
British citizenship is no longer primarily based on birth within the 
territory of sovereign and the assumption of allegiance which goes with it. 
Membership of the national community (in the subjective sense of 
Englishness or Britishness) is not the same as legal citizenship which 
affords membership of the state as a political community. Under the 1981 
Act, the legally resident ethnic minority population were citizens of the 
British state, but Powellites and cultural conservatives do not equate this 
with membership of the national community. Thus Powell, Casey and others 
refuse to recognize the existence of "black Englishmen". Even for more 
moderate Conservatives, members of the ethnic minorities are not regarded as 
integrated into British society unless they exhibit the outward signs of 
British identity ie speaking the language of the majority and adapting the 
British way of life and traditions. In the language of the conservative 
nation, with its emphasis on political culture, shared traditions and the 
subjective nature of nationhood, the British Nationality Act only defines 
membership of the state Ue citizenship), which is by no means the same as 
membership of the nation or nationhood. This separation of membership of 
state and nation underlies the conservative approach to immigration and the 
integration of the Immigrant communities into British society. 
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The codification of British citizenship in the BIA was based an the 
restrictions on right of abode made under the 1971 Immigration Act. The BNA 
itself necessitated a further tightening of immigration controls by a 
government publicly committed to reducing immigration as a means of 
improving race relations. The 1979 Conservative Manifesto proclaimed a "firm 
but fair" dual approach of strict immigration controls and equal 
opportunities for the ethnic minorities. 
*Firm immigration control for the future is essential if we are to 
achieve good community relations. It will end persistent fears about 
levels of immigration and will remove from those settled, and in many 
cases born here, the label of 'immigrant'. " (Conservative Party Election 
Xanifesto, 1979, p. 20). 
The manifesto made eight specific proposals to reduce immigration. 
These proposals included an end to the practice of allowing permanent 
settlement for those who came here for a temporary stay and a reduction in 
the secondary immigration of parents, grandparents and children over 18. 
However several of the manifesto proposals ran into difficulties early on 
in the lifetime of the first term (Laytc3n-Henry, 1986, pp. 77-80). Two of the 
key proposals, a quota system placing a finite level on the number of 
immigrants to be allowed entry, and a register of dependents proved to be 
impractical and were dropped in the face of Home Office opposition. The 
promised end to the 1974 concession to husbands and male fianc6s was also 
modified. The 1980 changes to the immigration rules restricted the entry of 
husbands of women with close connections with Britain, and aimed to prevent 
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such entry if its sole purpose was deemed to be settlement. Elderly 
dependents were only allowed to enter if they would be wholly supported by 
their children or grandchildren. These early changes set the tone of 
Conservative - immigration policy by seeking to prevent the entry of 
immigrants unless they were closely connected to Britain and restricting 
the entry of those who would have to be supported by the state, including 
refugees (Gordon, 1989). 
The 1982 changes in immigration rules were introduced in the light of 
the new category of British Citizenship introduced in the previous year's 
nationality law. All British citizens 'were to be allowed to have their 
husbands and fiances join them if they met the conditions of registration, 
but those women who were not citizens did not enjoy this right. This was 
criticized by many on the Tory Right, including Stanbrook and Budgen, as a 
reversal of the specific manifesto commitment and as inconsistent with the 
stated goal of a "halt to immigration'l. The government's decision to allow 
10,000 Vietnamese refugees living in Hong Kong to come to Britain revealed 
a pragmatism not in keeping with Thatcher's populist determination to 
reduce immigration to a minimum. 
In Thatcher's second term, immigration. issues were not as high on the 
political agenda. The BNA and the changes to immigration rules it brought 
about meant that immigration would be kept to minimum levels, ending the 
possibility of a substantial influx of New Commonwealth immigrants. But the 
government was determined that any loopholes in immigration laws be closed, 
although the numbers of cases involved would be small. The tabloid press and 
the Tory Right vigorously campaigned against illegal immigration and abuses 
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of the social security system. In 1985 and 1986, in the context of this anti- 
immigration climate, the government acted to counter increases in asylum 
applications by imposing visa requirements on visitors from Sri Lanka, 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ghana and ligeria. The 1987 Immigration (Carriers 
Liability) Act made it an offence for airlines to bring people into the UK 
without proper documentation. Responsibility for the administration of 
immigration controls was thereby extended to airlines. 
The tightening of immigration laws to prevent illegal entry and 
fraudulent asylum applications was promised in the party's 1987 election 
manifesto. The 1988 Immigration Act again sought to reduce immigration and 
tighten loopholes though the number of cases involved was small. It ended 
the automatic right for men settled in Britain to bring their dependents 
into the country. The Act appeased the Tory Right and popular press by 
making right of entry for dependents conditional on them being provided 
with adequate accomodation and financial support by their families, rather 
than seeking welfare from the state. Overstaying became a criminal offence, 
rights of appeal were restricted and the entry of second wives from 
polygamous marriages was outlawed as inappropriate to British society. 
The future of, Hong Kong in the light of its return to China in 1997 
necessitated the 1990 British Rationality (Hong Kong) Act. The Act was 
designed to encourage Hong Kong residents to remain in Hong Kong by 
offering key members of that society the safeguard of right of abode in the 
UK. The Governor of Hong Kong would choose 50,000 leading residents of the 
colony, who, with their spouses and families, would be assured of a British 
passport with right of abode in the UK. A points sytem. and a number of 
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categories would be used to determine who should become eligible. The scheme 
was criticized by Labour as elitist, while Norman Tebbit was a key figure in 
a revolt by the Conservative Right who opposed the prospect of a large 
influx of immigrants. 
John Xajor's f irst period in government maintained the Thatcherite 
trend 'of tightening immigration rules. In the 1991/2 Parliamentary session, 
Home Secretary Kenneth Baker introduced an Asylum Bill to identify bogus 
applications for asylum and speed up the process as a whole. The Government 
was reacting to a rise in the number of asylum applications from 5,000 a 
year in 1988 to 30,000 in 199O. Baker argued that only a small minority of 
those coming to the UK had a well-founded fear of persecution as envisaged 
under the United Nations Convention on Refugees which forbade countries 
from sending back genuine refugees. The majority were economic migrants 
hoping for a better standard of living in the UK, looking to by-pass the 
strict immigration rules for people from -Africa and South Asia. The asylum 
process would be tightened at air and sea ports, document tests would be 
stricter and cases would be speeded up. But the Bill was the subject of 
widespread opposition inside and outside Parliament, with critics arguing 
that genuine refugees would be sent back because they would find it 
impossible to produce the necessary documentation. The Bar Council felt that 
the Bill could be rejected by the European Court of Human Rights, while the 
United Nations warned that it could contravene its Convention on Refugees. 
The Bill was amended by the House of Lords and dropped by the 
Government in February 1992 as a difficult passage appeared inevitable in 
the run-up to the general elect ion. However, both the Conservative Manifesto 
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and the 1992 Queen's Speech included a commitment to reintroduce an Asylum 
Bill. In the election campaign, Baker stressed Labour's opposition to the Bill 
claiming that they would allow a flood of refugees to enter, and arguing that 
controls were needed to prevent a continental-style fascist backlash 
against immigrants. 
The rise in applications f or asylum was a cause of concern in most 
Vest European states. EC members argued that the 1951 UN Convention on 
Refugees was becoming unworkable as it had not envisaged the present scale 
of refugees. The - internal market programme produced EC pressure for co- 
ordinated policies on immigration and asylum, seekers in the light of the 
free movement of peoples planned for 1992. The UK has co-operated with the 
Schengen Group, founded in 1985 by Germany, France and the Benelux countries, 
on exchanging information on refugees. However the government has not joined 
the Schengen Group, fearing that a common immigration policy would mean 
replacing its own effective border controls with internal controls such as 
the continental practice of identity cards. The UK has though been involved 
in the Trevi Group which co-operates on terrorism and crime in Europe. In 
1987 EC member states agreed to common practices on carriers duties and 
documentation in asylum cases. Since then the trend in the Community has 
appeared to be towards an integrated policy on immigration, though the 
Xaastricht summit did not produce a common policy as some states had 
hoped. 
Overall then, the Thatcher administrations introduced a series of curbs 
on immigration and a stricter enforcement of immigration laws, resulting in 
a drop in the number of people accepted for settlement in the - UK. These 
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measures were the policy results of the Thatcherite belief that 'If irm but 
fair immigration controls are essential for harmonious and improving 
community relations" (The Next Moves Forward, 1987 Conservative Manifesto, 
p. 59). Good race relations meant allaying the fears of the majority about 
the rate of immigration and the growth and concentration of ethnic minority 
communities. The party had held out the prospect of a halt to immigration In 
1979, and though immigration continues, the numbers have been reduced and the 
application procedure changed so as to discourage immigration. The "firm but 
fair" immigration policies have been shaped by a desire to limit New 
Commonwealth immigration: immigrants are presented as a problem for social 
order, race relations and the British way of life. Though ethnic minority 
families resident in the UK have had their rights curtailed by restrictions 
on their chances of having family members join them in the UK, the 
government presents immigration controls as-in the best interests of the 
ethnic minority communities themselves. Immigrants must become accustomed 
to the British way of life and accept the legitimate fears of the majority 
about their presence here. 
"It would not be in the interests of the ethnic minorities themselves 
if there was a prospect of further mass inward movement. That prospect 
would Increase social tens ions, part icularly in our cities. That is why we 
say firm immigration control is essential if we are to have good 
community relations. " (Home Secretary Douglas Hurd in Hansard, vol 122, 
col 779). 
The Tory Right were not satisfied by the extent of the government's 
changes to immigration law, with the Monday Club urging repatriation. 
Although the, Conservative Party rejected calls for repatriation and 
denounced racism within its ranks, by bringing race issues to the fore and 
presenting immigrants as a problem, it helped foster a climate in which 
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racial prejudice was not so readily stigmatized. Though the Salisbury Group 
adherents had little direct impact on policy-making in the party, it became 
more legitimate for Conservative MPs to challenge the multi-cultural society 
in the name of "common sense" or national ident ity. Powel lite rhetoric was 
heard on the Tory backbenches, and although the Powellite rump had little 
practical input into policy-making, it was indirectly influential in 
fostering the new attitude in race politics. 
The commitment to a "f irm but fair" immigration policy was coupled 
with a desire f or better race relations, to be achieved through equal 
oportunities - for members of the ethnic minorities and through further 
integration into British society. However, though immigration control and 
improved race relations are linked in Conservative discourse, in the realm of 
government policy the emphasis has been predominantly on immigration. There 
has been no co-ordinated or state-directed approach to racial disadvantage 
or discrimination by the Conservatives. Immigration issues may have been 
politically centre-stage in the f irst term, but racial disadvantage did not 
achieve the same level of priority. 
Instead, Conservative policies on race relations appear to have been 
reactive, f ormed in relation to specif ic events, notably the 1981 inner city 
riots. Policy has often been concerned with conflict management or damage 
limitation rather than with long-term solutions. Many initiatives have been 
left to others eg local government on anti-racism, and the Commission for 
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Racial Equality's role in providing data and co-ordination on race issues. 
Central government has failed to produce a co-ordinated approach under both 
Labour and Conservative administrations. Since 1979, the Conservatives have 
pursued free-market policies believing that they will encourage the growth 
of a black middle-class stratum of professionals and businessmen who be 
seen as an example of the potential for successful integration in British 
society. This free market strategy has though exacerbated the disadvantages 
of minority communities. Integration and the multi-cultural society are 
important areas which the language of the conservative nation must adapt 
to, but even in the case of problems raised by multi-cultural education and 
by the Rushdie affair, conservatism has offered little positive guidance, 
choosing mangement of the plural society not state-led initiative. 
The Thatcher governments frequently expressed their commitment to 
improving community relations, stressing the formal equality of ethnic 
minority members and promising equal opportunities to them. The party 
opposes discrimination on racial grounds, but equally opposes any measures 
of positive discrimination to overcome racial disadvantage. Thus the 1987 
manifesto stated: 
"We want to see members of the ethnic minorities assuming positions of 
leadership alongside their fellow citizens and accepting their f ull 
share of responsibility. Racial injustice is an injustice and can have no 
place in a tolerant and civilized society-Progress towards better 
community relations must be an a basis of equality. Reverse 
discrimination is itself an injustice and if it were to be introduced it 
would undermine the achievement and example of those who had risen on 
their merits. " (The Next Moves Forward, Conservative Manifesto 1987, 
p. 59). 
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Improvements to the position of minority communities then have to be 
achieved through the free-market system where the emphasis is on self- 
discipline and self- improvement. State action to improve the lot of the 
disadvantaged is not regarded as a preferrable course of action, being 
costly and inefficient, undermining achievement and producing a culture of 
dependency. However instead of improving the position of most blacks, a 
reliance on the market locks them into their sphere of disadvantage. For 
those lacking the resources to compete in the market, promises of 
achievement mean little. Equal opportunities cannot be achieved in a market 
economy where those with the least cannot compete effectively. Thatcherite 
policies have exacerbated the plight of those inner city blacks suffering 
unemploynent, poor housing, eroded welfare rights, educational disadvantage and 
racial discrimination. 
Thatcherism's neo-liberal emphasis on self-reliance and improvement 
through the market is not able to provide the lift needed for the minority 
communities to break out of the cycle of inner city deprivation and 
disadvantage. For some communities though the idea is more attractive. The 
founder of the Anglo-Asian Conservative Society, Narinda Saroop, noted that 
the values of family, discipline and self-reliance accorded with the values 
of *naturally conservative" Asian businessmen and professionals. 2 However, 
this has not been significantly reflected in the voting patterns of Asians, 
or in their representation and involvement in the party. Instead they have 
become alienated by other Conservative policies an race and immigration. 
Thatcherism's neo-liberal strand also approximates to the Jewish values 
of freedom, enterprise and individualism, which Thatcher herself recognized in 
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speeches to the St. Lawrence Jewry in 1978 and 1981 (Thatcher, 1989). Thatcher 
forged close links with the Jewish business community and Jewish voters in 
her Finchley constituency. She was sympathetic to the opinions of British 
Jews on the Palestinian question and on the issue of the ritual slaughter 
of animals (shechita). The Chief Rabbi for much of her premiership, Lord 
Jacobovitz, was also an enthusiastic Thatcherite. 
Racial discrimination is publicly criticized by the Conservative 
leadership, but many in the party question the desirability and effectiveness 
of race relations leg is lation. Forty- three Tory MPs defied the party's order 
to abstain and voted against the 1976 Race Relations Act. In, 1981, a party 
publication noted that: 
"The Conservative Party is committed to the ideal of racial harmony. It 
believes that there must be equal treatment for all citizens under the 
law. It recognizes, however, that although a body like the Commission for 
Racial Equality, backed by race relations legislation, can check the most 
flagrant cases of discrimination, ultimately racial harmony depends on 
the people of Britain as a whole, in all communities, being prepared to 
live and work together and to respect each other's way of life. " 
(Politics Today, no 11,1981, p. 200). 
The Thatcherite commitment to restricting the role of the state has 
worked against a strengthening of state action to counter direct or 
indirect racial discrimination. The 1976 Race Relations Act remains on the 
statute book though doubts remain about the government's commitment to it. 
The neo-liberal focus on the individual also hinders special treatment for 
minority communities, and tends to reject arguments that ethnic minority 
status is a key factor in racial disadvantage. The prescribed solution is for 
blacks to improve themselves as individuals within the market and become 
more closely integrated into British society, so breaking down strong ethnic 
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community bonds. The onus is on individual blacks themselves and not on the 
majority of the population whose prejudices are perceived as legitimate by 
the New Right. The language of the Thatcherite nation rejects the concept of 
institutionalized racism, claiming that British society is not racist, though 
some individuals may be. Blacks are primarily seen as individuals having to 
achieve self-improvement and adaptation for themselves, not as members of 
communities with special disadvantages. The, 1981 riots and the Home Affairs 
Select Committee report on racial disadvantage though led to a greater 
willingness to view problems in terms of racial discrimination and 
disadvantage -Ethnic monitoring was introduced into the civil service and 
local authorities were encouraged to direct money to deal specifically with 
racial disadvantage by reforming Section 11 of the 1966 Local Government 
Act. 
Since the mid-1970s, the popular Tory press, the police and sections of 
Conservative opinion had linked rising crime, and especially I'muggings" in 
inner city areas, with black youth. Relations between police and young blacks 
in the inner cities had worsened during the years of recess ion. Racial 
prejudice among the police, poor relations between police and the community, 
and the lack of police officers from the ethnic minorities contributed to 
mutual distrust. Kany blacks felt they were singled out for police 
harassment under the "sus" laws, which the Home Affairs Select Committee 
criticised, and which was later abolished. In 1981 civil disturbances raged in 
Bristol, Brixton, Toxteth and Moss Side. Despite some media reports and the 
comments of Powell in the Commons. the disturbances were not racially 
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inotivated, but were largely directed against the police. Instead of pursuing 
a firm law and order line on the riots, the Government took a liberal- 
pragmatic view, accepting that the multiple disadvantages suffered by ethnic 
minorities in the inner cities were underlying factors in the build-up of 
tension. The 1981 riots thus gave added impetus to programmes to overcome 
racial discimination and disadvantage and made the government willing, in 
the short term at least, to recognize the race politics dimension of inner 
city problems. 
The Government broadly accepted the recommendations of both the 1981 
Home Affairs Select Committee report on racial disadvantage and the 
Scarman Report on the riots. Whitelaw accepted the findings of the Scarman 
Report in the Commons, but again rejected calls for positive discrimination. 
"Vhat is commended is positive action to recognize and to deal with 
more effectively than at present the special needs of ethnic minorities 
where they exist in education, employment and housing-We are not talking 
of giving black people a favourable advantage over white people. What we 
are saying is that everyone in our society should have equal 
opportunities, and that those who start from a disadvantaged position 
may need special help to provide them with similar opportunities to 
those enjoyed by the majority of the population. " (Vhitelaw, in Hansard, 
vol 14, col 1006). 
Some on the Right of the party were openly critical of the Scarman 
Report and of the government's more positive approach to race relations. 
They had hoped for a hard-line government stance on law and order issues, 
condemning all criminal acts, backing the police and criticizing black youths 
for not respecting authority or British values. Ivor Stanbrook feared that 
the Scarman report would place the majority at a disadvantage by "going 
easy on the blacks", arguing that the solution to the social tensions 
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produced by ethnic communities was a stronger immigration policy and 
blacks "living up to the standards involved in being a British citizen" 
(Stanbrook in Hansard, vol 14, col 1045). 
second wave of inner city riots occured in 1985 and on this 
occassion the government abandoned its 1 iberal- pragmatic approach, reverting 
to a traditional law and order strategy. These riots in Handsworth, Brixton, 
Toxteth and Tottenham had resulted in the deaths of two Asians and that of 
PC Blakelock on the Broadwater Farm estate whose horrific murder prompted 
media outrage-The government responded to this general mood by identifying 
criminality rather than disadvantage as the prime cause of the riots. The 
police were given extra funds for riot training and equipment. Instead of 
positive legislation addressing disadvantage, the government relied an the 
1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act and other public order legislation. A 
rise in racial violence did prompt the government to press the police for a 
positive response, but the Blakelock Trial confirmed black fears about the 
unfairness of the police and criminal justice systems. 
The more positive approach to race relations after the inner city riots 
of 1981 did not though bring a co-ordinated central strategy on overcoming 
racial disadvantage and indirect racial discrimination. Policy lacked 
sufficient central co-ordination as responsibility was split between the 
Rome Office and the Department of the Environment, where Sir George Young 
was g iven special responsibility for race relations. The government's focus 
was on improving the inner city environment, leaving to local authorities 
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the tasks of improving race relations and directing money and resources to 
the special needs of ethnic minorities. This local agenda of race relations 
policy produced a growth in the "race relations industry" in local 
authorities, which. in turn produced criticism from the New Right and the 
media, especially on "anti-racism" and multi-cultural education .3 
Education became a focus for struggles about the direction of 
integration during the later years of the Thatcher governments when local 
education authority anti-racist strategies were criticized by Conservatives. 
Various controversial incidents forced education into the political 
limelight. In 1983, Ray Honeyford the headmaster of the mainly Asian Drummond 
Xiddle School in Bradford was critical of multi-ethnic education, believing 
that it lowered standards and placed minority white pupils at a 
disadvantage. In 1985 he was dismissed, the High Court overturning a 
successful appeal he had made against the local education authority. West 
Yorkshire saw more controversy In 1987 when the parents of white children 
sought to "Opt out" of local authority control to avoid their children 
joining predominantly Asian schools. Kenneth Baker, the Education Secretary, 
in this case supported Kirklees Council against the parents. His predecessor 
Sir Keith Joseph had though been publicly critical of the anti-racist and 
multi-ethnic education policies adopted by ILEA and other local education 
authorities. In 1990 problems of race and education surfaced again in West 
Yorkshire as white parents in Dewsbury withdrew their children from 
schools which held multi-religious assemblies, forming the Parental Alliance 
for Choice in Education (PACE). In October 1991 the High Court ruled that 
Cleveland County Council was correct in allowing a white mother to withdraw 
her five year old daughter from the 60% Asian Abingdon Road Infant School 
-297- 
and send her instead to a predominantly white school. Mr Justice MacPherson 
argued that discreditable natives of parents had to be ignored when 
upholding the right of the parent to choose their child's school. 
The 1985 Swann Report on education had recommended a strategy of 
"education for all", with teachers preparing all pupils for life in a multi- 
racial and multi-cultural society. The report wanted children to grow up 
regarding Britain as a pluralist society, its emphasis being on all pupils 
rather than Just advocating special resources to be directed towards ethnic 
minority pupils was a significant change of strategy and one not met with 
great enthusiasm by the Conservative party. The 1988 Education Reform Act 
did little to encourage multi-cultural teaching. The national curriculum has 
relegated multi-ethnic teaching to a low level in school timetables and 
educational priorites (Troyna, 1990). The government's preferred direction for 
the history national curriculum, focusing on aspects of British history, also 
runs counter to a development of cultural diversity and a multi-ethnic 
sense of national identity. The Act also instructed most schools to provide 
daily "collective worship.. wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian 
character", provoking the disputes mentioned above which arose in Dewsbury 
and Vakefield-The greater power for school governors to decide the 
direction of their schools may also limit multi-cultural education in 
predominantly white areas. In June 1992 the High Court ruled that the Bishop 
Challenor Roman Catholic School in East London could give priority to 
Christian over local Hindu or Muslim children in its admissions policy so 
as to preserve its religious character. The ERA's provision for schools to 
opt-out of local control, grant- maintained schools and then seek a change 
in their character five years later raises the possibility of a rise in the 
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number of single race/religion schools. But Baker indicated that he favoured 
mixed race schools and the government has been reluctant to allow Muslim 
voluntary aided schools. Meanwhile, the educational achievements of pupils of 
Vest Indian origins remain lower than those of the white majority, though 
the achievements of pupils of Indian background are higher. In general, anti- 
racist policies have often had negative implications, adopting the New 
Right's emphasis on the centrality of cultural and racial distinctions 
between "black" and "white". 
The Conservative's desire to keep problems involved in integration and 
the management of a plural society off the centre's political agenda by 
delegating responsibility for race relations to local authorities was 
undermined by the controversy surrounding anti-racist local education 
policies. However it was the Rushdie affair which brought the problems 
inherent in the management of a plural society to the fore. The Rushdie 
affair centered on the publication of Salman Rushdie's novel "The Satanic 
Verses" which offended many Nuslims with its blasphemous references to 
Islam and the prophet Mohammed. The book provoked outrage in British Musilm 
communities, and the author's death was demanded in Iranian leader Ayatollah 
Khomeni's "fatwa" of February 1989-The Rushdie affair raised many political 
questions about the nature of liberalism (in relation to free speech, 
toleration and blasphemy laws) plus problems of community and identity in 
a plural society (Parekh, 1990, a). 
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The Rushdie affair revealed the limitations to the integration of ethnic 
communities with their own strong communal identities into British society 
and the British way of life. The dominant concept of integration in Britain, 
as outlined by then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1966 was based around 
equal opportunity, cultural diversity and mutual tolerance. The alternative 
view urges the assimilation of ethnic communities into the way of life of 
the indigenous population, with the ethnic minorites; adopting the cultural 
values and behaviour of their adopted country rather than maintaining their 
own conflicting lifestyles. The Jenkins approach to integration has shaped 
many areas of public policy (eg in the Swann Report, race relations 
legislation andoin a few cases, special legal arrangements catering for the 
religious beliefs of ethnic minorities). Since 1979 the Thatcher governments 
have followed an integrationist approach, but by managing the present 
arrangements rather than through a ccy-ordinated state sponsored policy for 
the development of a plural society. They have opposed differential treatment 
or the use of state legislation in community relations. 
As a plural society, Britain contains ethnic communities which have 
their own strong communal identites, drawn from cultural traditions, shared 
experiences and religious beliefs. The Muslim community's strong sense of 
religious identity was at the heart of the Rushdie affair, as many British 
Muslims were attracted to Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative to 
Vestern secularism. The values of militant Islam were at odds with British 
traditions of the rule of law, and the division widened with the "fatwa" and 
Muslim demands for the blasphemy laws to take account of their faith. 
During the Rushdie affair the government tried to placate Muslims by 
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expressing understanding of their feelings, but stressing the values of 
British society. Essentially the government wanted to uphold the status quo 
and avoid having to react to the demands of a pluralist society. The view 
was most strikingly illustrated in July 1989 in two open letters by John 
Patten, the Home Office Minister with responsibility for race relations. The 
first was addressed to leading Muslims, focusing on the government's 
response to "The Satanic Verses" and the role of Muslims in British society. 
The second letter entitled "On Being British" was sent to the Home Office 
Advisory Council on Race Relations and looked at the need for Muslim 
integration into British society. 
In the f irst letter, Patten stated that the main aim of the government 
was a society of diversity without separation, with ethnic minorities playing 
a full participating role. Moves towards such a society required the ethnic 
minorities to adJust to the British way of life, its language and traditions. 
"As with language, so with knowledge of institutions, histary and 
traditions. Of course, British Muslims should be brought up faithful in 
the religion of Islam and well-versed in the Holy Koran.. But if they are 
also to make the most of their lives and opportunities as British 
citizens, then they must also have a clear understanding of British 
democratic processes, of its laws, the system of government and the 
history that lies behind them, and indeed of their own rights and 
responsibilities. " (Patten in Commission for Racial Equality (a), 1989, 
P. 85). 
The shared link between communities in a plural Britain would be the 
sense of Britishness instilled by knowledge of British history and 
traditions. Patten stressed that this would not mean ethnic communities 
having to forfeit their faith or roots, but these would have to exist within 
a framework of British traditions, and respecting British law and the 
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obligations of living in Britain are of paramount importance. Thus 
government ministers claimed to understand the anger raised by "The Satanic 
Verses" but urged Xuslims to accept the priority of British traditions of 
free speech and the rule of law. 
wAt the heart of our thinking is a Britain where Christians, Muslims, 
Jews, Hindus, Sikhs and others can all work and live together, each 
retaining proudly their own faith and identity, but each sharing in 
common the bond of being by birth or choice, British. " (Patten, op. cit., 
p. 87). 
In the second letter, Patten argued that "one cannot be British on one's 
own exclusive terms or on a selective basis, nor is there room for dual 
loyalties where those loyalties openly contradict one another". In the case 
of the Rushdie affair, some British Muslims had publicly burned "The Satanic 
Verses", called for civil disobedience as a means of extending the blasphemy 
laws to cover Islam, and supported the Ayatollah's death sentence on Rushdie. 
Such activities clashed with the duty to respect the rule of law (including 
freedom of speech) which went with British citizenship. Thatcher, Baker and 
Howe all called Rushdie's book "offensive" but warned Muslims not to break 
the law and were, of course, scathing of Iran's involvement in the affair. 
Patten wished to see "integration and active involvement in the mainstream". 
This meant that Muslims would have to respect British law and ensure that 
their children were fluent in the English language plus had a good 
understanding of British history and culture. Though arguing that such 
integration would not mean assimilation as it was compatible with 
toleration and diversity, the conflict of loyalties provoked by the Rushdie 
affair could only be satisfactorily settled if Muslims' overriding loyalty 
to the British state and law. Home Office Minister Timothy Renton suggested 
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that this could extend to the equal treatment of women, as expected by 
British culture-4 
The Rushdie affair saw the Conservative's trying to manage the status 
quo, rather than adapting to the pluralist society in a new way. Despite the 
strains imposed on community relations and Muslim confidence in British 
government and society, the government continued to see community relations 
as outside the scope of state action. In terms of the conservative nation, the 
Rushdie affair again revealed that ethnic minorities had a place in the 
"nation" but has to substantially adapt to British ways to be full members. 
The nation in conservative thought is not primarily defined in ethnic 
terms, but in terms of subjective senses of identity and belonging. If ethnic 
minorities are to be British they must immerse themselves in British 
history, trad it ions, institutions, and the English language. Though cultural 
diversity is accepted as an inevitable part of modern society, this sense of 
Britishness must be paramount. Britishness brings with it duties of 
allegiance and willingness to adapt to the cultural expectations of the 
majority. Integration must encourage ethnic minorities to become full 
members of British society, so one of the few acts of central intervention 
in the process has insisted on a common teaching of history to encourage a 
sense of Britishness through an appreciation of British traditions and 
institutions. 
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The leadership of the Conservative Party has insisted that racism is 
unwelcome in the party, with both Thatcher and Major rounding on racists 
during times of controversy in the party. Powell's expulsion from the Shadow 
Cabinet showed that the right-wing would not be able to steer Conservative 
policies on race. However, a Powellite rump remains in the party and at 
Vestminster. Though the party took a more hard-line position on immigration 
since Thatcher became leader, few of the MPs associated with extreme views 
on race issues have held government posts. In debates on immigration, 
nationality and race relations the Tory Right has often been critical of 
government policy, from accusing it of reneging on manifesto commitments in 
the early 1980s to the revolt on the Hong Kong nationality proposals in 
1990. 
A 1981 Monday Club pamphlet on race politics by the MP Harvey Proctor 
and Club member John Pinniger called on the Conservative Party to adopt a 
programme of repatriation and abolish the Commission for Racial Equality. 
Proctor argued that the party had failed to put into effect its 1970 
election commitment that there would be "no further large scale 
immigration" and proceeded to play Powell's "numbers game" about the future 
growth of ethnic minorities. Proctor also echoed Powell's apocalyptic 
predictions of a breakdown of British society and values, claiming that an 
end to immigration alone was not enough, and that repatriation was "common 
sense"An his article, Pinniger argued that racial discrimination could not be 
deterred by state action or through the CRE, and that anti-racist policies 
were discriminating against whites. 
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The Monday Club has long been involved in controversy because of its 
views an immigration and repatriation. It is not a part of the Conservative 
Party organization, but its members have to be Conservative supporters. In the 
early 1970s, the Monday Club was dominated by the extreme Right, including 
people sympathetic to the National Front, while in 1984 a spate of 
resignations and accusations followed further claims of racism in the 
group. A Young Conservative Report of 1984 claimed that "extremist and 
racialist forces are at work in the Conservative Party" with the Monday 
Club "an important channel for racist sentiments". r, The report's authors 
also accused MPs on the Right of the party of using race "in an emotive 
manner, whipping up bigotry and prejudice" and berated Mrs Thatcher for not 
doing enough to combat racism in the party (she had been absent from the 
platform during a 1983 conference debate on race relations). 
The Right of the party contains a number of MPs with Powellite views 
an race and immigration issues. The strategies recommended include the 
assimilation of existing ethnic groups into British culture, meaning the 
abandonment of diverse identities depicted as threatening the British way 
of life. Powellite MPs refuse to accept that immigrants can ever become true 
Englishmen. The Tory Right consistently presses for hard-line immigration 
policies, demanding a complete end to immigration, and, in some cases calling 
for a government funded programme of voluntary repatriation. In policy 
terms, this Powellite rump has had little influence in the party with few of 
its members reaching positions in government. 
In Parliamentary debates, the Right of the party has attacked government 
immigration policies for not being tough enough, and has been critical of 
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the leadership for not implementing all its manifesto commitments an race 
issues. Multi-culturalism has also been attacked as against the wishes of 
the British people. In the debate on the BNA in 1981, MPs from the Right of 
the party wanted tough immigration controls, with Ivor Stanbrook claiming 
that nationality laws were inevitably exclusivist, but every nation-state had 
the right to determine its citizenship. Others such as Nick Budgen were 
critical of the provision of dual nationality arguing that allegiance as a 
facet of citizenship was being undermined. The most flagrantly racialist 
comments about race in debates on nationality, immigrat ion and race 
relations have though come from John Stokes. In the nationality debates he 
referred to Disraeli's claim that "race is everything" and attacked the Bill 
for not mentioning racial origin. He also attacked multi-culturalism as 
destructive of English values and society. 
"Where immigration has occured, the immigrant penetration is against the 
wishes of the indigenqus population. The ordinary Englishman still 
clings obstinately to his Englishness and to the old known ways. He 
knows only too well that if immigration continues at the present 
rate-the British people will in time be supplanted by aliens and 
British people will gradually disappear from these islands. " Mansard, 
vol 997, col 988). 
In immigration debates, the Tory Right has organized abstensions and 
rebellions against government measures it regards as contrary to party 
commitments to halt immigration. In a 1982 debate, Stanbrook claimed that 
immigration laws were necessarily discriminatory, but that this was not 
racial discrimination. Rather, "the application of any particular law may 
fall unevenly upon people of different origins" (Hansard, vol 31, col, 708). In a 
1987 immigration debate, Tim Jannan argued for a well funded state 
repatriation policy "to reduce the degree of swamp ing"Y inal ly, in the 1990 
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debates an Hong Kong and British nationality, Norman Tebbit organized a 
rebellion against measures which would permit the entry into the UK of up 
to a quarter of a million residents of Hong Kong. Tebbit had been 
increasingly critical of multi-culturalism, arguing that many immigrants 
refused to adapt to the British way of life of respect British law. He argued 
that many immigrants failed his "cricket test" by cheering for their former 
homeland rather than their adopted country when at Test matches. On the 
Hong Kong issue, Tebbit outlined what was rapidly becoming a nationalist 
stance on Europe and race politics, noting public support for Conservative 
pledges to reduce immigration. 
"These pledges were made because these islands of ours are already 
overcrowded and they were made in the belief that great waves of 
immigration by people who do not share our culture, language or rules of 
social conduct, and who in many cases owe no allegiance to our country, 
were and are destabilizing factors in our society.. If we are not to see 
social upheaval arising from religious, cultural and ethnic differences, 
we have more than enough to do to integrate existing communities into 
British society. " (Hansard, vol 170, cols 1598-9). 
uOne nation" Conservatives like Heseltine, Walker and Pym have rejected 
the Right's opposition to multi-culturalism, calling instead for tolerance, 
diversity and equal oportunity. Heseltine claims to be the first Conservative 
to publicly criticize Powell's 1968 "rivers of blood" speech, and at the 1981 
Conference debate on race and the inner cities, reminded the party of its 
uone nation" credentials (Heseltine, 1987). A 1982 Tory Reform Group pamphlet, 
with an introduction by Peter Walker, also uses the "one nation" theme and 
makes a number of specific policy recommendations on multi-cultural 
education, community policing and improved employment prospects. The "Young, 
British and Black" pamphlet argued that the deprivation and discrimination 
experienced by ethnic minorities was unacceptable to Conservatives, 
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NFor a Conservative this is an intolerable state of af fairs since a 
prime tenent of Conservatism is the belief in One Nation, which is a 
rejection of all unnecessary divisions in society such as those between 
rich and poor, north and south, and black and white. A Conservative 
believes in equality of opportunity for all and thus must support all 
positive action to enable specially disadvantaged groups in society to 
have the chance to compete relatively equally with their neighbour. " 
(Tory Reform Group, 1 982, p. 2). 
Like-minded Conservative MPs have also called for improved community 
relations-John Vilkinson, then chairman of the Anglo-Asian Conservative 
Society, welcomed the 1981 BNA as a boost to community relations, enhancing a 
sense of belonging and community. In a 1987 immigration debate, Robert Hughes 
expressed his disgust at manifesto pledges an immigration, arguing that all 
people in the country should be regarded as British. The debate on the 
Scarman report brought favourable comments from Edward Gardner and Harry 
Greenway who saw the Scarman proposals as encouraging community relations, 
Participation by members of the ethnic minorities in the Conservative 
Party is still though at a low level. Since the late 1970s Conservative 
Central Office has recognized the electoral importance of ethnic minority 
voters, particularly in marginal inner city seats (Layton-Henry, 1978). By 
1992, there were 51 constituencies (16 of which were marginal) in which 
ethnic minorities made up at least 15% of the population, 17 held by the 
Conservatives (Amin & Richardson, 1992). In 1976 the Anglo-Asian and Anglo- 
Vest Indian Conservative Societies were founded, made up of businessmen and 
profess ionals. The National Union also insisted on party involvement in the 
joint Committee Against Racial ism, despite Thatcher's objections about 
working' in the sane group as the far Left. The 1983 party election poster 
"Labour Says He's Black, Ve Say He's British" illustrated the Central Office 
strategy. Its desire to gain electoral support among the ethnic minorites 
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was though undermined by party policy on immigration and its lack of 
positive initiatives on overcoming racial disadvantage-In a 1991 Runnymede 
Trust/ Independent on Sunday survey, only 9% of Afro-Caribbeans and 14% of 
South Asians said they intended to vote Conservative (Amin & Richardson, 
1992, pp. 22-30). Despite Central Office attempts to woo South Asians (and 
Indians in particular) with their commitment to family values, the work 
ethic and private enterprise, 60% of South Asians said they were Labour 
supporters. 
In 1987 the party abolished the Anglo-Asian and Anglo-West Indian 
societies, fearing Labour-style sectional isn. The former had seen tensions 
rise as militant Sikhs demanded an independent Khalistan, while the latter 
had never been very significant. In their place a "One Nation Forum" was set 
up headed first by Peter Morrison and then John Cope. The tensions raised by 
the selection of ethnic West Indian John Taylor, a barrister from Solihull, as 
the party's parliamentary candidate for Cheltenham in December 1990 showed 
that grassroots racism still exists in the party despite the leadership's 
attempts to eliminate or disguise it. Taylor's selection was challenged by 
local Conservatives in Cheltenham who objected to his imposition by Central 
Office, but much of the criticism was barely disguised racism. At the 1992 
general election the party fielded eight ethnic minority candidates, but only 
three in winnable seats. Ultimately only one of these candidates, the Sri 
Lankan-born Kirj Deva in Brentford and Isleworth, was success fu l. Cheltenham. 
was lost to the Liberal Democrats whose campaign stressed their candidate's 
Olocal" credentials, but Major's public support for Taylor and his contempt 
for racial discrimination are encouraging signs of the new leadership's 
desire that ethnic minorities gain a higher profile in the party. 6 
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Thatcherism produced significant developments in Conservative discourse on 
race and immigration issues, yet lacked the strategic or ideological coherence 
attributed to it by some analysts. The language of cultural conservatism has 
f ound its way into Thatcherite rhetoric, but there has not been the level of 
theorizing on race, culture and nation associated with Powellism or that wing of 
the New Right. The influence of Powell on the politics of race is evident in 
Thatcherism. The populist focus on immigrant communities as posing problems for 
British society moved to the centre of Conservative discourse on race 
relations under Thatcher's leadership, but his desire for an integrated politics 
of nationhood to restore British national identity was not coherently promoted 
or realized by Thatcherism. Also, Powell's questioning of the liberal consensus 
affected the entire spectrum of race politics in Britain, not just the attitude 
of the Conservative Party. Dual- party agreement on the desirability of, strict 
immigration controls, a Nationality Bill and improved race relations emerged in 
the 1970s. Where Thatcherism departed from Heath's approach to race issues was 
in its populism, addressing and using for electoral advantage popular fears 
about immigration and multi-culturalism. Party discourse still -paid lip-service 
to the, "dual approach" of immigration controls and improved race relations, but 
overwhelmingly stressed the Conservative's hardline credentials on immigration 
and did little more than manage the plural society. 
The "New Right, lew RacismN thesis is a useful one in tracing the growth of 
thearising about race, culture and nation in conservative and New Right thought, 
but its analysis of Thatcherism is less convincing (Gordon & King, 1986; Seidel, 
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1986). The prime fault of these accounts lie in their exaggeration of the 
coherence of Thatcherite ideology and strategy. Clearly, Thatcherism did push 
immigration - issues to the top of the political agenda and benefit from this 
electorally, but this did not constitute a fundamental shift towards a 
redefinition of national identity along ethnically exclusivist lines. The 
cultural conservatives of "The Salisbury Group" and the Powellite rump on the 
Tory backbenches have had only a minimal impact on government policy. Many of 
the 1979 manifesto commitments on immigration had to be dropped, and the 
Thatcher governments acted pragmatically in a number of areas eg Vietnamese 
boat people, British citizenship for people of Gibraltar and the Falklands, and 
arrangements for Hong Kong after 1997. The Thatcher record on immigration is a 
hardline and often punitive one, open to criticism for its excesses in 
sacrificing human rights for the sake of a small reduction in numbers. 
However, Thatcherism has not put into practice a Powellite nationalist strategy. 
Tighter immigration regulations have not been accompanied by repatriation 
measures and the national community is not exclusivist: ethnic minority members 
are not necessarily excluded from society. 
Doctrinal ly, there are significant tensions between the individualist and 
strong state elements of Thatcherism. The rhetoric of the latter is populist in 
tone, portraying immigrant communities as alien and unwelcome, while 
sympathizing with the fears and prejudices of the white majority. Its focus is 
on the nation as a culturally united community. The focus of the former though 
is on the individual and market. rejecting group-based accounts of political 
life. It claims to be "colour-blind", seeing ethnic differences as politically 
irrelevant in a free market society-The fact that these two competing outlooks 
are fused in Thatcherism militates against claims that it is a coherent 
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nationalist doctrine. The doctrinal evidence would appear to show that 
Thatcherism is populist rather than nationalist. But the hardline immigration 
controls urged by its strong state wing, taken with the rejection of state 
action to reduce racial discrimination and disadvantage by its individualist, 
free market wing mean that Thatcherism has been unwilling and unable to 
address the problems of a plural society. The doctrinal tensions in this 
Thatcherite mixture of cultural and political accounts of the nation are an 
extension of the doctrinal problems the mainstream conservative nation has 
experienced in adapting to Britain as a plural society. The values of tradition, 
organicism, authority and allegiance associated with "one nation" conservatism 
also rest uneasily with a diversity of strong communal identities. The 
pronouncements of "one nation" conservatives reveal their dislike for the 
divisions within the community which Thatcherite policies exacerbated. 
The national community envisaged by Thatcherism is one in which 
immigration is restricted and groups slow to adapt to British society are 
distrusted and regarded as undesirable. It is not though a strictly ethnically 
exclusive nation. Thatcherism's attitude towards ethnic minority groups is not 
uniform: those groups who integrate themselves into British society are praised 
and courted by the Conservative Party. Thatcher herself has emphasized the 
proximity between Thatcherite and Jewish values, while the party as a whole has 
sought to appeal to Asian values of individualism, family and enterprise. The 
values and lifestyles of other minority groups are frowned upon. Vest Indians 
have been portrayed as unsuitable for integration into British society because 
of their perceived tendency towards criminality and lack of respect for 
authority. This pattern fits with Krieger's account of Thatcherism as a "de- 
integrative strategy", dividing society into favoured groups (eg entrepreneurs) 
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who prosper, and "out-groups" or the "enemy within" (eS black youths, trade 
unionists) who are treated as outsiders unless they fall in line with 
Thatcherite values (Krieger, 1986). 
Goulbourne argues that Thatcherism has developed an ethnic account of the 
British nation, but the doctrinal and empirical evidence I have presented 
questions this (Goulbourne, 199D. Because of the United Kingdom's ethnic make- 
up, "British" identity cannot be adequately defined in strictly ethnic terms. 
Thatcherism does not attempt to define nationhood along purely ethnic lines 
either. Instead it tends towards a mixed ethnic- ideological account of the 
nation in which immigrant communities are accepted into the national community 
provided that they accept the primacy of British values and adapt themselves 
accordingly to the "British way of lifell. The costs of integration are raised: 
diversity of cultures is acceptable but the British way of life must be the 
dominant one-Where tensions occur, Thatcherism is more uncompromising than the 
liberal view: ethnic minorities have to undergo a cultural exchange, abandoning 
or adapting the elements of their lifestyle which clash with the values of 
British society. Thatcherism's terms for integration are tough. Inm igrat ion is 
severely restricted and integration becomes cultural transfer when tensions 
arise. Its ideological attachment to British culture and values (which for 
Thatcherism includes the market ethos) inevitably favours the majority group 
and discriminates against ethnic groups with different lifestyles, hence its 
mixed ethnic- ideological account of membership of the nation. Members of ethnic 
minorities may be British citizens under the BIA, but membership of the legal- 
political community is different from membership of the national-cultural 
community-Here Thatcherite rhetoric implies that only those individuals or 
groups willing or able to adapt to the British way of life are accepted as full 
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members of the community. According to its rhetoric and strong state doctrine, 
the Thatcherite vision of the nation is de-integrative in that groups whose 
cultural values and traditions cannot be easily incorporated into the British 
way of life are marginal ized. This situation is aggravated by Thatcherism's 
failure to take positive measures to aid disadvantaged minorities. 
The problems posed for Conservatives by a plural society containing ethnic 
communities with their own strongly held identities was most clearly 
illustrated during the Rushdie Affair. The distinction between integration and 
assimilation becomes blurred in cases like these where the benefits of ethnic 
minorities adopting the values and culture of the majority cannot easily be 
reconciled with the desirability of ethnic minorities retaining their 
traditional culturesJohn Patten made clear that in cases of conflict, a 
recognition of the authority of the state is paramount, and ethnic minorities 
must be willing to immerse themselves in the traditions of their adopted 
country. Membership of the national community here becomes ideological, based an 
adapting to the culture and values of the dominant ethnic group. The ethnic 
minority community must effectively subdue its own values, accept the 
legitimacy of the demands of the majority, show allegiance to the state, and 
recognize the primacy of the culture of the national community. In education, the 
Swann Report urged the government to encourage the development of multi- 
culturalism, but the Education Reform Act seeks to insure the primacy of the 
British way of life through a national curriculum, the teaching of British 
history and shared worship. 
Thatcherism's record on race relations was poor. The strategy of the 
Thatcher governments was one of managing the plural society rather than 
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employing positive measures to counteract racial disadvantage. The individualist 
ethos of Thatcherism may not have been racially discriminatory, but neither was 
it colour blind-By ignoring the long-term disadvantages suffered by ethnic 
minority groups in the inner cities, market- oriented policies meant that real 
problems would not be adequately addressed. By encouraging individual 
enterprise, the Thatcher governments encouraged the emergence of a black 
bourgeoisie of entrepreneurs and profess ionals, but continued the alienation of 
others by refusing to see their problems in terms of group disadvantage. 
Bulpitt argues that it has been in the interests of succesive British 
governments to keep race issues off the political agenda of "high politics" and 
instead delegate responsibility for them to lower levels eg local authorities 
and the Commission for Racial Equality (Bulpitt, 1986, b). To some extent this has 
been the Thatcherite attitude towards race relations: management of the status 
quo rather than state-led Initiative. However, the thesis is weakened by 
Thatcherism's populist exploitation of the immigration issue, moving race 
politics to centre stage for electoral advantage. The popular Tory press also 
helped create an atmosphere in which race issues moved to the top of the 
political agenda and racial discrimination was not challenged head on. 
Thatcherism's hostility to the "anti-racist" initiatives of some local 
authorities also saw the centre playing a more active role in race politics 
when it felt delegating authority was counterproductive eg in education. Other 
issues like the Rushdie affair moved to centre stage independently of the 
government and showed that the preferred strategy was still one of management 
rather than initiative. 
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Overall then the Thatcher period produced a move away from the liberal 
consensus towards a populist, hardline stance an immigration. However, doctrinal 
tensions and practical problems meant that a Powellite nationalist strategy 
was always impractical. Thatcherism neither followed the Powellite course of 
reconstructing nationhood at the expense of the ethnic minorities, nor followed 
a liberal strategy of encouraging multi-culturalism. Instead it blurred the 
dividing line between integration and assimilation by formulating an ethnic- 
ideological account of what being British should involve. On race relations, both 
Thatcherite and traditional conservative accounts of the national community 
have failed to address the problems of integration versus assimilation or 
diversity versus commonality posed by the plural society. Compared to 
Thatcher's failure to comprehend disadvantage, Major's gut contempt for racial 
discrimination offers only a limited cause for optimism. The Asylum Bill and 
opposition to a common EC immigration policy suggest that the dual approach 
of hardline immigration controls and management of the status quo in race 
relations will not be fundamentally overhauled. 
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Although the concept of the nation remains an important theme in 
conservative thought, it is my contention that in recent years the 
conservative nation has been weakened. Burkean and "one nation" accounts of 
nationhood have graduallly been eroded, undermined by the emergence of the 
rival neo-liberal and cultural conservative wings of the New Right. Equally, 
the Conservative Party's grip on the language of nationhood, though revived 
by Thatcherism, has come under pressure: it can no longer be portrayed as a 
natural or inevitable relationship. Its use of nationalistic rhetoric has 
persuaded some analysts that Thatcherism has a coherent nationalist 
doctrine which feeds into government policies on EC or race issues. But this 
account is unsatisfactory, neglecting the tensions within Thatcherite 
doctrine and the limitations placed upon a national strategy by the demands 
of statecraft. The Thatcher era saw neither the "one nation" nor the 
Powellite "nationalist" strategies being persued. Instead Thatcherism moved 
towards a fusion of neo-liberal individualism (the political nation) and 
authoritarian conservatism (the cultural nation). This led to inconsistency 
and deviations from the traditional conservative nation eg in the trend 
towards an ethnic- ideological account of nationhood. Nor did Thatcherism 
construct a coherent national strategy in its approach to policy areas like 
race relations, the EG or the Union-' 
The conservative nation's highpoint was the Disraelian era when the 
Conservative Party successfully appropriated the language of nationhood to 
construct a political strategy in which themes of national identity and 
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unity fed into key policy areas. But even the Disraelian national strategy 
had flaws: the universalizing tendencies of myths of race and empire, the lack 
of concrete social reforms. Baldwin's nostalgic and parochial national 
rhetoric marked a relative depoliticization of the concept of the nation, for 
by this time nationalism had come to be identified with the oppositional 
politics of the Far Right. Powellism offers a more recent example of the 
oppositional rather than governmental character of nationalist politics in 
Britain. The Powellite nationalist strategy proved incompatible with the 
demands of statecraft and pragmatic issue management faced by government. 
This also illustrate the gap between conservative thought and the policies 
of the Conservative Party: there is no explicit or necessary relationship 
between the two. Pragmatism and scepticism prevent the Conservative Party 
from becoming an ideological party, but the division betwen liberal- 
conservatives and authoritarian conservatives is evident in both the party 
and wider conservative thought. Although many Conservative Party XPs and 
members are happy to avoid serious contemplation about the nature of 
conservatisn, their views are shaped by a cluster of identifiably 
conservative values (eg scepticism, respect for tradition and private 
property) and by opposition to rationalist politics. 
Demands of statecraft and issue management work aginst the creation of 
a coherent nationalist strategy-Though it did not systematically attempt to 
construct a new politics of nationhood, Thatcherism did try to reverse some 
of the trends of the 1960s and 1970s which had contributed to the 
weakening of the nation-state and national identity eg devolution, 
inmigration, problems with the EC budget. Thatcherism sought to restore the 
nation-state as the central unit of political life, undermining competing 
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power centres (eg local government and trade unions), pressing for British 
interests and protecting state sovereignty in Europe, and returning to 
Unionist politics in Scotland. Northern Ireland was the key area of deviation 
given the AngloýIrish Agreement, though there was little scope for local 
input into policy-naking in the Province. The conservative nation has always 
been faced with the difficult task of promoting an Anglo-British state- 
based identity, while component nations of the UK to enjoy a reasonable level 
of cultural and political autonomy. Thatcherism though exacerbated existing 
territorial tensions by clinging to a strident form of constitutional 
Unionism, in Scotland, further alienating an area in which Conservative 
support was in real decline. The devolution question is likely to reamin on 
the political agenda in the 1990s given the rising interest in the concept 
of a "Europe of the regions" as an alternative to a centralized European 
Union. The Conservatives fought the 1992 general election an a strongly 
Unionist platform, but moves towards a new decentralized relationship may be 
necessary in the medium-term. 
The decline in the efficacy of the nation-state has continued despite 
Thatcherism's attempts to restore its pre-en inence -Thatcher tended to view 
developments in the EC in terms of British sovereignty, but this concept is 
an imprecise and unhelpful one, while the maximalist definition accorded to 
it by Thatcher failed to take into account the reduced scope for 
independent British action. This should not be taken to mean that European 
union is inevitable or wholly desirable. John Kajor's willingness to work 
within the EC and adapt the Community language (eg nations of subsidiarity 
and democratic deficit) to meet British visions and interests is a more 
constructive means of ensuring that British interests are considered than 
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was Thatcher's obstruction ism. Major Is approach is a more positive type of 
scepticism than that of the "Euro-sceptics'l, drawing on traditional 
conservative scepticism towards grand projects and its preference for 
gradual, controlled change. Thus Major signed the Maastricht Treaty but 
secured an opt-out on the final stage of EMU based as much on scepticism 
about its workability and desirability as on any ideologicallly- inspired 
opposition. By contrast the postions; taken by many "Euro-sceptics" are based 
an outright hostility towards the EC and a clinging to mythical notions of 
economic and political sovereignty. -- The Danish referendum result has cast 
a sizeable shadow over the 1992 British Presidency which should have seen 
the government acting positively to secure Britain's place at "the heart of 
Europe" by pressing for the completion of the single market, an inter- 
governmental path for future development, and the long-term enlargement of 
the Community-The Major government needs to develop its more constructive 
approach to Europe and its vision of an inter- governmental EC by outlining 
a commitment to a subsidiarity based on decision-making at both nation- 
state and regional level. 
Thatcherism departed from the "one nation" model of the Conservative's 
national strategy which valued both territorial and social integration. 
Relations between state and local government were strained, with the 
economic and electoral divide betwen North and South widening in the 
1980s. The de-integrative trend in Thatcherism undermined the "one nation" 
emphasis on national unity and social cohesion. Vhereas the Conservative 
Party has historically used nationalist and "one nation" appeals to 
neutralize or disguise class conflict, Thatcherism allowed social relations 
to degenerate to a point where up to one-third of the population are 
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alienated from the values of the rest of society. Britain's development as a 
plural society following the influx of New Commonwealth immigrants in the 
1950s and 1960s has never beeen adequately addressed by the Conservative 
Party. Its reaction has been a mixture of hard-line immigration policies 
and a pragmatic management of race relations designed to keep race issues 
off the political agenda. In the Thatcher years the emphasis was very much 
on the tightening of immigration and citizenship laws, with little effort or 
initiative to improve race relations. The conservative nation, with its focus 
on the traditions and institutions of the Anglo-British Establishment, may 
not be the best vehicle for addressing the problems of a plural society 
with a diversity of ethnic lifestyles, but Thatcherism again aggravated 
existing problems by moving towards an ethnic- ideological account of 
nationhood in which ethnic minorities who diverge from the nBritish way of 
life" are alienated and chastised. 
The conservative nation has been doctrinally threatened by a revival of 
socialist thinking an nationhood, and, of more concern, by the rise of neo- 
liberal individualist and cultural conservative concepts of the nation. 
Recent socialist scholarship has helped undermine the myth that the 
language of nationhood is inevitably linked to conservative discourse, while 
New Right thought has undone the delicate balance betwen political (civic) 
and cultural (ethnic) accounts of the nation found in the Burkean model of 
the conservative nation. Though not formulating its own coherent concept of 
the nation, Thatcherism has tipped the balance away from the traditional 
fusion of civic and ethnic elements by embracing the more extreme accounts 
found in New Right thought. This creates an unstable concept of the nation 
in which the individualist and cultural conservative elements continually 
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clash (eg on race and EC issues), adding to the problems of statecraft 
mentioned above. Doctrinal tensions and policy inconsistencies act as 
reminders that Thatcherism was not a coherent ideology, though its departure 
from previous Conservative national strategies is significant. 3 
The task of post-Thatcherite conservatives is to redefine and build 
upon a conservative concept of the nation in which the positive themes of 
community and identity are accentuated. The doctrinal strength of the 
conservative nation rests upon its espousal of tradition and recognition of 
man's place as a member of various communities from family and locality to 
the historical national community. Conservatives f rom. Hume and Burke to 
Hayek and Oakeshott have valued traditional practices as a repository of 
wisdon, guiding present procedures (Parry, 1982). Shared traditions are an 
important source of identity and community in the historical national 
community. Conservative and nationalist thought shares this belief in the 
importance of tradition, community and identity. Anthony Smith argues that 
the continued strength of national identities can be explained by man's 
need to identify with a collectivity which extends over time, linking man 
with his co-nationals and with the past and future of his community (Smith, 
1991, pp. 161-163). The national community is though an "imagined comunity": no 
one can personally know all of his fellow citizens, but becomes aware of 
their shared citizenship and experiences through socialization and the use 
of symbols of national identity (Anderson, 19 83). 
it is my belief that the concept of community should be a central plank 
of a redefined conservative nation. In a plural society, the focus should not 
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be purely an the nation, but on the plethora of communal relations and 
identities (Burke's "little platoons") desirable in a society which accepts 
diversity yet has a common idea of itself Community and identity are 
inextricably linked: it is through his membership of various communities 
that man becomes aware of himself as a social being, sensing his role and 
belonging within the social whole. Conservatives will readily accept David 
Clark's contention that the worth of community lies in the sentiments of 
solidarity ýsocial cohesion, national unity, common purpose) and significance 
(each person being part of an ordered society, with rights and 
responsibilites) (Clark, 1973). As a community, the nation is an important 
source of identity, loyalty and shared purpose, but it should not be defined 
in exclusively ethnic or political terns. The nation is the arena in which 
political rights and obligations are framed, as well as the historical 
community which binds people through shared traditions and loyalties. 
Conservatives have been slow to respond to the recent revival of 
communitarian thinking, even though many non-conservative communitarian 
thinkers have espoused identifiably conservative themes. 4 Communitarian 
thought rejects the Rawlsian idea of the "unencumbered self" which believes 
that man can be abstracted from his social relations to an "Archimedean 
point" outside of society from where the character of the Just society can 
be decided. Thus Valzer argues that membership of a community is the 
primary political good, for the community is the arena in which cultural 
values and identities are moulded (Valzer, 1983). Though Walzer opposes the 
regulation of communal membership along ethnic or cultural lines, he accepts 
the continued relevance of national identity and the need for a society to 
control the distribution of its membership rights. Kymlicka is also critical 
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of liberalism for ignoring man's embeddedness in communal practices and 
shared culture. 
"People are bound in an important way to their own cultural community.. 
Cultural membership affects our very sense of personal identity and 
capacity., Cultural membership seems crucial to personal agency and 
development: when the individual is stripped of her cultural heritage, her 
development becomes stunted" (Kymlicka, 1989, pp. 175-176). 
The communitarian revival began on the Left, but themes of virtue, social 
identity, culture and tradition offer important pointers to a new direction 
for the conservative nation (Cochran, 1989, p. 435; Nisbet, 1962). The Thatcher 
era saw a repudiation of "one nation" or "middle way" conservatism, but as a 
post-Thatcherite agenda emerges, ideas of community are again coming to the 
fore, often linked with the new-found conservative interest in the concept of 
citizenship. Thus conservative thinkers are returning to a Burkean mix of 
political and cultural accounts of community and nation, avoiding both the 
de-integrative individualism of the neo-liberal New Right and the demands 
for a reassertion of cultural unity expressed by its authoritarian wing. In a 
recent work David Willetts, the former head of the Policy Studies Unit and 
now a Conservative MP, states that the task of the modern conservative is 
the linking of ideas of community and market in a new politics, without 
succumbing to narrow nationalism (Villetts, 1992, p. 74). He argues that 
conservatives should not see the nation as the only viable community, but as 
one among many. 13 This is a I'm icro-conservat ism" which: 
"emphasizes the particular network of communities which gives each 
individual life its meaning - from the family and the firm to the 
neighbourhood, and to friends or relatives or colleagues who may cone 
from another country. The nation-state has a role, but a much more modest 
one in sustaining a political order in which this multiplicity of 
communities can thrive. The nation-state can command our loyalty as the 
protector of those communities, but we certainly cannot look at is as 
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one organic whole embodying detailed moral purposes which we all 
share. " (Willetts, 1992, p. 105). 
Villetts associates the conservative commitment to community with co- 
operative relations between individuals and with decentralization. He argues 
for a reconciliation of individualism (focusing on freedom, prosperity, 
ownership and the free market) and community (the family, community work 
and civic culture). This emphasis on community and market is evident in 
other examples of post-Thatcherite conservative thinking. John Vincent 
places Thatcherism "at a tangent" to mainstream conservatism which rejects 
materialism and selfish individualism and looks to community, identity and 
I stability 
(Vincent, 199 D. Kenneth Baker argued that 1990s conservatism had 
to revive the family and local communities in a society of "responsible 
individuals" (Baker, 1990). The One Nation group of Conservative MPs continues 
to press for an agenda in which national unity and a socially-responsible 
market are guiding values (One Nation Group, 1992). The Thatcherite torch 
though is still being carried by the 'No Turning Back' Group and by 
ministers such as Michael Portillo. 6 
Of greater significance is Conservative interest in citizenship, another 
crucial element of community which seeks to link man to the state and to 
his compatriots. John Major's "Citizens Charter" nust, though, be classed as a 
disappointment for those who welcomed Douglas Hurd's advocacy of "active 
citizenship" or Chris Patten's espousal of the social market. The Citizen's 
Charter is as yet little more than an elaborate, though not particularly 
successful, mechanism for the redress of grievances against bureaucracy. Its 
key themes are quality, choice, standards and value, but its focus is almost 
exclusively on the "improvement" of public services, through Thatcherite 
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methods of privatization and performance-related pay. Hurd's concept of 
"active citizenship" focuses on civic obligation, the diffusion of power, and 
voluntary service as means of nurturing effective forms of community (Hurd, 
1988 & 199D. The rhetoric of "active citizenship" and "entitlement" is 
though misleading: the conservative concept of citizenship is not concerned 
with increased participation, community power or democrat ization, but with 
voluntary work, social order and the depoliticization of local communities. 
Chris Patten's advocacy of the social market is a departure from the 
individualism of the Thatcher years, stressing rather than frowning upon 
themes of social solidarity, economic partnership and a socially-responsible 
market (C. Patten, 1991). 
The Conservative interest in citizenship and community is a welcome 
move away from the individualist ethos of the Thatcher era, but as yet its 
rhetorical commitments to local communities and entitlement have not been 
matched by substative government action. The traditional conservative view 
of man as subject rather than citizen has not been abandoned: the Major 
government is not encouraging the politicization of relations between 
individual, local community and state. Instead it aims to construct competing 
centres of loyalty, bridging the gap between individual and state: a laudable 
vision, but local control of schools, neighbourhood watch schemes and the 
redress of grievances against public services is unlikely to restore a 
sense of communal loyalty to Britain's decaying cities. The rhetoric of 
responsible private industry has not prevented the newly- privatized 
utilities from raising prices and the wages of their chief executives. 
Conservative citizenship does not have the commitment to social, economic 
and democratic rights present in Left-liberal accounts. 7 Without a real 
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commitment to a more socially-responsible market economy, active citizenship 
will only half-heartedly address the alienation of significant sectors of 
society. 
The post- Thatcherite conservative nation should seek to complement a 
commitment to active citizenship with the fostering of a patriotism 
tailored to meet the demands of a plural society. Atavistic nationalisms and 
myths of empire or British isolation must be sacrificed - the latter being 
the only positive message to come from Powell ism. Conservative scepticism 
dictates that the search for community should not become an all-embracing 
philosophy, but must be part of a gradual realignment of society, reflecting 
empirical realities. The cultural conservatives quest for cultural 
homogeneity and common moral purpose is thus an example of the worst 
excesses of rationalist projects. A return to the style of depoliticized 
patriotism advocated by Baldwin or Oakeshott is the necessary counterpart 
of conservatism's search for community, which itself should be constructed 
along the Burkean lines of affinity with the "little platoons". The focus on 
the British political and institutional traditions of constitutionalism and 
the rule of law found in political accounts of the nation provides a basis 
for patriotic allegiance. L' This political account must though be coupled 
with a recognition of man's membership of a historical, cultural community 
in which his identity and perceptions are shaped. 
One of the most difficult problems for conservatives is adapting the 
conservative nation to the plural society. Though one nation conservatism 
urges unity and harmony, its values are still those of an Anglo-British 
political culture. Historically, British conservatives have found it easier to 
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disguise and overcome class divisions than they have ethnic ones. What is 
required is a reassertion of the conservative nation's civic-ethnic mix, 
taking into account the valuable historical traditions of British society, 
but accepting ethnic diversity within a framework of patriotic allegiance. 
Thatcherism demanded the abandonment of lifestyles deemed incompatible 
with the "British way of lifell. Post-Thatcherite conservatism should work for 
a society in which all its members, of whichever ethnic group, share a sense 
of belonging and a common idea of a Britain where racial discrimination and 
disdvantage are more effectively tackled. The encouragement of loyalty to the 
Elittle platoons" will faster tolerance of ethnic minorities, while the 
construction of a depoliticized civic-ethnic patriotism based on common 
institutions and active citizenship can help to ensure that the nation is 
the arena in which values of community and identity can be realized. 
A Conservative Party national strategy comes into being when its key 
figures espouse a coherent concept of the nation and use this when 
developing policy responses in relevant policy areas (eg foreign policy, 
social and territorial integration) -Thatcherism rejected the "one nation" 
and Powellite "nationalist" models, embarking instead on a redefinition 
of the nation drawing on neo-liberal and cultural conservative themes. 
The Thatcher governments revived Tory use of the language of 
nationhood but did not develop a fully-fledged national strategy 
because of doctrinal tensions and problems of issue management. 
The problems of constructing an intellectual Euro-sceptic response in a 
political climate shaped by Euro-enthusiasts are discussed in Jim 
Bulpitt: "Conservative Leaders and the 'Euro-Ratchet': Five Doses of 
Scepticism" in The Political Quarterly, vol. 63, no. 3,1992. pp. 258-275. 
Bulpitt concludes that, given the problems of constructing an anti- 
integrationist strategy or coal it ion, Euro-scept ics are left with the 
unappetizing option of waiting for the predicted contradictions of 
European Union to reveal themselves. 
3. My use of the term "Thatcherism" is a loose one. Thatcherism is not 
hegenonic in character, nor were the policies pursued by the Thatcher 
governments consistent over time or across policy areas. But the changes 
-329- 
in style, policy and doctrine associated with the Thatcher governments, 
and its move away from the traditional conservative nation or national 
strategies justifies the use of the term. It is still too early to 
categorically state whether Major's premiership is a continuation or 
rebuttal of Thatcherism, though I suspect that Thatcher herself is right 
in saying that "there is no such thing as Majorism". 
4. on communitarian thought see also Chapter Nine of Raymond Plant: 
Nodern Political TbouS-bt. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991 and H. N. Hirsch: 
"The Threnody of Liberal ism: Const itutional. Liberty and the Renewal of 
Community" in Political Tbeory, vol. 14, no. 3,1988. pp. 423-449. 
Villetts model of a conservatism embracing ideas of community and 
market is undermined by conceptual weaknesses. He appeals to the Burkean 
idea of a society of "little platoons", yet criticizes Burke for a I'macro- 
conservatism" which emphasizes the nation at the expense of other 
communities (p. 105). He also claims that Thatcherism followed this dual 
course, despite obvious differences between his account and the 
Thatcherite vision. 
6. See The 'No Turning Back' Group: Choice and Responsibility: The Enabling 
State. Conservative Political Centre, London, 1990 and Michael Partillo: A 
Vision for the 1990s. Conservative Political Centre, London, 1992. 
7. On Left-liberal accounts of citizenship and community see Stuart Hall & 
David Held: "Left and Rights" in Narxism Today, vol. 33, no. 6,1989. pp. 16- 
22. Raymond Plant: "Citizenship, Empowerment and Welfare" plus David 
Xarquand: "A Language of Community" both in Ben Pimlott et al: The 
A1 terma ti ve. -Poll tics For A Cbange. W. H. Allen, London, 1990. Tony Blair: 
"Drawing on an Inner Strength" in The Guardian, 30th June 1992. 
8. Influenced by Ernest Renan, Spanish conservative theorist Jose Ortega Y 
Gasset looks to the nation as a political community in which a people, 
linked by a shared past and common territory, come together to build a 
common future. See Ortega Y Gasset: The Revolt of the Masses. George 
Allen Unwin, Landon, 1961. 
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